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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE USE OF A/B TESTING AMONG E-COMMERCE
PRACTITIONERS
Alex P. Miller
Kartik Hosanagar
Randomized experiments—often called A/B tests in industrial settings—are an increasingly
important element in the management of many organizations. While some ﬁrms have
long had both the managerial and technical know-how to use experiments for making key
decisions, new forms of software and internet infrastructure have dramatically lowered the
cost of conducting A/B tests online, opening up the practice to an entirely new set of
organizations. This dissertation studies the practice of A/B testing among this new wave
of practitioners, characterized primarily as e-commerce businesses that have adopted new
forms of low cost, easy to use, third-party experimentation software. The ﬁrst two chapters
of this document study A/B testing as its own distinct phenomena in digital business,
answering questions about the prevalence of p-hacking among e-commerce practitioners
and the nature of how ﬁrms use A/B testing software in the real world. The ﬁnal chapter
demonstrates how e-commerce ﬁrms can use A/B tests and recent developments in causal
machine learning for improved customer targeting and price discrimination. As a whole,
this work demonstrates the growing importance of A/B testing and causal reasoning as a
key factor in the future of managerial decision making.
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PREFACE
Background
In the past twenty years, e-commerce sales have grown from less than 1% of total retail sales
in the United States to more than 14%, representing an annual market of nearly $800 billion
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2021).1 This signiﬁcant and ongoing shift of our economy toward
internet retailing of all sorts has required e-commerce ﬁrms to invent business models,
processes, and strategies that would have been impossible in traditional retail. And while
early movers in online retail have been massively rewarded, our economy is moving into a
phase in which digital business is the default form of business for companies of all sizes:
Almost any company that sells something can sell something online.
This transformation has been accelerated by the development of layers of information technology infrastructure that have opened up new forms of economic opportunity to more
businesses. Cloud computing infrastructure dramatically increased the number of people
who can host a website on the internet; online e-commerce engines make it simple to run
a functioning online storefront. And in recent years, a number of services and companies
have emerged at the top layer of internet infrastructure that allow for entirely novel forms
of data analytics, marketing strategies, and customer interactivity. Among the novel forms
of marketing activity allowed by the internet—and a key focus of this dissertation—is socalled “A/B testing”, a phrase that has come to signify the use of randomized controlled
experiments in industrial contexts.
Randomized controlled trials have a special place in the history of science and are often
referred to as the “gold standard” of causal inference and statistical epistemology. The
ability to precisely measure and quantify uncertainty about the causal eﬀect of an intervention has proven to be extremely valuable in a number of scientiﬁc domains. Academic
scientists have long used experiments in the process of developing and testing scientiﬁc
1

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “E-commerce sales are sales of goods and services
where the buyer places an order, or the price and terms of the sale are negotiated over an Internet”.
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theories; but an important development over the last century has been the instrumentalization of controlled experimentation as an industrial decision making tool. Indeed, the
foundational work on modern experimental design by R.A. Fisher (Fisher, 1928, 1937) was
motivated by the problem of selecting potato varieties that best responded to fertilization
for the purposes of increasing crop yield (Box, 1980).2 This work led to a revolution in how
stakeholders across a number of disciplines — including biomedicine, public policy, and
philanthropy, among others — make consequential decisions (Bothwell and Podolsky, 2016;
Hamermesh, 2013; Sanders and Halpern, 2014; Kleven, 2018; Bellemare and Bloem, 2017).
Scholars in other disciplines such as entrepreneurship and corporate strategy, criminology,
and international law have all advocated for using experiments more prominently as tools
for evaluating competing strategies or policies (Hsu et al., 2017; Chatterji et al., 2016; Berk,
2005; Chilton and Tingley, 2013).
The emergence of “A/B testing” as an application of randomized experimentation in marketing and digital business has been facilitated by the larger shift in managerial science
towards data driven decision making and analytics (McAfee et al., 2012; Brynjolfsson et al.,
2011; Brynjolfsson and McElheran, 2016). While not exclusive to the internet, adoption of
A/B testing has grown signiﬁcantly among e-commerce companies, whose entire customer
experience is delivered digitally—whether through the world wide web or dedicated device
applications. At its core, controlled experimentation requires three components: (1) an
intervention to test against the status quo (or two interventions to compare against each
other), (2) the ability to randomize the implementation of the intervention(s) among a
target population, and (3) the ability to precisely observe the consequences of the intervention(s) measured by some metrics that are relevant for decision making. Relative to prior
forms of commerce, digital businesses face lower marginal costs along each of these dimensions. This is particularly true now that an ecosystem of infrastructure and software services
have emerged that are speciﬁcally designed to facilitate experimentation, measurement, and
2

While some forms of experiment were conducted before Fisher, his systematic method for conducting and
measuring the results of an experiment allowed for it to inﬂuence a signiﬁcant portion of modern statistics
(Yates, 1964).
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statistical computing for online businesses.
The rise of A/B testing online and the growing use of experiments in business generally has been met with a commensurate surge in methodological research. Owing to its
speed, scale, and complexity, digital experimentation for managerial decision making is a
distinct phenomenon from traditional, scientiﬁc experimentation for the purposes of theoretical insight. As such, researchers from both academia and industry are contributing
to a growing body of work that aims to adjust for and exploit the novel features of the
digital economy (Wager and Athey, 2017; Liu and Chamberlain, 2018; Kohavi et al., 2013;
Taddy et al., 2016; McFowland III et al., 2019; Azevedo et al., 2018). However, much of this
work has been motivated by problems faced by the largest players in the digital economy.
Firms such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Facebook have long had both the ability
to conduct experiments using custom-built infrastructure and the budget to fund research
related to challenges in A/B testing. But as the digital economy matures, A/B testing is
steadily growing into a standard business practice among the long-tail of internet-enabled
businesses (Koning et al., 2019). As such, there is a growing need for research on A/B testing as a distinct phenomenon that is widely practiced in the digital economy at large. As
more ﬁrms implement experimentation practices of their own, there is a unique opportunity
to answer questions about how A/B testing is being used among this population and how
managers might use it more eﬃciently.

Dissertation outline
This discussion motivates the topic of the current dissertation, in which I set out to study,
better understand, and improve the ways that A/B testing is used as a decision making
tool by real-world practitioners. Among the questions I investigate in this project are:
• How much of the “replication crisis” plaguing academic science is relevant for industrial
practitioners, particularly those in the e-commerce space?
• What do we know about how existing e-commerce practitioners use A/B tests in their
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businesses?
• Are there any insights related to marketing or web-design that can be learned from
cross-sectional analysis of many ﬁrms’ A/B testing data?
• What are concrete ways that ﬁrms can use A/B testing and recent developments in
causal machine learning for improved proﬁtability?
• How can A/B testing be used for online price discrimination? What are the implications for e-commerce managers and policymakers?
As a core part of the research associated with this dissertation, I have gathered a large
dataset of more than 2,700 A/B tests conducted by upwards of 250 e-commerce companies
over the course of three years. This data was provided by a software-as-a-service platform
that, on an annual basis across all of its customers, observes over 100 billion pageviews
with total transaction revenue approaching one-third of all e-commerce dollars spent in the
United States. As such, the data from this platform—while by no means exhaustive or
universal—provides a unique vantage point from which to study the use of A/B testing in
the U.S. economy.
In this dissertation, I use this dataset to study the practice of A/B testing from several perspectives in three separate projects, which comprise the main chapters of this document. In
the ﬁrst project, I set out to investigate the extent to which e-commerce ﬁrms engage in “phacking”, an incorrect (but widely presumed common) way of using the statistical outcomes
reported by testing platforms. In the second project, I provide a thorough description of the
types of experiments that e-commerce ﬁrms run and conduct a cross-sectional analysis to
arrive at several empirical insights about customer behavior in the e-commerce conversion
funnel. In the ﬁnal project—building on recent developments in the literature on the use of
machine learning for causal inference—I propose a technique and estimation algorithm that
describes how online retail ﬁrms can use A/B tests to deploy an optimal discount targeting
strategy. I estimate the eﬃcacy of my proposed techniques on two experiments from my
xii

dataset and discuss important managerial and policy-related issues around the potential of
these methods for price discrimination.
The background, motivation, methodologies, ﬁndings, and conclusions of each of these
projects are contained in separate chapters of this dissertation. A summary of the core
ﬁndings from each project are provided below:

Chapter 1: An investigation of p-hacking in e-commerce A/B testing
Randomized experiments—often called A/B tests in industrial settings—are an increasingly
important element in the management of many organizations. Such experiments are meant
to bring the beneﬁts of scientiﬁc rigor and statistical measurement to the domain of managerial decisions. But just as this practice is starting to reach widespread adoption, the
problem of p-hacking—by which experimenters try several statistical analyses until they
ﬁnd one that produces a suﬃciently small p-value—has emerged as a prevalent concern
among statisticians, industrial practitioners, and the scientiﬁc community at large. In A/B
testing in particular, experimenters have the ability to watch their data arrive in real time
and either stop experiments when, or gather additional data until, a test’s p-value reaches
a given threshold of statistical signiﬁcance. Such behavior, which is known to inﬂate false
discoveries, can dilute the value of A/B testing for data driven decision making and give
managers false impressions about the eﬃcacy of their interventions. In this paper, we attempt to study the prevalence of this form of p-hacking in a sample of 2,518 experiments
from 232 e-commerce ﬁrms conducted on a large A/B testing platform. Applying both
existing statistical techniques and a newly-proposed approach with improved robustness to
nuisance parameters, we ﬁnd little to no evidence for p-hacking in our sample of experiments. We use counterfactual simulations to determine that if a modest eﬀect of p-hacking
were present in our dataset, our methods would have high levels of power to detect it at
our current sample size. In addition to outlining a robust method for detecting p-hacking
in similar datasets, this project serves as a valuable data point in an increasingly important
xiii

discussion on how managers and marketers use data and statistics for strategic decision
making.

Chapter 2: An empirical meta-analysis of e-commerce A/B testing strategies
In this project, we attempt to provide a rigorous, empirical study of e-commerce A/B testing
strategies. We perform a meta-analysis on 2,732 A/B tests conducted by 252 e-commerce
companies across seven industries over the course of three years. While there is much interest in the ﬁeld of digital experimentation generally, little is known empirically about the
testing strategies of ﬁrms in real-world environments and how these strategies are related to
business outcomes. Our dataset gives us unique insight into what ﬁrms are experimenting
with on their websites and which of these strategies are associated with larger experimental
eﬀect sizes. We develop a framework for quantifying the eﬀect of two diﬀerent experimental
factors on an intervention’s ultimate eﬀect size: the type (or content) of an experiment and
its location within a website’s conversion funnel. After providing a descriptive analysis of
A/B testing practices among the ﬁrms in our sample, we exploit the metadata in our dataset
to classify the experimental interventions using this framework. We ﬁnd that experiments
involving price promotions and those targeted on category or product listing pages are associated with the largest eﬀect sizes, relative to other experiment types in our sample. We
then attempt to identify heterogeneity in the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent types of interventions
at diﬀerent stages of the conversion funnel. We ﬁnd evidence that consumers’ response to
diﬀerent types of promotions depends on where those promotions are targeted within a website’s architecture. In particular, we ﬁnd that promotional interventions on product prices
are most eﬀective early in the conversion funnel, whereas shipping-related promotions are
most eﬀective late in the conversion funnel (on product and checkout pages). As a unique,
large-scale, cross-ﬁrm meta-analysis of empirical experimentation practices, this project not
only provides practical insight for managers, but also makes a theoretical contribution to the
e-commerce literature by documenting and quantifying how multiple dimensions of website

xiv

design shape online shopping behavior.

Chapter 3: Personalized discount targeting in online retail with technographic trace data
In this project, we investigate the potential of using technographic data—user characteristics revealed in the metadata of standard web communication protocols—for the targeting
of promotional discounts to online shoppers. While researchers have historically emphasized the importance of purchase history and behavioral data for promotional targeting,
such data is typically unavailable about most visitors to online storefronts. Digital trace
data, on the other hand, has the potential to be used in targeted promotional campaigns,
even for individuals with whom a ﬁrm may have no prior relationship. The value of this
data, however, has yet to be empirically investigated in this context. To do so, we develop
a novel framework that identiﬁes the optimal targeting policy for a ﬂexible set of discount
campaigns. We demonstrate how to use machine learning methods and data from an online
experiment to estimate this policy and apply our techniques to data from two promotional
campaigns at separate online retailers. Using counterfactual policy evaluation, we ﬁnd (1)
our proposed methodology outperforms both a non-targeted baseline and standard benchmark techniques in targeted marketing, and (2) that technographic trace data can be used as
an eﬀective means of price discrimination in online retail. We estimate the increases in proﬁt
possible using these methods to be on the order of 3%-6%—equal to thousands of dollars
of incremental value over the course of the studied promotional campaigns. By empirically
quantifying the value of this data for price discrimination, this project adds valuable insight
to the growing discussion about the use of personalization technologies for price-related
interventions on the web, with implications for e-commerce managers, consumer advocates,
and policymakers.
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CHAPTER 1
AN INVESTIGATION OF P -HACKING IN E-COMMERCE A/B
TESTING
1.1. Introduction
1.1.1. Experimentation and A/B testing
In the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, an industrial researcher named Ronald Fisher published
several books that would go on to be some of the most inﬂuential works in all of statistical
science. By advocating for the use of p-values and signiﬁcance testing, these works systematized and popularized the use of experiments for instrumental purposes. Over time, Fisher’s
statistical methods—in particular his emphasis on randomization—have come to revolutionize how stakeholders across a number of disciplines make consequential decisions (Kohavi,
2019; Bothwell and Podolsky, 2016; Hamermesh, 2013; Sanders and Halpern, 2014; Kleven,
2018; Bellemare and Bloem, 2017).3
As the practice of data driven decision making and analytics gained prominence over the last
several decades (McAfee et al., 2012; Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; Brynjolfsson and McElheran,
2016), the use of Fisherian experiments for strategic decisions have become much more
common. This is particularly true in digital business, where the marginal cost of both
service innovation and delivery is relatively low (Mitchell et al., 2003). Dozens of softwareas-a-serivce (SaaS) platforms have launched in recent years that enable ﬁrms to run
experiments on their websites and apps, sometimes at no cost (Gartner, 2019; BuiltWith,
2019). A growing body of research on digital experimentation—now widely known as
“A/B testing” among software, marketing, and e-commerce companies—has emerged in
recent years, including work from academics in many ﬁelds such as economics, computer
science, statistics, information systems and marketing (Liu and Chamberlain, 2018;
3

The practice of using randomization in experimental design dates back to least to the work of 19th
century psychologists (Peirce and Jastrow, 1884), though this early work lacked the statistical rigor and
precision of Fisher’s work, limiting its broader inﬂuence (Hacking, 1988; Yates, 1964)

1

Kohavi et al., 2013; Azevedo et al., 2018). In industrial contexts, A/B testing has emerged
as a key component of the corporate innovation process, allowing ﬁrms to statistically
compare competing strategies about product-market ﬁt, pricing, messaging, targeting,
and user experience. Several studies have documented the use of A/B testing for these
strategic purposes among large enterprises, online merchants, and technology startups
(Koning et al., 2019; Kohavi and Longbotham, 2017; Miller and Hosanagar, 2018). While
the largest technology companies have used online experiments for years, the use of A/B
testing is growing dramatically among ﬁrms of all types. This can be seen in the results of
a 2018 survey of more than 200 companies with at least $500 million in annual revenue, in
which 74% of respondents indicated they either already use or plan to use A/B testing in
the near future (Virzi, 2018).
1.1.2. Growing concerns around p-hacking
Just as randomized experimentation has proliferated outside of the traditional domains of
academic science and medicine, there has been a renewed interest in the downsides of common statistical procedures for analyzing experimental results. Much of this research focuses
on the shortcomings of null hypothesis signiﬁcance testing (NHST) and its emphasis on pvalues, which has been the dominant paradigm for conducting statistical tests in academic
science for decades, due largely to the original inﬂuence of Ronald Fisher (Huberty, 1993).4
It has long been known that published scientiﬁc research based on signiﬁcance testing is
likely ﬁlled with many (if not a majority of) false positive results due, in part, to a selection
eﬀect induced by the peer-review and publication process (Rosenthal, 1979; Ioannidis, 2005;
Franco et al., 2016). However, in addition to this passive selection eﬀect present in the reporting of experimental results, more recent studies have highlighted how ﬂexibility in the
design and analysis of experimental results can dramatically inﬂate empirical false discovery
rates (Simmons et al., 2011; Gelman and Loken, 2013). This phenomenon by which analysts
4

See Schneider (2015) for a discussion on the origin of the modern, commonly-used practice of NHST and
its relationship to the foundational statistical methods developed by Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson. Also see
Leahey (2005), who documents how the adoption of statistical reporting practices among prestigious editors
and institutions led to the proliferation of signiﬁcance testing in social science.

2

change their data sampling procedures or statistical techniques to obtain “signiﬁcant” results
has come to be known as “p-hacking” (Simmons et al., 2013). Concern about the prevalence
of both publication bias and p-hacking in many areas of academia—including psychology,
economics, and biostatistics—has led some scholars to characterize the current state of scientiﬁc inquiry as being in the midst of an epistemological “crisis” (Dreber and Johannesson,
2019; Dougherty, 2008; Earp and Traﬁmow, 2015; Gelman and Loken, 2016).
Despite this crisis, NHST and p-values have come to predominate much of the statistical
software used throughout the A/B testing industry. A particularly pernicious form of phacking enabled by the use of NHST in digital experimentation is the practice of continuous
monitoring, whereby experimenters regularly check a test’s p-value and only end an experiment when a suﬃciently small (“statistically signiﬁcant”) value is obtained. Many testing
platforms will explicitly highlight when an experiment’s p-value dips below the conventional
signiﬁcance level of 5%, with some going so far as to notify their users when this threshold
is met. Many practitioners are aware of the pitfalls of continuous monitoring in online
experiments, encouraging the use of sample size calculators or Bayesian methods in place
of classical NHST (Miller, 2010; Borden, 2014; Draper, 2016). At larger organizations, a
signiﬁcant amount of resources has been allocated to the problem of developing valid statistical methods that are robust to continuous monitoring. While research on related problems
dates back to at least Wald (1945), methods for dealing with continuous monitoring in A/B
testing continues to be an active area of industrial research. Microsoft, Walmart, Twitter,
AirBnb, Uber, and Optimizely have all published recent work on the topic (Deng et al.,
2016; Lu, 2016; Overgoor, 2014; Abhishek and Mannor, 2017; Feng, 2017; Pekelis et al.,
2015).
However, the rise of low-cost A/B testing platforms has dramatically increased the ability of ﬁrms of all sizes to run experiments—particularly those without the know-how to
develop the technology required to run digital experiments or the statistical expertise to
analyze their results. As such, many ﬁrms that have adopted A/B testing software in re-
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cent years might not be aware of problems around p-hacking; instead, they rely on testing
platforms for cues on how to interpret the statistics associated with online experiments.
While some companies are aware of issues around p-hacking, many experimentation platforms and internal testing tools continue to employ classical statistical testing paradigms
based on simple frequentist p-values. Given that academic researchers, often with doctoral
degrees and graduate training in statistics, have been known to engage in p-hacking behavior (Head et al., 2015; Masicampo and Lalande, 2012; Leggett et al., 2013; Hartgerink,
2017; Perneger and Combescure, 2017), it is reasonable to ask whether analysts in corporate
environments, using similar statistical techniques make similar methodological errors.
Answering this question can have far-reaching implications for both how researchers and
managers understand the value of A/B testing and statistical methodologies in industrial
contexts. If p-hacking behavior is indeed a widespread phenomenon, many ﬁrms would
be justiﬁed in reevaluating the way they use experiments for business decisions. On the
other hand, if p-hacking is less common in industrial settings than academic settings, this
would be an interesting result in multiple regards. First, such a result would suggest that
the use of digital experiments in real-world settings may not be as fraught with error as
the existing literature on the subject might suggest. This may increase the conﬁdence
that managers and executives have about the use of statistics and A/B testing for making
business decisions more generally. Further, if p-hacking is absent in the industrial context,
this would put in stark contrast the ubiquity of p-hacking in academic science, potentially
highlighting the need for more research that demonstrates precisely how incentives drive
p-hacking behavior and in which settings it is most likely to occur. In either case, we
argue there is both scientiﬁc and managerial interest in a credible empirical analysis on the
incidence of p-hacking on digital testing platforms.
This discussion motivates the current project, in which we set out to investigate the prevalence of p-hacking behavior on a large A/B testing platform. We proceed by conducting
an analysis on the distribution of p-values from a large sample of A/B tests conducted
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by e-commerce merchants. Our analysis will exploit the fact that, if experimenters do
consistently stop their tests right when their p-values reach 0.05, or gather extra data for
experiments that have yet to reach this value, we would expect to see a jump in the number
of p-values observed right below this threshold. To detect this eﬀect, we use both existing
statistical techniques for detecting such discontinuities and also develop a new method that
is more robust to nuisance parameters than existing approaches found in related literature.
We apply these techniques to the distribution of p-values from 2,518 experiments conducted
by 232 ﬁrms and ﬁnd little to no evidence for the incidence of p-hacking in our dataset.
While it is not strictly possible to prove a null hypothesis, this does not mean our ﬁndings
are uninformative about p-hacking behavior among e-commerce companies (Abadie, 2018).
In addition to demonstrating the robustness of our null result across many speciﬁcations,
we also use counterfactual simulations to demonstrate that, if a modest eﬀect of p-hacking
did exist, our statistical methodology would have the power to detect it at our current
sample size. Despite ﬁnding a null result, this research makes a valuable contribution by
presenting both robust approach to estimating discontinuities in p-value distributions and
credible empirical evidence about how real-world ﬁrms use and deploy statistical tools for
managerial decision making.

1.2. Background & Motivation
To motivate the research questions addressed in this article, we ﬁrst discuss why ﬁrms run
experiments and exactly what role A/B tests typically play within an organization. We
then explore the role of A/B testing at e-commerce companies in particular, which is the
context we study here. We conclude this section by addressing how these factors are relevant
for studying the subject of p-hacking among companies in this space and develop several
hypotheses about the motivations and incentives of experimenters that could be driving
their behavior in regards to statistical rigor.
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1.2.1. Primer on A/B testing
Why do ﬁrms run experiments?. In line with the rapid adoption of data-driven
decision making by ﬁrms across many public and industrial sectors in recent decades
(Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; LaValle et al., 2011; Brynjolfsson and McElheran, 2016), A/B
testing has grown in popularity as a management practice among organizations of all
types. From an epistemological perspective, given that basic statistical criteria are met,
A/B tests oﬀer decision makers unparalleled eﬀectiveness for obtaining unbiased estimates
of the causal eﬀect of making one decision over another (Rubin, 2008).

Due to its

putative objectivity, experimentation has been explicitly advocated for as a means for
moving beyond subjective opinions and to ensure that diﬃcult decisions are not merely
driven by the loudest or most senior voices on a team (Kohavi et al., 2007). Of course,
managers make many decisions without the aid of randomized experiments, and even
when an experiment is technically possible, there are numerous potential practical and
ethical reasons why a decision maker may proceed without the rigor of experimentation
(Kaptchuk, 2001; Mislavsky et al., 2019). However, due to the rise of the internet and
ubiquity of information technology in the modern economy, managers increasingly ﬁnd
themselves making decisions in contexts where experimentation is not only possible, but
also cheap, easy, and informative.
In its most generic form, A/B testing is useful when a manager faces a decision with a
clearly identiﬁed set of two (or possibly more) options. If the manager has a set of quantiﬁable metrics on which they are basing their decision, an A/B test can be used to estimate the causal eﬀect on these metrics of choosing one option over another. Exactly what
these options are and which metrics are relevant to the decision depend on the context
in question. Existing literature has documented the use of A/B testing by large technology companies (Kevic et al., 2017; Kohavi et al., 2009; Azevedo et al., 2018), software
start-ups (Koning et al., 2019), digital media outlets (Matias et al., 2021; Deniz, 2021),
and consumer retailers (Siroker and Koomen, 2013). Within these organizations, A/B test-
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ing is known to be used in the functional roles of product innovation and market testing
(Hampel et al., 2020), user interface design (King et al., 2017), marketing and promotion
(Nelson et al., 2020; Feit and Berman, 2019; Miller and Hosanagar, 2020), and software engineering (Spinellis, 2017; Gupta et al., 2019). Commonly cited examples of decisions that
get made with the aid of A/B tests include the design of visual and interactive elements on
a web page, the selection of article headlines, the language used for call-to-action elements,
and the algorithms used for recommendation systems (Gallo, 2017; Netﬂix, 2016).
Thinking more closely about the motivation of decision makers who run experiments in these
roles, there is likely heterogeneity in their preference for ﬁnding null vs. non-null (“significant”) eﬀects in an A/B test. For example, software engineers may be more likely to run
“non-inferority” tests to ensure that newly developed features or functionality do not signiﬁcantly degrade user experience and application performance (D’Agostino Sr et al., 2003;
Kohavi and Thomke, 2017). On the other hand, marketers and user experience designers
are often interested in explicitly improving performance on key metrics, such as user retention, click-through rate, purchase rate, or revenue. Indeed, A/B testing is used extensively
in digital marketing for “conversion rate optimzation” and “landing page optimization”
(Goward, 2012; Cotton, 2020). The goal of these practices is to continuously and iteratively
increase the proportion of customers or website users that take a desired action, such as
making a purchase, signing up for a mailing list, or creating an account. In these contexts, the objective of ﬁnding improvements through experimentation is explicit, suggesting
that—at least when hypothesis testing is used for detecting such improvements—decision
makers are primarily interested in ﬁnding non-trivial, “signiﬁcant” eﬀects.
Evolution of A/B testing and the role of experimentation platforms. Prior to the modern
IT revolution, A/B testing was an ad hoc procedure that was largely practiced within isolated teams for specialized purposes. There is both academic and practitioner-oriented work
that documents the use of random experimentation in advertising, sales, and direct mail
campaigns at large enterprises (Chickering and Heckerman, 2013; Ganzach and Karsahi,
1995; Warwick, 2003). However, as much of the economy became digitized throughout the
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early 2000s, the costs associated with implementing, measuring, and analyzing experiments
dropped signiﬁcantly. It was around this time that large organizations such as Google
and Microsoft started developing standardized software tools and organizational practices
around A/B testing, which ultimately ended up being core to how many decisions at these
companies got made (Tang et al., 2010a; Kohavi and Thomke, 2017). As legacy enterprises
started adapting to the information economy and new digital-native companies emerged, the
capital developed by these successful IT companies—both human and technological—began
to inﬂuence organizational practices in the economy at large (Tambe and Hitt, 2014).
Within these broader shifts in the economy, the diﬀusion of A/B testing speciﬁcally was
enabled by new platforms that began to oﬀer “experimentation-as-a-service”. Around the
turn of the 2010s, a number of these platforms emerged as both additional products oﬀered
by existing software companies (e.g., Google Optimize, Microsoft Azure, Adobe Test &
Target, Mixpanel, HubSpot) and independent start-ups focused on A/B testing as key value
proposition (e.g., Optimizely, Visual Website Optimizer, AB Tasty, Experiment.ly, Split
Optimizer). In addition to handling technical challenges with digital experimentation—
such as user allocation, behavior tracking, and statistical reporting—a key component to
the commercial success of these platforms was their interactive “WYSIWYG” (what you
see is what you get) website editors. By installing a simple script on one’s website, these
editors allowed non-technical users to use a simple point-and-click interface to change the
text, colors, imagery, content arrangement, and other visual characteristics of a website,
without having to know programming languages like HTML and CSS. This dramatically
lowered the cost of developing new website variations for non-engineering teams, which was
a key step in facilitating the spread of A/B testing across and within organizations of all
sizes (Christian, 2012a).
With the combined inﬂuence of successful tech companies that were known for relying on
digital experiments and the marketing eﬀorts of these new testing-focused platforms, A/B
testing has since developed over the past decade into a well-established practice in the
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Figure 1.1: Examples of WYSIWYG editors used to create variations in A/B testing
software

management of many types of organizations (Christian, 2012b). Many executives, managers, consultants, and academics now recognize A/B testing as a critical tool in modern
managerial decision making (Thomke, 2020).
A/B testing in e-commerce. These developments have been particularly relevant to managers of retail e-commerce companies, deﬁned here as ﬁrms who sell retail goods and services
to individual consumers on the internet. Such managers face many decision problems for
which A/B testing can be exceptionally helpful: interface design, marketing messaging,
promotional strategies, product placements, and algorithmic recommendations can all have
dramatic eﬀects on consumer behavior. And, in contrast to other sectors that have to contend with complex statistical estimation issues (such as long sales cycles in enterprise software, or network interference in social media, Xu et al. 2015), classical conditions required
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for causal inference in experimental settings are typically satisﬁed in e-commerce settings
by simply randomizing individual users in an experiment and measuring their short-term
response. It further helps that, in e-commerce, the key indicators of consumer behavior
that managers are primarily interested in include easily quantiﬁable metrics that can be
measured within a single website session, such as purchase incidence and revenue. These
conditions, combined with the development of low-cost, user-friendly experimentation tools,
has led to the rapid adoption of A/B testing among e-commerce companies.
Notably, managers of online retail stores are likely to have backgrounds that are quite
diﬀerent from the earliest adopters of A/B testing practices. Those who contributed to the
development of internal A/B testing software at large technology companies, or who ﬁrst
pushed for the adoption of experimentation tools within other ﬁrms, are likely to have had
speciﬁc expertise in engineering or statistics and analytics. However, managers of online
retail companies may have earned their positions due to skills in other domains, such as brick
and mortar retail, trend forecasting and fashion, marketing, or supply chain operations.
Relative to their tech-industry counterparts, these managers are more likely to learn about
website development, statistics, and A/B testing in an ad hoc way throughout the course of
their job. And while this is precisely the audience that A/B testing platforms seek to serve
with their user-friendly tools, we believe the extent to which this lack of technical expertise
aﬀects the value of A/B testing and analytics software overall is an under-explored question
in existing academic literature and a key component of the motivation for the current
research project.
1.2.2. A/B testing interfaces
In the latter half of this paper, we will closely examine the behavior of e-commerce ﬁrms
that use a particular A/B testing platform. And while testing platforms in general all have
idiosyncrasies, there has been a remarkable amount of technological convergence in the A/B
testing industry, with a number of implicit standards that have come to be expected by
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users of testing software5 . Importantly, the platform studied in this project shares many
key features with other testing platforms, especially those pertaining to how experimental
results are calculated and reported. Reviewing these features will help with both motivating
the current research project and contextualizing our results within the broader A/B testing
industry.
An important challenge for developers of A/B testing tools, particularly given their goal
to reach non-technical users, has been deciding how to communicate quantitative results
and concepts around statistical uncertainty. Over time, a number of practices have become
standard among experimentation platforms. Essentially every testing tool allows users
to view basic analytics associated with each arm in a given experiment; this will typically
include the number of participants in each arm, along with key outcome metrics (also known
as “dependent variables” in more academic settings) relevant to the particular experimental
context. In many scenarios, this will include some form of “conversion rate”—the percentage
of users that took a desired action (e.g., button click, product purchase, account creation,
email list subscription). When they are relevant, other metrics can also be included in
a results dashboard, such as session length, pageviews, bounce rate, revenue, and load
time. It is also common, though not universal, for platforms to show time-series charts
of how various metrics have evolved over time. When it comes to directly comparing
the performance of each arm in an A/B test, standard practice is to display how each
experimental treatment diﬀers from a selected “baseline” or “control” treatment along the
metrics being measured. For each metric, it is common to report the measured eﬀect size
between each non-baseline treatment and the baseline treatment, sometimes described as the
“lift”, “change”, or “improvement”. Depending on the platform, this eﬀect size will either
be described in level terms (the mean diﬀerence of an outcome between treatment groups)
or in percentage terms (the percentage change in a treatment arm’s metric compared to the
baseline treatment). Another key feature of modern testing dashboards is that their results
5

How and why technologies tend to converge in this way is a well-studied phenomenon that is observed
in a number of sectors and industries (Borés et al., 2003; Hancock, 1996)
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update in real time, as soon as new participants enter an experiment and their actions are
observed. Various examples of this can clearly be seen in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Examples of industry dashboards used to report the results of A/B tests

Testing platforms use various methods for quantifying the statistical uncertainty around
the results of an experiment. Though it is by no means universal, by far the most common
paradigm seen in A/B testing software and instructional literature on the subject is based
on classical null hypothesis signiﬁcance testing. This is perhaps unsurprising given the
predominance of NHST throughout much of statistical science. Generally, there is no standard around exactly which test is used to calculate p-values, as there are many reasonable
choices for testing the diﬀerence between two proportions in the statistical literature: Z-test
of diﬀerence in means, two-sample binomial proportion test, χ2 -test of homogeneity, among
others. There are also diﬀering practices around whether one-sided or two-sided hypothesis
tests are used, whether ﬁnite sample corrections are accounted for, or if variances between
the two treatment populations is assumed to be equal or unequal.
Perhaps the simplest and most common method used by platforms is a two-sided Z-test
for testing the diﬀerence in sample means, where it is assumed that sample sizes are large
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enough to invoke the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) so that the test statistic is normally
distributed under the null hypothesis (Kohavi et al., 2009). In mathematical terms, the pvalue for this test can be calculated by assuming one observes both the number of conversions
(represented by ct ) and total number of users (nt ) in each of the treatment conditions of a
two-armed A/B test, where treatment is indicated by superscript t ∈ {a, b}. The observed
eﬀect size of an experiment (or lift) is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence in mean conversion
rates between the two treatment conditions:

Lift: µ̂ = cb /nb − ca /na
The empirically observed Z-score can then be computed by calculating the standard error
of the mean diﬀerence:

σ̂ =

p

p̂a (1 − p̂a )/na + p̂b (1 − p̂b )/nb

where p̂t = ct /nt

This standard error is then divided into the estimated mean, µ̂, to obtain the primary test
statistic of interest, Z := µ̂/σ̂.
To derive the p-value associated with this test, one must then compare this empirically
observed statistic, Z, to the theoretical distribution for this statistic under the null
hypothesis—i.e., the assumption that there is no diﬀerence in conversion rates between
treatment arms. We denote this theoretical test statistic (the null test statistic) as z, whose
distribution can be derived in closed form as the standard Gaussian (normal) distribution
using the CLT. The p-value of an experiment is then deﬁned as the theoretical probability
that the null test statistic, z, would be as large or larger than the empirically observed test
statistic, Z:


p-value := P z ≥ |Z| z ∼ Φ
= 2(1 − Φ(|Z|))
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Interestingly, almost no testing platform that relies on “p-values” of any kind describes them
as such. Instead, a very common practice in the industry is to show analysts a value equal
to (1 − p) × 100, and to use a term of art, such as “conﬁdence”, to signal how this number
is to be interpreted. For example, a test with a p-value of 0.13 will be shown to analysts as
“87% conﬁdence”. Other phrases in the industry used for this quantity include “statistical
signiﬁcance” level or even “chance to beat baseline”. These terms will often be deﬁned
more precisely in the language of null hypothesis signiﬁcance testing within a platform’s
documentation, though it is relatively common for even these more detailed explanations
to contain signiﬁcant errors about the proper interpretation of reported “conﬁdence” levels.
Independent of how testing platforms compute p-values or describe them to end-users,
another characteristic common to nearly all platforms is how they discretize statistical
uncertainty. This practice likely originated as a consequence of both the prominent use of
“signiﬁcance” thresholds throughout the history of academic science (e.g,. “p < 0.05”), as
well as managers’ inherent need to make binary “ship” or “don’t ship” decisions about the
interventions being tested on these platforms. The precise methods used for representing
the “conﬁdence” or “signiﬁcance” of a test result vary between diﬀerent platforms. Some
platforms translate diﬀerent results into multiple interpretable categories, such as “not
signiﬁcant”, “promising”, and “statistically signiﬁcant”, depending on how close a p-value
or “conﬁdence” level is to a speciﬁed signiﬁcance threshold; and diﬀerent platforms use
diﬀerent “conﬁdence” thresholds for discretization, such as 75%, 90%, 95%, and 99%.6
In many testing tools, the 95% threshold is given special prominence, with results that
reach this threshold being visually distinguished as having achieved some actionable result.
We have shown various examples of how some popular online A/B testing signiﬁcance
calculators represent the diﬀerence between results below and above this threshold in Figure
1.3.
It is worth noting that several A/B testing platforms eschew frequentist techniques in favor
6

For example, see the documentation for Klayvio, an e-commerce email marketing platform, at
https://perma.cc/HHN3-WMR6.
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Figure 1.3: How online A/B testing tools describe results that reach 95% “conﬁdence”

Notes: The images above are screenshots from popular online “signiﬁcance calculators”, which are commonly suggested to help ﬁrms understand results from an A/B test. In the ﬁrst column, we used each
tool to calculate the results of an imaginary experiment with 10,000 observations in each arm with 565
conversions observed in arm “A” and 570 conversions in arm “B”; in the second column, we decreased
the number of conversions in arm “A” to 500 and had the tool recalculate the test’s results. Sources are
as follows: (a) https://neilpatel.com/ab-testing-calculator/, (b) https://www.convertize.com/ab-testsigniﬁcance/, (c) https://abtestguide.com/calc/, (d) https://www.surveymonkey.com/mp/ab-testingsigniﬁcance-calculator/

of Bayesian approaches for quantifying statistical uncertainty.7 In their marketing materials
and documentation, these platforms make it a point to distinguish their approach from other
testing companies, citing the unintuitive nature of NHST, the potential for misinterpreting
the results of p-values, and the fact that analysts often want to “peek” or look at the results
of an experiment while it is unfolding (Michaeli, 2016; Pekelis et al., 2015). These concerns
are related to some of the core factors that motivate this project’s focus on the potential
for p-hacking on A/B testing platforms, which we explore in full detail below.
7

Some companies that are known for using Bayesian statistics in the reporting of their A/B test results
include Optimizely, Visual Website Optimizer, and Dynamic Yield.
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1.2.3. p-hacking in A/B testing
Potential for p-hacking and existing evidence. To motivate our research questions, we
highlight a few key factors from the preceding discussion on the A/B testing industry. First,
we emphasize that modern A/B testing tools are explicitly designed to allow non-experts to
run randomized experiments for decision-making purposes. While prior generations of A/B
testing practitioners may have had expertise in engineering or statistics, it is clear that in
industries like online retail and digital marketing, many individuals running experiments
may have little formal training in these areas.8 Next, we reiterate that the most common
paradigm used for reporting and interpreting the results of experiments in the A/B testing industry is based on simple hypothesis testing, where frequentist p-values—typically
converted into metrics described with simplistic misnomers such as “conﬁdence”—are used
as the primary indicator of statistical evidence. As the examples in Figure 1.3 demonstrate, experimenters are encouraged—through the use of visual cues such as color changes,
check marks, and special verbiage in the presentation of test results—to view tests with
“conﬁdence” above certain thresholds (e.g., 95%) as being “signiﬁcant”, “conclusive”, or
“actionable”; tests with “conﬁdence” levels below the relevant thresholds are labeled with
tags such as “pending”, “not enough data”, or “inconclusive”. Importantly, A/B testing
dashboards are frequently updated with real-time data throughout the course of an experiment, with “conﬁdence” levels being re-calculated after each batch update.
This combination of factors has led many practitioners and statisticians to highlight the
potential for p-hacking and false discovery in A/B testing (Miller, 2010; Goodson, 2014;
Labenz, 2019; Draper, 2016).9 The core statistical concern at the heart of this literature is
that, to maintain their nominal false positive rates, frequentist hypothesis tests are intended
to be calculated exactly once at the conclusion of a pre-speciﬁed data collection period.10
8
Some commentators have stated that these platforms were speciﬁcally “designed for the uninformed”
(Kohavi, 2018).
9
It was also around this time that similar issues around multiple comparisons and false positives emerged
as a prominent issue in several ﬁelds of applied academic science, including psychology, economics, and
biostatistics; some commentators explicitly use the academic discussion around p-hacking as motivation for
calling for better industrial practices (Walker, 2015).
10
In the original circumstances in which Ronald Fisher developed his theory of p-values, this assumption
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It has long been known analyzing simple p-value-based hypothesis tests at multiple points
throughout the data collection process can signiﬁcantly inﬂate an experiment’s false positive
rate (Anscombe, 1954); this problem, by which an analyst wishes to evaluate the results of
an ongoing statistical analysis while still controlling their false positive rate, is known as
“sequential testing” and dates back to Wald (1945). Indeed, practitioners in other contexts
such as medicine and psychology have been aware of the “calculate once” limitation inherent
to frequentist p-values for decades, and developed numerous statistical techniques that
allow for valid and robust sequential testing (Fiske and Jones, 1954; Pocock, 1977, 1982;
Armitage et al., 1969).
Despite this long stream of literature on the problem of sequential testing and its consequences on the interpretation of classical p-values, the extent to which real-world users of
A/B testing software are aware of these issues is very much unclear. There are numerous
examples of analysts that have documented the ways in which they or their clients speciﬁcally stopped or extended A/B tests based on whether or not the results were “statistically
signiﬁcant” (Borden, 2014; Sando, 2020; Laja, 2019; Flory, 2021). There are also examples of testing platforms themselves remarking that this behavior is common among their
customers (Johari et al., 2017; Kovanen, 2017). Further, there is a recent working paper
based on data from Optimizely (with co-authors that were at the time employed by the
platform) that claims to ﬁnd evidence for this type of p-hacking behavior among users of
that platform (Berman et al., 2018).
On the other hand, there are by now many blog posts, technical papers, and popular press
articles about the problem of p-hacking and its incarnation in the form of stopping A/B
tests in response to an experiment’s signiﬁcance level. Despite their use of design cues that
many practitioners believe encourage p-hacking behavior, most testing platforms do mention
somewhere in their product or documentation the importance of setting an experiment’s
was entirely reasonable. His analysis was primarily motivated by the problem of selecting potato varieties
that best responded to fertilization, a context in which results can only be observed at a discrete point in
time (after an entire season’s harvest). However, contrast this context with modern A/B testing, in which
experimental results accumulate over time and can be observed continuously and instantaneously.
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sample sizes prior to beginning a test (though the prominence of this information varies
dramatically). It is possible that most practitioners have internalized best practices around
stopping behavior and are able to avoid what was once a common pitfall. Though, the
fact that so many articles on A/B testing ﬁnd it pertinent to mention the problem of phacking through sample size ﬂexibility may itself be indicative of the prevalence of this
behavior among practitioners. One thing this discussion does make clear is that p-hacking
is a common concern among both users and developers of A/B testing software.
Incentives and behavioral factors around statistical rigor in A/B testing. While prior research has demonstrated the potential for p-hacking in digital experimentation and outlined
alternative methods for valid sequential testing, few researchers have explicitly addressed
the role of incentives and the potential behavioral motivations of practitioners that run digital experiments. We take this opportunity to discuss several factors that we hypothesize
might aﬀect whether or not industrial practitioners p-hack. First, consider the following
factors that might motivate p-hacking behavior in the context of A/B testing:
• Signiﬁcance testing is not intuitive and its goals are often misunderstood. Given that
many notions in classical frequentist statistics—signiﬁcance, p-values, conﬁdence intervals, and hypothesis testing—are not intuitive for many students (Hubbard, 2011;
Aquilonius and Brenner, 2015; Greenland et al., 2016), many researchers and practitioners misunderstand the goal of experimental analysis as achieving statistical signiﬁcance rather than recovering true model parameters (Ware and Munafò, 2015;
Szucs, 2016; McShane and Gal, 2016; White and Gorard, 2017). These misconceptions about how to conduct hypothesis tests and interpret their results can result in
a number of “questionable research practices” without full knowledge of how such
practices undermine statistical validity (Sijtsma, 2016; John et al., 2012). Analytic
ﬂexibility combined with a misunderstanding that induces a bias toward statistical
signiﬁcance—whether the bias is explicit or implicit—is well known to result in phacking, even among analysts with rational, well-incentivized, and benign intentions
(Carp, 2012; Gelman and Loken, 2013). An analyst using A/B testing software that
18

mistakenly believes the purpose of an experiment is to gather data until the result is
statistically signiﬁcant would unwittingly engage in p-hacking behavior.
• Misaligned incentives and moral hazard within the organization. An alternative explanation for p-hacking behavior is the presence of misaligned incentives. Recent work in
managerial science by Hall and Hasan (2020) and Ghosh et al. (2020) has speciﬁcally
highlighted how the adoption of A/B testing has the potential to interact adversely
with the conﬂicting incentives across diﬀerent layers of organizational structure, resulting in outcomes that can negatively aﬀect ﬁrm performance. As for how such
incentives may play into p-hacking behavior speciﬁcally, consider the role of principalagent dynamics between managers and employees or clients and marketing agencies
(Baker, 1992; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).11 In particular, if an analyst is rewarded in any way for ﬁnding “signiﬁcant” results—but veriﬁcation of these ﬁndings
is inherently costly for the principal—p-hacking may result as a consequence of this
incentive misalignment. As concrete a example, consider a marketing agency that is
hired by small ﬁrm for “conversion rate optimization”; if the agency is responsible
for setting up A/B tests, measuring their performance, and reporting results back to
the ﬁrm, it may be cheaper to cherry-pick and/or p-hack data from ineﬀective interventions, as opposed to developing new interventions that truly improve the client’s
conversion rate.12 Similar dynamics may also be at play within ﬁrms, say between
CEOs and their marketing teams. Stock and proﬁt-based compensation may mitigate
some of these issues, but such practices are by no means universal, leaving ample
room for the aforementioned dynamics to aﬀect analysts’ behavior.
• Misaligned incentives between testing platforms and their customers. Up to this point,
we have described various ways in which experimentation platforms treat tests that
11

Work by Spiess (2018) speciﬁcally discusses a principal-agent model of p-hacking-type behavior, though
in the academic rather than industrial context.
12
Again, to reiterate, none of this behavior need be intentional or deceitful. It may just be inherently costly
for an analyst to invest enough time to truly understand how to properly interpret p-values or to doubt results
from experiments that are likely false positives. As long as there is some degree of incentive misalignment,
p-hacking has the potential to emerge as a natural consequence of rational and benign behavior.
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reach nominal signiﬁcance thresholds with discontinuous distinction. There are, of
course, benign reasons that platforms might be designed this way. Some authors have
claimed that the developers of these platforms themselves are (or were at some point)
misinformed about how to use p-values, and thus merely made an honest “ﬂaw” in
how they interpret them for their customers (Kohavi, 2018).13 Even if employees that
build A/B testing tools based on frequentist statistics become aware of the problem
with continuous monitoring, there are natural reasons—both internal (technical debt,
Kim and Kankanhalli 2009) and external (having to admit prior techniques are inadequate; resistance to change by users, Tom et al. 2013)—that may prevent them from
changing their systems to reﬂect these concerns.14 It should be noted, however, that
some analysts have suggested that experimental platforms have incentives for the continued use of design paradigms that result in an abundance of false positives (Gamber,
2019). Indeed, many marketers may be unaware of the sample sizes actually required
to run truly well-powered experiments (Lewis and Rao, 2015; Sawyer and Ball, 1981).
For a website with a baseline conversion rate of 3%, detecting a 10% lift in relative
terms (using common frequentist standards of 80% power at a 5% signiﬁcance level)
requires over 100,000 observations. This may be prohibitive for many businesses of
small and medium scale, a fact that experimentation platforms may not be eager to
emphasize in their marketing materials or product documentation. A ﬁrm that is
continuously running inconclusive or noisy experiments may ﬁnd little value in paying
for experimentation software, opening up the possibility for a misalignment of incentives between platforms and their paying customers who may get little value from the
service.
13

There is certainly evidence for this in some cases, as can be seen in some old documentation and discussion pages of A/B test platforms, where some engineers suggest using statistical signiﬁcance as a criterion for
notifying users or ending tests (see examples at https://perma.cc/6N7C-QF7C, https://perma.cc/U3TGPZ8C, and https://perma.cc/U9K6-U3BW). One can also ﬁnd examples of code designed continuously
monitor a test’s (unadjusted, frequentist) p-value and notify users when it crosses a signiﬁcance threshold
(see https://perma.cc/2P6T-YBVE).
14
Note that academic scientists are also known to resist shifts in statistical paradigms (Sharpe, 2013); this
suggests that changing the way statistics are calculated or reported by experimentation platforms will likely
face some form of resistance from their customers.
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• The inherent appeal of surprising and unlikely results. One more factor that may aﬀect
the behavior of A/B test analysts is the enduring appeal of surprising and unlikely
results. Examples of analysts claiming to have dramatically increased conversion
rates with a simple tweak to their website abound, and it is apparent that an analyst
can increase their credibility, authority, and audience by claiming to have valuable
knowledge about how to increase proﬁts. These incentives can work at levels both
within organizations (earning credibility with one’s colleagues) and across them (by
establishing oneself as an expert that gets large results) (Walker, 2015). While it may
not be the most signiﬁcant factor, these incentives—combined with the ﬂexibility and
ambiguity in experimental design aﬀorded by most testing platforms—might result in
an inﬂation of false positives through p-hacking.
While the factors discussed above provide explanations for why p-hacking would be common
in A/B testing, there are also very plausible reasons for why this might not be the case:
• Aligned incentives. Despite the possibilities for misaligned incentives described above,
there are clearly forces working in favor of incentive alignment that might discourage
p-hacking. As discussed earlier, A/B tests are frequently used for purposes instrumental to a ﬁrm’s economic strategies, informing managerial decisions about product
variations, service delivery, user experience, and marketing campaigns. The results
of experiments in these domains—particularly among internet-scale companies—can
often have signiﬁcant eﬀects on proﬁtability (Hern, 2014). To the extent that one
believes employee and ﬁrm incentives are aligned, we would expect an industrial practitioner to face at least some economic incentive to avoid engaging in p-hacking behavior. Research by Aral et al. (2012) suggests that ﬁrms who adopt analytics and
IT practices are also likely to adopt eﬃcient human capital management practices.
This provides some empirical basis for believing that ﬁrms who use A/B tests—which
is likely associated with adoption of IT and analytics practices in general—might actually be better at aligning organizational incentives than ﬁrms that do not use A/B
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testing software.
• Practical/logistical limitations on p-hacking. Further, there are practical reasons why
the type of p-hacking we have described—in which an analyst stops when, or waits
until, a desired conﬁdence level is achieved to stop data collection—might be rare.
For one, managers may be trading oﬀ the eﬀects of multiple metrics, without a strong
preference about the signiﬁcance of any particular outcome. Also, ﬁrms may have
a natural cadence of meetings (say weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly) during which test
results are reviewed and implementation decisions are made; this would prevent the
most egregious types of truly continuous monitoring that are known to inﬂate false
discovery.
• Organizational learning. Lastly, it is possible that ﬁrms have learned to avoid phacking, through either the extensive literature on continuous monitoring or their
own experience using experimentation platforms. Part of the intuitive appeal of A/B
testing is that it enables managers to rigorously test their hypotheses and learn for
themselves what works in their business. Numerous companies mention the value
of “A/A” testing (where two identical variations are compared using a platform’s
interface) and repeat testing (where the same experiment is run twice) for developing
intuitions about what type of statistical results can or cannot be trusted. Thus, despite
the academic preoccupation with “statistical signiﬁcance”, real-world managers have
the opportunity learn directly through experience what thresholds of evidence they
require before making consequential decisions.
Given the factors reviewed here, it appears quite ambiguous whether one should expect
to empirically observe evidence for p-hacking of real-world A/B tests run by proﬁt-seeking
ﬁrms. Clearly, some literature suggests that p-hacking is a common practice in digital
experimentation. Indeed, such a ﬁnding would be consistent with the by-now extensive
literature on p-hacking in academic science, where it is known to be quite prevalent. On the
other hand, there are also very plausible reasons laid out above for why this behavior might
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be rare industrial settings, in which economically-motivated actors face a diﬀerent set of
incentives from analysts in academic contexts. This discussion motivates our main analysis
in this project, in which we attempt to empirically measure the incidence of p-hacking
among users of a large A/B testing platform.

1.3. Empirical Context & Data Description
To investigate the phenomenon of p-hacking in A/B testing, we have gathered data from
a private, third-party digital experimentation platform (subsequently referred to as “the
platform”). The platform is a large purveyor of e-commerce SaaS solutions, including web
analytics, online personalization, and A/B testing. According to internal estimates, their
tracking software observes over 100 billion pageviews annually and, for the period of data
collection studied in this project, witnessed online sales totalling close to one-third of all ecommerce dollars spent in the United States. At a high level, we have access to a population
of two-armed experiments (i.e., literal “A/B” tests) conducted by all US-based ﬁrms using
the platform between January 2014 and February 2018. In total, this amounts to 2,518
experiments from 232 diﬀerent companies. An important diﬀerence compared to some
testing platforms is that the platform studied here does not have a free-tier of service; to
begin using the service, a company must make contact with the platform’s sales team and set
up an account. Pricing is proprietary and depends on the exact bundle of products/services
a company uses, but can be expected to be in line with other enterprise B2B SaaS products.
1.3.1. Description of ﬁrms in sample
Given that the platform specializes in analytics solutions for online retailers, essentially all
ﬁrms in our sample are engaged in some form of direct-to-consumer e-commerce. Within
this category, the vast majority (93%) of ﬁrms are in discretionary consumer retail, most
commonly apparel and home goods, with a smaller representation of ﬁrms in specialty
segments (e.g., travel, electronics, cosmetics, and nutritional supplements). The remaining
7% of ﬁrms in our sample are software, telecommunications, or media/publishing companies.
Though there is some heterogeneity across these industries, all the companies in our sample
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use their website to conduct paid transactions in exchange for goods or services. Thus,
while the meaning of a “conversion” can vary dramatically across the web more generally—
indicating anything from the act of clicking a link to creating an account—in our context,
this word nearly always refers to the act of a customer making a monetary transaction.
To get a slightly better sense of the size of ﬁrms in our dataset, we used a third-party business
intelligence service that maintains a database of organizational characteristics that can be
referenced by a company’s domain name. The summary statistics for various indicators
of company size, website traﬃc, age, and social media presence are provided in Table 1.1.
There is clearly a diverse set of ﬁrms in our sample, ranging from small online businesses
to large public companies with substantial oﬄine retail operations. While a site’s “Alexa
Global Rank” is based on various factors and should not be used as an exact measure of site
traﬃc, some analyses suggest that sites near the median ranking in our dataset of 46,900
have somewhere on the order of 13,000 daily unique visitors to their website.15 . The fact
that the median founding year of a ﬁrm in our dataset is 1983 suggests that a substantial
portion of our sample is comprised of legacy (i.e., not digital-native) retailers that have had
to develop e-commerce capabilities in addition to their traditional oﬄine competencies.
Table 1.1: Firm Characteristics
Variable
Number of employees
Alexa Global Rank
Year Founded
Twitter Followers

Mean
8,318
215K
1967
740K

Std. Dev.
25.3K
744K
42.1
4.5M

Min.
5
106
1812
0

Median
930
46.9K
1983
35.4K

Max.
203K
7.8M
2015
50M

Coverage
89%
100%
86%
76%

The composition of our sample may present some challenges for some forms of external
validity. Clearly any analysis based on this data should not be casually generalized to all
domains in which A/B testing is common. That being said, we contend that there is no
single source of data that could plausibly describe behavior across such disparate domains.
Within the space of online retail, our sample does contain a diverse set of e-commerce ﬁrms
that use A/B testing to inform consequential decisions about their websites’ designs. Our
15

See https://netotraﬃc.com/alexa-traﬃc/ and http://domain.tips/alexa-rank-traﬃc-converter/
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discussions with employees at the platform indicate that their tools are most commonly used
by marketing and web design teams within broader organizations. Indeed, much like other
A/B testing products reviewed in Section 2, the ﬁrms in our sample make extensive use of the
platform’s WYSIWYG website editor. As opposed to other domains where non-inferiority
testing may be a common use-case for A/B testing, our discussions suggest that nearly all of
the platform’s customers use digital experiments for conversion rate optimization. Seasonal
promotions, call-to-action manipulations, and design modiﬁcations were all mentioned as
common interventions being tested on the platform. Further, e-commerce is an extremely
high-growth sector of consumer retail, poised to only become more important in coming
decades. For these reasons, we believe analysis of our data can be valuable and informative
for understanding how real-world ﬁrms use experimental and statistical software for decision
making generally, and especially relevant in how these factors play out in the rapidly-growing
e-commerce sector.
1.3.2. Description of the platform itself
Testing Interface. Before proceeding, several aspects of the platform’s interface are important to discuss. Much like other third-party testing tools, ﬁrms using the platform must
integrate the platform’s tracking and testing script into their website’s codebase.16 Once a
customer’s account is created and website is conﬁgured, they can use the platform’s WYSIWYG interface or custom CSS/Javascript injection to create an intervention to be tested
in an experiment. Throughout the course of an active A/B test, the platform automatically manages all session randomization, analytics measurement, statistical calculations,
and reporting of results.
By default, eight dependent variables are analyzed and shown to the analyst throughout
the course of every experiment. These are: conversion rate, session revenue, new visitor
conversion rate, add-to-cart rate, cart abandonment rate, page views, session duration, and
16
This requires (1) ensuring a callback function is executed when important website actions are performed
by site visitors (e.g., product views, conversions, etc.); and (2) the installation of a Javascript tag that allows
the testing provider to manipulate website elements and measure session characteristics.
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bounce rate. Prior to starting an experiment, ﬁrms are allowed to choose one or more
“target metrics”, which correspond to the outcome(s) being targeted by the intervention. If
no target metric is explicitly selected by the ﬁrm, the platform sets the target to “conversion
rate”. In 95.6% of experiments in our sample, conversion rate is speciﬁed as a target metric;
the most other common target metrics are session revenue and add-to-cart rate.
What data do ﬁrms have available during an experiment?. The primary interface by
which ﬁrms view the results of their experiments is an online dashboard listing the outcome
metrics, their associated eﬀect sizes (or lift), standard errors, and “conﬁdence” levels. These
conﬁdence levels are deﬁned as 1 minus the p-value associated with a null hypothesis test
for each metric. In the case of binary outcomes, p-values are computed using two-sided
Z-test described in Section 1.2.2; p-values for continuous outcomes are calculated using a
standard two-sided, two-sample t-test for equal means with a pooled variance estimate. A
stylized version of the dashboard which is functionally similar to the real interface is shown
in Figure 1.4. Experimenters can click on a speciﬁc metric to see the time-series history of
the eﬀect size over time, but by default they merely see an up-to-date snapshot overview
like the one shown in the ﬁgure.
Figure 1.4: Simpliﬁed recreation of test result dashboard interface

One characteristic about the interface worth noting is that there is always a badge indicating
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which “target metric” the experimenter speciﬁed at the beginning of the test. This reinforces
to the ﬁrm the metric that they pre-speciﬁed as their primary performance indicator for the
experiment. Also, important for our research question, as soon as a variable crosses above
95% conﬁdence (i.e., its p-value dips below 0.05), it is moved from the “pending” portion
of the dashboard to the “actionable” portion and shown in a diﬀerent color. Through
the use of these design cues, the platform clearly reinforces the importance of the 95%
signiﬁcance threshold and, in a not entirely subtle way (directly labeling signiﬁcant results as
“actionable”), encourages ﬁrms to react to their experiments when they reach this threshold.
How do ﬁrms end an experiment?. When a test is running, the platform has a simple
“stop” button that stops allocating a ﬁrm’s website traﬃc to the experiment. If a ﬁrm wants
to actually implement a variation (i.e., send all traﬃc to the treatment that performed
better), they are supposed to go through a new process intended for non-experimental
website edits.
1.3.3. Experiment-level data
We now turn to the details of the experiments themselves in our main sample and begin to
examine some of the factors that may help us identify p-hacking behavior. As mentioned, we
have a total of 2,518 separate experiments in our sample from 232 ﬁrms; for each experiment,
we observe all outcomes relevant to each treatment arm’s performance on the eight outcome
metrics that are tracked by the platform. From this, we can derive the p-value that was used
to calculate the “conﬁdence” metrics that were used to mark a test result “Actionable” vs.
“Pending”. On average, there are 9.6 two-armed experiments per ﬁrm, which ranges from
1 to a maximum of 86; the distribution of experiment count by ﬁrm is plotted in histogram
form in Figure 1.5. We have provided further experiment-level summary statistics at the
in Table 1.2. The median experiment length in our dataset is 23.7 days and the median
number of sessions per experiment is near 46,000.
Model free evidence on experiment stopping behavior. The primary question we wish
to study in this project is if and how an experiment’s p-value aﬀects a ﬁrm’s decision to
end the test. To fully understand this phenomenon, however, it is useful to know whether
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of experiment count by ﬁrm
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Table 1.2: Experiment level characteristics

Length of experiment (days)
Number of sessions
Conversion rate
Average order value ($USD)

Median
23.7
46,634
0.046
114.67

Mean
39.7
217,232
0.093
185.18

Std. Dev.
43.8
440,690
0.139
273.81

other factors drive ﬁrms’ test-stopping behavior. To that end, we now present some model
free results that partially characterize when ﬁrms choose to stop their tests. First, we can
see that if we plot histograms across the days of the week that experiments begin and end
(Figure 1.6), there is a clear pattern in both graphs showing how both types of action are
less common on weekends. Thus the day of the week seems to have at least some role in
determining when ﬁrms end their experiments.
We can see another eﬀect at play by plotting the histogram of experiment duration (Figure
1.7). In this plot, we have added white circles to the tops of the histogram bars that are
multiples of seven—i.e., experiments that last in increments of one week. As can be seen by
the relative peaks at these values, it appears to be a common practice among ﬁrms to run
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Figure 1.6: Starting/Stopping Behavior By Day of Week
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their experiments for one week intervals, with the most common experiment length being
exactly one week. Again, this suggests that logistical factors and common practices around
test duration play a role in ﬁrm stopping behavior.
Figure 1.7: Distribution of experiment length
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Notes: Histogram of experiment durations binned by day. White circles
highlight histogram heights at multiples of 7 days.
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1.4. p-hacking analysis
We now turn to the question of whether the p-values (or, equivalently, “conﬁdence” levels)
aﬀect the timing of when ﬁrms choose to terminate their tests and discussing ways we might
detect this behavior. Prior research on meta-analytic techniques for detecting p-hacking in
scientiﬁc literature has suggested that the type of continuous monitoring behavior alluded
to in this context would result in an empirical distribution with a disproportionate number
of experiments just below the 0.05 cut-oﬀ (Simonsohn et al., 2014).17 Thus, one way to
observe p-hacking behavior in our dataset is to look at the empirical distribution of the
p-values observed when experiments are stopped. If we assume that, for some proportion of
experiments in our sample, ﬁrms were continuously monitoring their p-values and stopping
experiments when or waiting until they dropped below 0.05, we should expect to see a
disproportionately large amount of tests with p-values below this threshold than above it.
Given all the information visible to ﬁrms in the platform’s reporting dashboard, we should be
clear in describing exactly how p-hacking behavior might manifest itself and how we might
detect it in our dataset. As a starting point, we propose assuming that ﬁrms primarily pay
attention to the “target metric” that they speciﬁed at the beginning of their experiment. In
this case, we imagine that while ﬁrms can see statistics associated with other metrics, the
target metric outcome plays the most signiﬁcant role in driving stopping behavior. There
are other ways that p-hacking behavior might manifest; for example, perhaps a analysts
monitored outcomes from all metrics, and stopped whenever any of their conﬁdence levels
exceed 95%. Another possibility is that ﬁrms pay attention to only a subset of metrics,
such as revenue or add-to-cart rate, and discount the eﬀects measured on time-on-site or
pageviews. Because the platform gives special visual distinction to each test’s target metric,
we believe analyzing the distribution of p-values associated with these metrics is the most
reasonable place to initially look for p-hacking behavior. While our primary analysis is
17
This is essentially a form of “slow” p-hacking, in which p-values will change relatively little from day to
day, since the only variable being manipulated by ﬁrms is the number of observations in an ongoing A/B
test. This is precisely the type of p-hacking for which we would expect to observe a discontinuity near the
signiﬁcance threshold; see Simonsohn (2020) for more.
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Figure 1.8: Theoretical distribution of p-values near signiﬁcance threshold
(a) Without p-hacking
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Notes: The regions marked πl and πr (visualized in red) represent the relative proportions of the
p-value distribution immediately below and above the threshold of interest, τ = 0.05. Along with a
given sample size N and speciﬁed bandwidth parameter h, these parameters fully identify the null
distribution of our test statistic.

centered on the p-values associated with these target metrics, we discuss alternative ways
of analyzing our data in Section 1.4.5.
1.4.1. Model free evidence
In light of the discussion above, we focus our main analysis on the p-values associated with
the target metric from each A/B test at the time it was concluded. While ﬁrms would
have seen these reported as “conﬁdence” levels, we will consider the data’s untransformed
parameterization as p-values and focus on the 0.05 signiﬁcance threshold.18 We can begin
looking for evidence of p-hacking behavior by investigating the raw distribution of these
18

Even though the user interface of the platform only shows users a metric’s conﬁdence level as (1−p)×100
rounded to the nearest whole number, the actual logic used to mark a test “Actionable” or not is based on
the raw, ﬂoating-point number associated with the test’s p-value. (The speciﬁc criteria used in the code base
is “1 − p > 0.95”, where p is the test’s raw p-value.) Because of this, there are no artifacts due to rounding,
and a test would only be marked as signiﬁcant if the p-value was any value below 0.05 exactly.
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p-values near this threshold.
In Figure 1.9, we have plotted histograms of our data for three diﬀerent bin widths (denoted
h), along with a dashed vertical line at 0.05 to facilitate inspection at this critical threshold.
We have further zoomed in on the region around 0.05 in Figure 1.10, where we have also
plotted bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals around the height of each histogram bin. A
cursory visual analysis of these plots seems to suggest that there is no evidence for an
abundance of p-values just below the 0.05 threshold; the bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals
of the bins nearest the threshold seem to overlap in all cases. This being said, one should
not be so quick to rely on visual inspection for this analysis. Especially in this case where
we have used histograms for density visualization, which are intuitive and easy to interpret
but also known to mask subtle characteristics of distributions in non-obvious ways and are
rarely optimal for density estimation (Thrun et al., 2020; Bourel et al., 2014; Lem et al.,
2014). One shortcoming of histograms — as can be seen in these graphs — is that diﬀerent
characteristics of the density function are visible at diﬀerent resolutions of the bandwidth
parameter h. While these visualizations are instructive, they are not dispositive and lack any
quantiﬁable characteristics about the the presence of a discontinuity in our dataset. We use
the next section to discuss statistical issues around detecting and measuring discontinuities
in p-value distributions.
Figure 1.9: Histograms of raw data (dashed line at τ = 0.05)
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Figure 1.10: Histograms near τ = 0.05 threshold, with 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence
intervals

1.4.2. Existing methods relevant for detecting p-hacking
Meta-analytic techniques. Prior work related to our project is that done by researchers
analyzing the distribution of test statistics across a diverse body of published literature
(Gerber et al., 2008; Andrews and Kasy, 2019; Vivalt, 2019). This work attempts to look for
discontinuities and other abnormalities in the distribution of reported test statistics across
many academic studies. While they are unable to determine whether such discontinuities
are due to the selection eﬀects of publication bias or the behavioral eﬀect of p-hacking,
their methods may still be useful in our context, especially the so-called “caliper test”—ﬁrst
named as such in Gerber and Malhotra (2008). This test is conducted by considering all test
statistics from a body of work and selecting a small window around a relevant signiﬁcance
threshold. If the distribution of statistics is indeed continuous, then the number of results
that fall on either side of this threshold should approximately be equal, assuming the caliper
is suﬃciently small. One can then perform a binomial test on whether the number of tests
on the signiﬁcant side of the threshold exceed those on the non-signiﬁcant side.
Another method that has been used to study p-hacking in other contexts is called “p-curve”
(Simonsohn et al., 2014; Vogel and Homberg, 2021). In our context, however, this technique
has two shortcomings: First, p-curve analysis is not actually concerned with detecting phacking speciﬁcally; instead, it is focused primarily on quantifying the “evidential value”
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of a set of related studies.19 As such, this analysis is not readily designed to positively
detect evidence for p-hacking. Second, p-curve analyses are conducted by disregarding all
p-values above a given signiﬁcance threshold. The motivation for this makes sense in the
context of studying published academic results, in which signiﬁcance is often a prerequisite
for publication. However, in our context, we observe the statistics from all relevant tests
conducted in our period of study and have access to the full distribution of p-values, not
subject any selection or ﬁltering eﬀects. This allows us to examine the distribution of pvalues on either side of the signiﬁcance threshold, opening up new analyses that are not
possible in the contexts most relevant for p-curve analysis.
Similar to p-curve, there are related research methods focused primarily on accounting for selection eﬀects in the construction of some meta-analytic estimator (Ioannidis and Trikalinos,
2007; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014). The methods described in these papers, however,
are not well-matched to our problem, as they typically assume all the experiments in the
analysis are studying a single phenomenon with a shared underlying eﬀect size. This assumption is clearly not applicable in our context, in which our data come from the results of
many diﬀerent experiments measuring the eﬀects of a disparate set of interventions across
hundreds of diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Generic density estimation techniques. It is also worth mentioning the existing literature
on discontinuity detection in empirical distributions more generally, outside of meta-analytic
contexts (McCrary, 2008; Jales and Yu, 2017). Detecting discontinuities in density functions
is a fundamentally diﬀerent problem than detecting discontinuities in dependent variables,
as is commonly the goal in standard regression discontinuity design (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008). An important method for density discontinuity detection has been recently proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2018a)—denoted “rddensity”, based on the name of the open
source software packages published by the original authors. This technique employs local
19

It would be better say p-curve is an estimation method with goal of estimating the strength of evidence
while accounting for the eﬀects of p-hacking. The statistics in the p-curve analysis are constructed so that
rejecting the null hypothesis occurs when the set of studies in question contains contains evidential value of
a non-null underlying eﬀect.
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polynomial regressions to approximate the density function on either side of the threshold
of interest, while taking into account many of the subtle issues that make density estimation
diﬃcult (e.g., bandwidth selection, kernel choice, bias near discrete boundaries). Because of
this, rddensity is frequently used as a manipulation check in standard discontinuity designs
and may be considered the state-of-the-art for discontinuity detection in generic density
functions.
Shortcomings of existing methods. We have dedicated an appendix (Appendix A) to
addressing the relevance of various candidate methods for studying our problem. To summarize the main points of this analysis here:
• The caliper approach is quite appealing for being both simple and intuitive; however,
it suﬀers from an important shortcoming. As used in existing literature, the caliper
test assumes that the number of observations on either side of the relevant signiﬁcance
threshold are equal. This assumption is only theoretically true either (a) when the
underlying density function is perfectly ﬂat in the region of interest, or (b) in the
limit as the size of the caliper (h, the window around the relevant threshold) goes to
zero, i.e., h → 0+ . We show how this can lead to an inﬂated rate of Type I error
(false positive) rate. In our case speciﬁcally, in which we are analyzing a distribution
of p-values — which is known to have right skew — we show how this test results in
an excessive rate of false positives (i.e., detects p-hacking when there is none present)
above nominal signiﬁcance levels.
• The p-curve and other meta-analytic methods are actually not designed to detect
p-hacking and so are omitted from our comparisons.
• Generic density-based methods, such as rddensity from Cattaneo et al. (2018a), appear to have good false positive control but are under-powered relative to other methods for detecting p-hacking reviewed in this project.
Given these shortcomings, we have developed a technique that builds on the caliper ap-
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proach, and extends it to account for the slope of the distribution near the discontinuity
threshold. These other techniques can still be useful in many contexts, but—in a number of
simulation analyses described in the appendix—our approach appears to achieve an optimal
balance of desired test characteristics among these methods.
1.4.3. Outline of asymmetric caliper discontinuity test
The basic idea of our test is to model what the distribution of p-values should look like in the
absence of any p-hacking eﬀect; with such a model, we can derive a test statistic based on
the diﬀerence in the number of p-values that fall on either side of the signiﬁcance threshold.
The caliper test used in prior studies assumed that these counts should be equal under the
null hypothesis; however, when global information about the shape of the distribution being
studied is accounted for, this assumption compromises the performance of the caliper test
for its intended objective. Our test corrects for this shortcoming by modeling the slope of
the distribution near the signiﬁcance threshold, allowing there to be an unequal distribution
of observations within a small window on either side of the threshold — giving rise to our
calling this method an asymmetric caliper test.
Modeling the empirical distribution of p-values. A key requirement for our model is that
we have a valid model of what a distribution of p-values should look like in the absence of
any p-hacking. To do this, we draw upon existing theory and established literature in bioand meta-statistics about how to model p-value distributions arising from many disparate
analyses. Consider that for an experiment where the null hypothesis is true (i.e., there
is no diﬀerence in conversion rates between treatment arms), frequentist statistical theory
predicts the p-value to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval. However, when we
look at the results of an experiment, we do not know ex ante whether the null hypothesis
is true or if, on the other hand, a non-zero eﬀect size is present. If we look at the results
of many experiments in a meta-analysis of p-values, some p-values will correspond to tests
where the null hypothesis is true (and therefore be uniformly distributed), but for another
portion the alternative hypothesis will be true (when the eﬀect size is non-zero). In these
cases, two-sided p-values will tend to cluster near zero (since such results have a lower
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probability of occurring when assuming the null hypothesis). This explains the rough shape
of the p-value distributions we observe in our data (Figure 3.1).
This discussion motivates the modeling of the distribution of p-values as a hierarchical mixture coming from one null component (with uniform distribution to model the null eﬀects)
and another component to model the results of non-null eﬀects. In this project, we model
the non-null portion of our density as a mixture of beta distributions, with the parameter
restrictions α < 1 and β > 1.20 This approach is well-established in biostatistics and has
been used extensively in many contexts to model p-value distributions (Pounds and Morris,
2003; Tang et al., 2007; Nettleton et al., 2006; Gronau et al., 2017; Parker and Rothenberg,
1988; Allison et al., 2002)21 . A full description of our model, derivation of relevant formulae,
and discussion around issues such as parameter restrictions, number of mixture components
in the model, and other implicit assumptions is provided in Appendix A.
In brief, we model our data as arriving from a two-stage mixture model, where in the ﬁrst
stage a mixture component ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} is drawn from a categorical (or multinoulli)
distribution with parameter vector π = (π0 , . . . , πK ):
ki | π ∼ Categorical(π0 , . . . , πK ) ,

subject to a natural ordering and unitary sum constraint:
π0 > π1 > · · · > πK and

X

πk = 1 .

k

In the second stage, conditional on knowing an observation’s mixture component ki , its
value xi will be distributed either uniformly (for ki = 0) or as a Beta random variable with
20

These inequalities merely constrain the distribution space to only those functions that could plausibly
model a sample of p-values with positive skew.
21
This literature is primarily concerned with modeling the results of genome-wide association studies, in
which the eﬀects of thousands of genes need to be simultaneously estimated through meta-analytic techniques. See Cai and Sun (2017) for a general discussion of these techniques.
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component-speciﬁc parameters (aki , bki ) (for ki > 0):
xi | ki = 0 ∼ Unif(0, 1)
xi | ki > 0, a, b ∼ Beta(aki , bki )

We estimate this model using the principle of maximum likelihood, by maximizing the
log-likelihood function of the observed data x over the distribution parameters θ = (π, a, b):
θ̂ = arg max ℓ(θ | x)
θ

where
(1.1)

ℓ(θ | x) = log L(θ | x)
=

N
X
i=1

log π0 +

K
X


πk

k=1

1
xak (1 − x)bk −1
B(ak , bk )

!

Hypothesis test for discontinuity at signiﬁcance threshold. The upshot of ﬁtting the
mixture model described above is that it provides a principled method for making inference about the shape of the distribution of p-values near the signiﬁcance threshold. With
the information provided by the model, we can describe what the distribution of p-values
should look on either side of the signiﬁcance threshold, in the absence of any discontinuous
p-hacking behavior. The visualization shown in Figure 1.8(a) highlights two regions within
some bandwidth (or “caliper”) parameter h of the signiﬁcance threshold: πl refers to the
proportion of the density function that lies in the left window and πr refers to the proportion in the right window. These two quantities — which can be inferred as a function of
the best-ﬁt parameters of the mixture distribution described above — help us deﬁne a null
distribution around our primary statistic of interest: the diﬀerence in the number of observations that fall between the left and right windows. Under the null hypothesis that our
data arise from a continuous underlying density function (described by our mixture model),
the counts of observations on either side of the threshold are distributed binomially as
nl ∼ Binomial(N, πl ) and nr ∼ Binomial(N, πr ), where N is the total number experiments
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in our sample, and nl , nr refer to the count of experiments observed in each bin. We use
these distributions to calculate the null distribution of the diﬀerence between the number of
observations below and and above the threshold: S := nl − nr . This quantity will serve as
our primary test statistic. Under the null hypothesis that our data are drawn from the fully
continuous mixture model, the null distribution of S can be derived in closed-form from
the parameters of the mixture model (see Eq. 1.3 in Appendix A). In the ﬁnal step of our
procedure, we conduct a one-sided hypothesis test by comparing the diﬀerence between the
number of observations below and above the signiﬁcance threshold — which we will denote
by S ∗ — to the estimated null distribution of Ŝ that is derived from the mixture model.22
The precise formula of the p-value corresponding to this test along with derivations of all
formulae used for this analysis are provided in Appendix A.
Final implementation details. Two factors we have yet to discuss about our test procedure are how we decide on (a) the number of components in our mixture model and (b)
what exactly it means to be “near” the signiﬁcance threshold (i.e., how we select h). In
regards to (a): For the primary results reported here, we use a model with K = 2 beta
components (three in total, counting the uniform component). However, we note that all
results reported here are not materially aﬀected by using other choices for this parameter.
As for (b): Nearly every density estimation technique requires that the researcher specify a bandwidth parameter in some form; our method is no diﬀerent in this regard. As
described above and visualized in Figure 1.8, our statistical test requires that we specify
the width of the “window” around our signiﬁcance threshold — given by some h > 0. A
well regarded technique for choosing this parameter is to use a data-driven approach such
as cross-validation or machine learning (Cattaneo et al., 2018b; Rudemo, 1982). We will
instead ﬁx the bandwidth for our tests manually, though at several diﬀerent possible values
for robustness. In our context, data-adaptive approaches are prone to small-sample biases
that can have unpredictable eﬀects on statistical tests dependent on this parameter. This
22

Because an abundance of p-values below the signiﬁcance threshold is the only phenomenon consistent
with p-hacking, we will only accept the alternative hypothesis (that our data have been p-hacked) if the
number of observations left of the threshold exceeds the amount on the right — leading to the one-sided our
conducting a primary analysis with a one-sided test.
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is explained in more detail in Appendix C, where we demonstrate how — at least for our
analysis — ﬁxed bandwidth exhibits higher power and more regularity than tests based on
adaptive bandwidths.
As for how we select h, we highlight our qualitative conclusions are unchanged if we use
essentially any value of h between 0.01, and 0.05. Multiple researchers studying metaanalytic p-value distributions in academic research have speciﬁcally pointed to a prevalence
of p-values in the 0.04-0.05 range as indicative of p-hacking behavior (de Winter and Dodou,
2015; Simonsohn et al., 2014). Based on this work, our primary test of interest will use a
bandwidth parameter of h = 0.01. However, we also describe the results of our analysis if
this parameter is set to either half (h = 0.005) and twice (h = 0.02) this value; this method
of reporting robustness to bandwidth choice is commonly used in regression discontinuity
designs, as suggested by McCrary (2008).
1.4.4. Main empirical results
Having outlined the main components of our model and statistical test, we are now in a
position to report the results of our discontinuity analysis. We begin by describing the ﬁt
of the mixture model; the maximum likelihood estimate for the parameters in our model
are given in Table 1.3. Our mixture model lends itself well to graphical visualization; the
MLE ﬁt of our model on top of our the empirical histogram has been plotted in Figure
1.11. In grey, we have generated a histogram of empirically observed p-values from our
dataset; on top of this, we show the best-ﬁt maximum likelihood estimate, as speciﬁed
above. This graph is broken up into a null component (f0 , in blue) and a composite
“alternative” component (fa = f1 + f2 , in red), corresponding to data generated from a
mixture of positively skewed beta densities. Since the density function outlined here is
clearly continuous at 0.05, it provides a theoretically-motivated null model to facilitate
hypothesis testing in the following sections.
Having computed the best-ﬁt the mixture model, we can now report the results of our
hypothesis test for discontinuity in our data at the τ = 0.05 threshold. These results are
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Table 1.3: MLE Parameter Estimates
Parameter
π0
π1
π2
a1
a2
b1
b2

Estimate
0.81
0.16
0.03
0.24
0.01
1.85
5.24

displayed in Figure 1.12, with key statistics also summarized in Table 1.4. Each of the
three rows in the ﬁgure corresponds to a separate calculation for the bandwidth choices,
h = 0.005, 0.01, 0.02. The left panel shows histograms of the empirical distribution with
binwidth set to h (the corresponding h value is shown above each histogram). The primary
characteristic of these histograms being considered is the diﬀerence between the bin counts
immediately above and below the 0.05 threshold; these have been colored in with solid red
to highlight the portion of the data that is used for each test. Additionally, the MLE ﬁt of
the beta-uniform mixture model shown as a solid black line above the histograms. The right
side of the panel shows the null distribution of the test statistic (based on the MLE ﬁt),
along with the empirically observed test statistic S ∗ . This value corresponds directly to the
diﬀerence in the highlighted histogram bin heights above and below 0.05. The p-values for
each test are displayed above the graphs of the test statistic distributions. Because we have
conducted a one-sided hypothesis test, p-values are computed by calculating the proportion
of the test statistic’s null distribution that lies above the observed value; this integration has
been represented visually by shading the region of the null distribution above the observed
test statistic.
Table 1.4: Primary tests for discontinuity at τ = 0.05 threshold

Bandwidth
h = 0.005
h = 0.01
h = 0.02

Values left
of threhold
nl
12
31
67

Values right
of threhold
nr
19
32
60
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Empirical
diﬀerence
S∗
-7
-1
7

Expected
diﬀerence
E[Ŝ]
1
2
7

p-value
0.89
0.61
0.50

Figure 1.11: Beta-uniform mixture MLE ﬁt and empirical histogram

Notes: Histogram of empirically observed data (shown in grey) with bin width h = 0.02.
Under our model’s assumptions, p-values can be thought of as coming from a null (uniform)
component with probability π̂0 = 0.81 (visualized in blue); alternatively, p-values can arise
from an alternative component (with probability 1 − π̂0 = 0.19 (visualized in red), which is
a mixture of beta distributions.

As can be seen, the p-values from our tests are all well above any reasonable signiﬁcance
level for any value of the bandwidth parameter (p = 0.89, 0.61, 0.50). In statistical terms,
we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of continuity in the underlying density function
of p-values near the 0.05 threshold. In behavioral terms, these results provide no evidence
for the form of p-hacking described earlier on the part of the ﬁrms in our sample.
Interpreting the null result & counterfactual analysis. It is important to recognize that
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. As in all frequentist hypothesis testing, it is
not possible for us to “test for” a null hypothesis. In this case, we cannot say for sure that
the experiments in our dataset were not p-hacked, merely that the method we developed

42

Figure 1.12: Main Results

Notes: Our primary statistical test measures the diﬀerence between the number of p-values
above/below the 0.05 threshold and compares this value to a theoretically derived null distribution of
this statistic, based on ﬁtting a beta-uniform mixture model to the observed data. We perform this
test three times, once for each of the bandwidth values h = 0.005, 0.01, 0.02. Empirically observed
histograms for each of these bandwidth values is shown in the left column (white/red bars), along
with the MLE-ﬁt beta-uniform mixture model (black line). In the right column, for each h, we plot
the corresponding null distribution of our test statistic (derived in Appendix A, Eq. 1.3) and the
empirically observed diﬀerence in bin heights, S ∗ . Taking the proportion of the null distribution that
lies above S ∗ gives us one-sided the p-value for our discontinuity test (see Eq. 1.8 in Appendix A for
precise deﬁnition). No p-value among the outcomes we observe (p = 0.89, 0.61, 0.50) approaches conventional levels of signiﬁcance, indicating we cannot reject a null hypothesis that assumes continuity
in the underlying density of p-values in our dataset.

was unable to reject the null hypothesis at conventional signiﬁcance levels. However, there
are several steps we can take to better understand and contextualize what our results can
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and cannot say about the presence of p-hacking in our sample. We begin by considering the
conﬁdence intervals associated with our main eﬀect, move on to discuss some of the nuances
associated with the quantifying the eﬀect we are trying to detect, and then describe our
attempt at measuring the power of our discontinuity test.
We describe in Appendix A how one can adapt our test procedure to deﬁne both the
one-sided and two-sided 95% conﬁdence intervals around our main test statistic; these
intervals are shown in Table 1.5, which have been calculated using the same three bandwidth
thresholds as above. For now, consider the test with h = 0.02, which has the widest
conﬁdence intervals among our three analyses. The two-sided 95% conﬁdence interval for
the size of the discontinuity at the p = 0.05 threshold is (−21, 21). To interpret these
numbers, consider that our test statistic is constructed as the diﬀerence between the number
of p-values below and above the signiﬁcance threshold. If one imagines simplistically that a
p-hacked test is one that moves a result that would have fallen in the window directly above
the 0.05 threshold to the window below the threshold, this would cause the diﬀerence in
our test statistic to increase by two. This suggests it may be better to divide this statistic
in half when attempting to translate the result into a “number of experiments that were
p-hacked”. With this particular interpretation, our data would indicate no more than 11
experiments (the upper end of the 95% conﬁdence interval divided by two) or — 0.58% of
the tests in our total sample — may have been p-hacked. While such reasoning can be a
useful thought experiment, we argue one should not interpret our results using this simple
logic. This is because it is simply not true that the diﬀerence between a “p-hacked” and
“not p-hacked” experiment is its p-value would move from just above 0.05 to just below
0.05. It is instructive to understand why this is the case.
Table 1.5: Conﬁdence Intervals

One-sided 95% conﬁdence interval
Two-sided 95% conﬁdence interval

0.005
(−∞, 4)
(−15, 5)
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Bandwidth h
0.01
(−∞, 5)
(−22, 7)

0.02
(−∞, 17)
(−21, 21)

There are essentially two ways one can imagine that p-hacking occurs in our context. First,
consider a test that under normal (non-p-hacked) circumstances would result in a p-value
somewhere below 0.05. Many tests in this category are those that have truly meaningful
diﬀerences between treatment arms, with corresponding p-values close to zero (< 0.001).
If an experimenter were to p-hack one of these tests and stop gathering data as soon as
the p-value dips below 0.05, this would counterfactually shift one p-value from the far left
of our observed distribution (near zero) to somewhere just below the 0.05 threshold. On
the other hand, one can imagine p-hacking an A/B test that under normal (non-p-hacked)
circumstances would have a p-value somewhere above the 0.05 threshold. In this scenario,
rather than stopping the experiment early, a p-hacking analyst might continue the experiment past its “normal” data-collection period and wait to see if the p-value eventually dips
below the signiﬁcance threshold. While it would be easier to p-hack tests with p-values
just above the 0.05 threshold, it is still possible that a p-hacked test of this variety would
shift the counterfactually non-p-hacked p-value from well above the 0.05 threshold into the
signiﬁcance region below 0.05. Without knowing the non-p-hacked p-value associated with
each test, it would be diﬃcult separate out one form of p-hacking from another and to
meaningfully interpret the magnitude of the discontinuity near the signiﬁcance threshold.
So while all forms of p-hacking would result in a discontinuity at the signiﬁcance threshold,
without strong assumptions about the underlying eﬀects being measured (giving us information about corresponding distribution of non-p-hacked values), it is impossible to say
precisely how the magnitude of the discontinuity maps onto an easily interpretable quantity
like the “number of experiments that were p-hacked”.
Nonetheless, it would be very useful—both for conceptual reasons and to interpret the
results of our analysis—if we could quantify the “eﬀect size of p-hacking” in some way.
We propose one way to think about this eﬀect, which is as the proportion of experiments
that were intended to be p-hacked. For every A/B test a ﬁrm could run, we imagine two
possible scenarios: In the ﬁrst scenario, the experiment is run in a “natural” state without
any interference of p-hacking behavior (i.e., we assume the experiment ends for exogenous
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reasons unrelated to the test’s p-value). In the second scenario, the test is run with the
intention of being p-hacked, where the stopping time of the experiment is determined by
how its p-value evolves through time. In this case, p-hacking would proceed along the
lines described in the previous paragraph, where an analyst might stop a test before its
“natural” lifetime, or extend it beyond its “natural” lifetime depending on the underlying
data generating process.
Based on this understanding, we have developed a procedure that allows us to counterfactually p-hack the experiments in our dataset. In addition to observing the terminal p-value
associated with each test in our sample, we also observe the (a) the raw outcomes of the
data used to derive the p-value (e.g., the number of user sessions and conversions observed
in each test arm), and (b) the duration of each experiment in days. Using these data, we
can simulate what the contemporaneous p-value would be throughout the duration of each
test. We can then simulate what the terminal p-value of a test would be if it were p-hacked.
Our full simulation procedure is described in Appendix B, but in short our process is as
follows: Assume some “eﬀect size” q ∈ [0, 1] is given (i.e., the proportion of experiments
that were intended to be p-hacked); take a random sample of ⌈qN ⌉ experiments from our
dataset and “counterfactually” p-hack them; this involves randomly dividing up the number
of observations across the lifetime of an experiment, calculating the p-value at each interval
of time throughout the life of an experiment, and ending an experiment early if it’s p-value
becomes signiﬁcant within its observed duration. If a counterfactually p-hacked test has not
reached signiﬁcance by the end of its natural duration, we simulate the eﬀect of extending
data collection for a period of time and stop the experiment at the ﬁrst point a p-value dips
below 0.05.
An important factor that determines precisely how “the proportion of experiments intended
to be p-hacked” maps onto the shape of the ﬁnal distribution of terminal p-values is the
frequency at which each test’s p-value is checked. Truly continuous monitoring would consist
of checking the p-value of a test after every new observation. That being said, this form of
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p-hacking would be unrealistic in our context. Based on our conversations with employees
at the platform, it is more common that experimenters check their results daily, weekly,
or with a frequency somewhere in between.23 To visualize how these diﬀerent forms of
p-hacking would manifest in the distribution of terminal p-values, we have performed the
simulation described above for varying proportions of p-hacked experiments q ∈ [0, 1] and
plotted the distribution of resulting p-values near the 0.05 signiﬁcance threshold. In Figure
1.13(a), we used a procedure that simulates the eﬀect of checking p-values every 24 hours; in
Figure 1.13(b) we perform the same analysis, except simulate the eﬀect of checking p-values
on a weekly basis. What is apparent in these visualizations is that checking p-values less
frequently makes it more diﬃcult to observe the discontinuity in the p-value distribution
near 0.05. That being said, even if only a fraction of experiments are p-hacked, the eﬀect
of this behavior should be noticeable.
We can be more precise about this observation and use our simulation procedure to quantify
how often the asymmetric caliper test is able to detect a discontinuity at the p-hacked
signiﬁcance threshold. In particular, we estimated the power curve of our statistical test in
the following way: For each of several values of q ∈ [0, 0.20], we took a bootstrap sample of
tests from our dataset (using N = 2,518 and sampling with replacement), simulated the pvalue distribution we would observe if a fraction q of the tests were p-hacked, performed our
asymmetric caliper test, and took note of whether our test was able to detect a discontinuity
at the α = 0.05 signiﬁcance level (i.e., we say we detect a discontinuity if our statistical
test results in a p-value of less than 0.05). For each value of q, for various values of the
bandwidth parameter h, and for both daily and weekly forms of p-hacking, we repeated this
procedure 1,000 times and took note of the percentage of the 1,000 repeats in which we
detected a discontinuity. (This procedure is described in detail in Appendix B.) The results
of this analysis are summarized in Figure 1.14.
For the most sensitive version of our test procedure (i.e., with h = 0.02), this analysis
23

Also recall from the discussion in Section 1.3.3 that some subset of analysts appear to make stopping
decisions on a weekly basis.
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Figure 1.13: p-value distributions from counterfactually p-hacked A/B tests
(a) Simulated daily p-hacking

(b) Simulated weekly p-hacking

Notes: For each subplot, we randomly select a fraction q of tests in our sample and simulate what
their p-values would have been throughout the lifetime of each test. In Fig. (a), experiments are
counterfactually p-hacked by checking p-values once very 24 hours; in Fig. (b), the experiments
are p-hacked by checking p-values once very 7 days. For full details on the simulation procedure,
see Appendix B.

estimates we would have 80% power to detect an eﬀect size of q = 0.032 for daily p-hacking
and q = 0.063 for weekly p-hacking. To be sure we interpret these results correctly, note
that real p-hacking behavior would obviously be less deterministic than the behavior we
are simulating. However, this method does capture many of the essential dynamics of real
p-hacking behavior and is able to quantify the power of our testing procedure while also
keeping the problem tractable and interpretable. If we believe real ﬁrms monitor their
experiments more frequently than once a day, then our simulations should underestimate
the consequences of this behavior on the distribution of terminal p-values. If, on the other
hand, we believe p-hacking behavior occurs less frequently than once a week, then the power
of our test is lower than what we report in Figure 1.14b. But we believe that, if it were
present, real p-hacking behavior — or at least the kind we hypothesize is most plausible —
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Figure 1.14: Power (sensitivity) analysis of asymmetric caliper method for detecting
p-hacking
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(a) Simulated daily p-hacking

(b) Simulated weekly p-hacking

Notes: These are plots generated by using Monte Carlo simulations, where for each of 1,000
bootstrap samples per eﬀect size, we simulate the daily (weekly) time series of p-values for all
experiments in our data and counterfactually p-hack a proportion q of them. For each simulation,
we perform our asymmetric caliper test for discontinuity, and report the “power” of our test as
the percentage of times our test detected a signiﬁcant eﬀect at the 5% level. Results are grouped
by bandwidth size h.

would fall somewhere between these two extremes.
So while we cannot conclusively rule out the presence of p-hacking in our sample, we can say
with reasonable conﬁdence that if there were a positive eﬀect of p-hacking in our dataset,
it would aﬀect fewer than 3% − 6% of the experiments in our sample. Even in the worst
case scenario that the there is an eﬀect and its magnitude is on the upper end of this
range, this estimate is smaller by a factor of ten compared to existing estimates of the
prevalence of p-hacking in similar contexts (Berman et al., 2018). We emphasize that across
the many speciﬁcations we have analyzed, we ﬁnd no positive evidence for the presence of
a discontinuity in our empirically observed distribution of p-values.
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1.4.5. Investigating other forms of p-hacking
Given that our primary analysis resulted in a null outcome, it is natural to ask if there is
evidence for other forms of p-hacking behavior sample. Below, we address several alternative
ways of looking for evidence of p-hacking in our data.
Alternative thresholds. One possibility we have yet to consider is that ﬁrms p-hack their
A/B tests at thresholds other than the platform default of “95% conﬁdence”. Indeed, in the
only other work we know of studying a similar context, the main ﬁnding suggests p-hacking
actually occurs at the 90% conﬁdence threshold, rather than the industry standard 95%
(Berman et al., 2018). Given that the platform in our context had a very clear default
around the 95% threshold, we believe it to be unlikely to ﬁnd evidence for discontinuous
behavior at these other thresholds, but nonetheless report the results of analyses that investigate behavior around the 90% and 99% thresholds (or the 0.10 and 0.01 thresholds in
the observed distributions of p-values) Fortunately, the method we developed can easily be
adapted to test for discontinuities at these other thresholds; the results of these statistical
tests—conducted for varying bandwidth levels reported below—are shown in Tables 1.6
and 1.7. We have also plotted histograms of our data near these thresholds (along with
bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals) in Figures 1.15 and 1.16. In none of these analyses do
we ﬁnd evidence for discontinuous behavior around the 90% or 99% conﬁdence thresholds.
Table 1.6: τ = 0.01 threshold
Bandwidth
h = 0.002
h = 0.005
h = 0.01

nl
12
38
239

nr
15
32
58

S∗
-3
6
181

E[Ŝ]
1
9
201

Table 1.7: τ = 0.10 threshold
p-value
Bandwidth
0.78 h = 0.01
0.62 h = 0.02
0.88 h = 0.05

nl
32
57
150

nr
24
47
132

S∗
8
10
18

E[Ŝ]
0
2
15

p-value
0.13
0.19
0.42

Alternative (non-target) metrics on the testing dashboard. Recall (from Sec. 1.3.2)
that the testing platform allows ﬁrms to choose a primary “target” metric for each A/B
test; in 95.6% of tests this metric was set to user conversion rate. But also recall that the
platform reports the eﬀect sizes and conﬁdence levels for eight metrics by default (see Figure
1.4). While we have argued that the most plausible place to look for p-hacking behavior
is in the distribution of p-values for the target outcome metric, there are potentially many
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Figure 1.15: Histograms of p-values near τ = 0.01 threshold

Figure 1.16: Histograms of p-values near τ = 0.10 threshold

other ways that the entirety of data reported by the testing platform could have inﬂuenced
experimenters’ behavior. For example, perhaps analysts were focusing on multiple metrics
of interest, without going to the trouble of specifying them as “target” metrics in the
platform’s testing interface. It seems reasonable—especially in our sample of ﬁrms that are
all engaged in some form of e-commerce retailing—that metrics such as the add to cart rate
and average revenue could have particular relevance.
Rather than trying to guess at exactly which metrics may have been most important, we
will instead plot the local distribution of terminal p-values from all eight metrics and report
the results of our asymmetric caliper test applied to each of these outcomes at the τ = 0.05
signiﬁcance threshold. These data are shown visually in Figure 1.17 and the results of our
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test for discontinuity are summarized in Table 1.8. As can be seen, there is little evidence
for p-hacking at the τ = 0.05 (95% conﬁdence) threshold for any of the outcome metrics
visible to ﬁrms on the platform’s testing dashboard. For the “cart abandonment” metric, we
do observe a p-value of 0.01 when testing for a discontinuity using the bandwidth h = 0.01;
however, evidence for this discontinuity does not remain robust to other choices of the
bandwidth parameter. Given that we conducted 24 diﬀerent tests for discontinuity in this
process (eight metrics, across three bandwidth values), it might not be terribly unexpected
that at least one of our test results appears “signiﬁcant”. Additionally, our contextual
knowledge about these data — speciﬁcally that “cart abandonment” would not likely be
a very salient outcome metric for most experimenters (especially in relation to conversion
rate or revenue) — makes us cautious about concluding too much from this one result. We
believe the most reasonable conclusion from this analysis as a whole is that there appears
to be little to no evidence for p-hacking behavior across diﬀerent experimental outcomes.
Figure 1.17: Local histograms for all outcome metrics

Notes: Histogram plots of raw data near the 0.05 signiﬁcance threshold, shown for each of the eight
outcome metrics visible in testing platform’s dashboard. We have also plotted 95% bootstrap conﬁdence
intervals around the observed bin counts.

1.5. Discussion & Conclusion
Accepting the apparent conclusion from our analysis—that ﬁrms in our sample engaged
in little to no p-hacking behavior—prompts us to consider why a phenomenon that is
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Table 1.8: Results of tests for discontinuity at τ = 0.05 threshold, for all eight outcome
metrics

Metric
Conversion rate
Revenue per session
Add-to-cart rate
Cart abandonment rate
New user conv. rate
Bounce rate
Pageview count
Time on site

nl
10
15
25
17
17
18
24
16

Bandwidth: h = 0.005
nr S ∗ E[Ŝ] p-value
19 -9
0
0.94
13 2
0
0.36
22 3
1
0.29
12 5
0
0.17
11 6
0
0.12
19 -1
0
0.57
22 2
1
0.37
22 -6
1
0.84

nl
30
35
41
42
36
28
48
35

Bandwidth: h = 0.01
nr S ∗ E[Ŝ] p-value
37 -7
2
0.86
34 1
2
0.51
37 4
2
0.39
22 20
2
0.01∗
23 13
1
0.05
31 -3
1
0.70
38 10
3
0.16
38 -3
3
0.73

nl
71
72
84
70
62
63
101
71

Bandwidth: h = 0.02
nr S ∗ E[Ŝ] p-value
67 4
8
0.62
65 7
7
0.47
71 13
9
0.35
53 17
7
0.17
55 7
6
0.43
67 -4
6
0.81
91 10
11
0.52
73 -2
13
0.87

widespread in other settings does not occur in ours. While we cannot claim to have proven
this deﬁnitively, our ﬁndings are consistent with at least two possible explanations. One is
that analysts at the ﬁrms in our sample are statistically sophisticated enough to know that
continuously monitoring their p-values is poor research practice. Our results would also be
consistent with the theory that private incentives of experimenters in economic settings are
more aligned with the truth than those in other settings. Said diﬀerently, the consequences
of p-hacking may be more salient or more severe for managerial decision makers than for
academic researchers.
It is also useful to contextualize our ﬁndings in light of the previous work of Berman et al.
(2018), who studied p-hacking in an ostensibly similar context. A careful comparison may
provide some clues as to why our results diﬀer and bring some clarity about the limits of
our ﬁndings. To begin, we highlight several factors that appear to diﬀer between our two
studies. First, Berman et al. (2018) studies data from Optimizely which, at least during a
part of their sample period, had a free tier for customers. The platform our data come from
has never had a free tier, meaning that all ﬁrms in our sample paid a non-trivial monthly
fee to use the testing platform’s services. While it is not clear what fraction of experiments
in their sample come from free-users, it appears possible that inherent diﬀerences in ﬁrm
size, budget, and perhaps statistical sophistication are the cause of our discrepant ﬁndings.
There may also be an economic explanation, whereby ﬁrms that have paid for a testing
service are more incentivized to use it “properly”. Further, the primary outcome metric
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analyzed by Berman et al. (2018) is “engagement”—which is deﬁned merely as whether a
user clicked anywhere on the page in their browsing session, and is the default reporting
metric on Optimizely’s platform. Recall that the default metric in our context is conversion,
i.e., whether a user actually bought something during their session. Perhaps the simplest
reason why this matters is that baseline conversion rates are much lower than baseline
engagement rates. All else being equal, a proportional variable with a higher base rate will
achieve statistical signiﬁcance more often, meaning it would be easier to p-hack this variable.
Another possibility is that because conversions are more closely translated into economic
value, ﬁrms in our sample had stronger incentive to interpret the results of their experiments
judiciously. While a full accounting for the diﬀerence in our ﬁndings will certainly require
more research, we can at least use this discussion to outline the conditions in which we
expect our results to be more relevant than that of other work. Speciﬁcally, this would
include A/B tests among ﬁrms that are mature enough to pay for experimentation software
who are analyzing conversion rates and other similarly high-value, instrumental outcome
metrics.
In conclusion, we highlight several managerial implications of our research project for both
testing practitioners and experimentation platforms. First, our ﬁndings provide some evidence that p-hacking is not the default, inevitable outcome of providing experimenters with
access to continuous data streams of experimental results—the current, standard industry practice in A/B testing. While many articles have been written about the perils of
using A/B testing in managerial decision making, our results provide at least one apparent counterpoint to this narrative. In the context of our data sample of medium to large
e-commerce companies, the typical A/B test does not appear to be the result of a contaminated data gathering process. Instead, we found that testing practices at the typical ﬁrm
are not obviously problematic, which may give managers a measure of conﬁdence in using
and interpreting A/B test results to inform consequential decisions. Similarly, these ﬁndings
suggest that despite widespread concern about p-hacking, it may actually not be necessary
to expend extensive resources attempting to ﬁx a problem that may not exist. A reasonable
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conclusion from our research is that before making dramatic changes to experimentation
practices—whether it be adopting a new statistical framework or retraining marketers on
best practices—it is prudent for ﬁrms to determine whether p-hacking is indeed a problem
for them in the ﬁrst place. This is true for individual practitioners, experimentation teams
at larger companies, and testing platforms themselves. Assuming ﬁrms have access to data
on a reasonable number of prior experiments, the methods described in this paper can be
used to investigate p-hacking behavior among such proprietary datasets.
While more research on the phenomenon of p-hacking in A/B testing is clearly necessary, we
believe this project—particularly since it appears to provide evidence against the prevailing
narrative on the subject—serves as an important contribution to the academic literature on
the industrial practice of digital experimentation.
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APPENDICES
A. Asymmetric caliper test for discontinuity detection
In this article’s main text, we laid out a stripped down outline of the asymmetric caliper test
we developed for this project. In this appendix, we provide more detailed information on
the formalities of the statistical test and also provide evidence for why this test is preferable
to other methods in our research context.
A.1. Test procedure, derivation of formulae, and statistical formalities
Assume we have a vector of N observed p-values denoted by x. We are interested in
determining whether there is a disproportionate number of p-values just below a chosen
threshold of interest τ (in our primary analysis, this is the conventional signiﬁcance threshold
of 0.05). Assume we have a given bandwidth value h > 0, which speciﬁes the local region
around τ in which we will be focusing our analysis.
We ﬁrst formally deﬁne the empirically observed diﬀerence in the raw counts of p-values on
either side of the speciﬁed threshold as follows:
S∗ =

N
X

I {xi ∈ [τ − h, τ )} −

i=1

N
X

I {xi ∈ [τ, τ + h)}

i=1

Our test procedure is based on comparing this empirically observed statistic to the distribution of this value that is implied by assuming, as our null hypothesis, that our data x
are adequately parameterized by the fully continuous mixture model f described in Section
1.4.3.
Null distribution of test statistic. Under the assumption of this null hypothesis, we can
deﬁne a random variable S (conditional on N , τ , and h) as the diﬀerence in the number of
observations above and below the threshold of interest. From a frequentist perspective, for
a given density f and speciﬁed values of N , τ , and h, this quantity S is random as it can
vary across diﬀerent samples of data drawn from f . To describe this quantity formally, we
begin by deﬁning πl as the fraction of the distribution in the window of width h on the left
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side of the critical threshold, and πr as the fraction on the right side:
Z
πl =

Z

τ

f (x)dx,

πr =

τ −h

τ +h

(1.2)

f (x)dx
τ

(A visualization of these parameters is provided in Figure 1.8(a).) One can use these
probabilities to model the null distribution of counts above and below the threshold as two
binomially distributed random variables, drawn from the entire sample of size N :
nl ∼ Binomial(N, πl ),

nr ∼ Binomial(N, πr )

We then formally deﬁne our test statistic as S := nl − nr , whose mass function can be
derived by summing up all ways in which these two binomials can diﬀer by some value
k ∈ N. This formula, given below, deﬁnes the distribution of our test statistic under the
null hypothesis:
ϕ(k) := P [S = k]


P

 N
i=0 P [nl = i + k] P [nr = i], if k ≥ 0
=

P

 N
i=0 P [nl = i] P [nr = i + k], otherwise
N 

 
X

N
N

i+k
N
−(i+k)

(πr )i (1 − πr )N −i ,
(πl )
(1 − πl )


i
i+k
= i=0


N  
X

N
N

i
N −i


(πl ) (1 − πl )
(πr )i+k (1 − πr )N −(i+k) ,

i
i+k

(1.3)
if k ≥ 0
otherwise

i=0

Maximum likelihood estimates of test statistic parameters. The distribution of the test
statistic given in Eq. 1.3 has only been deﬁned for a given density function f , parameterized
by some known vector θ. In practice, θ and f must be estimated from the observed data
x. We accomplish this in our project using maximum likelihood estimation. Recall that
we have based our model for f on the well-established beta-uniform mixture model, which
is commonly used in other research settings that deal with distributions of p-values. This
model consists of K mixture components indexed by k = 0, 1, ..., K, where the constituent
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parameters of θ = (π, α, β) are described in Section 1.4.3.
To proceed, consider a single draw xi from this model and integrate over our uncertainty
in the mixture component to which i belongs; this gives us an expression for the marginal
density of f :
Z
f (xi | θ) =

f (xi | θ, ki = k)dF (k) = π0 +
k

K
X

πk fk (xi )

(1.4)

k=1

In this notation, fk is the beta density function corresponding to the k-th component:

fk (x) =

1
xak (1 − x)bk −1
B(ak , bk )

where B is the beta function. The likelihood function for our model can then be calculated
by taking the product of the likelihood over each data point in the empirical vector x:

L(θ | x) =

N
Y

f (xi | θ) =

i=1

N
Y

π0 +

i=1

K
X

!
πk fk (xi )

(1.5)

k=1

allowing us to derive the data’s log-likelihood as:
ℓ(θ | x) = log L(θ | x)
"
#!
N
K
Y
X
= log
π0 +
πk fk (xi )
i=1

=

N
X

log π0 +

i=1

k=1
K
X

(1.6)

!

πk fk (xi )

k=1

For a given dataset x, an empirical estimate of our model’s primary parameters is then
given by θ̂ = arg maxθ ℓ(θ | x).
We can now deﬁne the maximum likelihood estimate for the null distribution of our test
statistic ϕ̂ (deﬁned in Eq. 1.3) by ﬁrst deriving estimates of π̂l and π̂r (deﬁned in Eq. 1.2).
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Conditional on estimated model parameters, this can be done in closed form:
Z

τ +h

fˆ(x)dx
#
Z τ +h "
K
X
=
π̂0 +
π̂k fˆk (x) dx

π̂r =

τ

τ

Z

τ +h

= π0

k=1
K
X

dx +
τ

= π̂0 h +

Z
πk

(1.7)
fˆk (x)dx

τ

k=1
K
X

τ +h

h
i
π̂k I(τ + h; α̂k , β̂k ) − I(τ ; α̂k , β̂k )

k=1

where I(x; α, β) is the regularized incomplete beta function, the CDF of the beta distribution; πl can be similarly derived.
Deﬁnition of p-value for test statistic. Having derived the null distribution of our test
statistic and described a procedure for estimating this from our data, we can now derive a
p-value for our analysis. This value will represent the probability that we would observe a
test statistic (i.e., the diﬀerence between the number of test results just above and below
the critical threshold) as large or larger than the observed statistic, assuming the sampling
distribution of the test statistic follows the formula derived in Eq. 1.3, with parameters
estimated via the MLE procedure described in Section A.1.
Because p-hacking behavior is only consistent with observing an excess mass of p-values
below the critical threshold, we will make use of a one-sided p-value, deﬁned as follows:
∞
h
i
X
p-value (one-sided) = P S ∗ ≤ Ŝ =
P [Ŝ = k]

(1.8)

k=S ∗

For completeness, a two-sided p-value can be deﬁned analogously. Even though the distribution of our null statistic is technically not guaranteed to be symmetric about its mode,
we can still closely approximate the exact two-sided p-value by simply doubling the appropriate one-sided p-value.24 If we deﬁne the two-sided p-value as the probability that
24
Recall our test statistic is based on the diﬀerence of two binomially-distributed random variables; as N
gets large, the binomial distribution is very well-approximated by the normal distribution, and the diﬀerence
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the null test statistic would be as or more “extreme” than the observed statistic, then the
direction of “extremity” used to deﬁne our base one-sided p-value depends on whether the
observed statistic is above or below the center of the null distribution. Speciﬁcally, we use
the following formula for this approximation:



 if S ∗ > E[Ŝ] :
p-value (two-sided) =



 if S ∗ ≤ E[Ŝ] :

h
i P
2P S ∗ ≤ Ŝ = ∞
k=S ∗ P [Ŝ = k]
h
i P ∗
2P Ŝ ≤ S ∗ = Sk=−∞ P [Ŝ = k]

(1.9)

Deﬁnition of conﬁdence intervals. Following the deﬁnition of Cox and Hinkley (1979), for
a given signiﬁcance level α, we can derive a 100 × (1 − α)% conﬁdence interval by computing
all values s ∈ N for which we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence between
our observed and null test statistics is exactly s:
n
o
C(S ∗ ) = s ∈ N | H0 : S ∗ − Ŝ = s is not rejected at signiﬁcance level α

(1.10)

This single deﬁnition works for both one- and two-sided conﬁdence intervals, where one
merely needs to adapt either the one- or two-sided p-values deﬁned in Eqns. 1.8 and 1.9 to
determine whether or not H0 in Eq. 1.10 is rejected for various values of s.
A.2. Comparison to existing methods
In this section we compare our proposed technique described above to two other wellestablished methods for density discontinuity detection (see Section 1.4.2 in the main text
for more context on diﬀerent techniques):
• The “symmetric caliper” technique, as ﬁrst applied to studying the eﬀect of signiﬁcance thresholds in Gerber and Malhotra (2008). This method consists of a simple
binomial test of equal proportions. For a given threshold τ and bandwidth h, this
tests whether the number of observations that fall below the threshold, in the interval
of two normal distributions is also normal—simplifying this computation dramatically. Further, because our
outcomes of interest are in integer counts, only in rare circumstances will a conﬁdence interval derived via
this approximation diﬀer from its exact value. For these reasons, we argue this simpliﬁcation is justiﬁed in
practice.
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[τ − h, τ ), exceeds 50% of the total number of observations that fall within the entire
window [τ − h, τ + h).
• The local polynomial technique of Cattaneo et al. (2018a), rddensity, as implemented
in their R package.
Analysis of false positive rates. In our ﬁrst analysis, we attempted to assess how these
methods perform in terms of their false positive rate. Importantly, because the bandwidth
h is a researcher-speciﬁed parameter with no objective value, it is important for a test
of discontinuity to be robust to diﬀerent values of this parameter. To assess this, we
generated 1,000 samples of p-values from a beta-uniform mixture model, with parameters set
to their values ﬁt to our dataset by MLE. (This guarantees that the underlying distribution
of p-values is indeed continuous; however, because there appears to be no discontinuity
in our raw data, the results we report below are essentially identical if we use simple
bootstrap sampling from empirically observed p-values.) Then for each bandwidth value h ∈
{0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05}, we use all three methods described above to perform a statistical
test for discontinuity at the τ = 0.05 threshold, with the bandwidth window for each test
set to h. In each case, we rejected the null hypothesis if the p-value from a test was below
α = 0.05. In Figure 1.18 we plot the proportion of times each method rejects the null
hypothesis—all of which are, by construction, false positives. We have plotted a dashed
line at α = 0.05 to facilitate comparison with the tests’ nominal false positive control rate.
As can be seen, both our proposed technique and the non-parametric rddensity technique
adequately control the false positive rate below the 5% level for all values of the bandwidth
parameter. However, we can see that starting at h = 0.02, the false positive rate of the
symmetric caliper technique jumps to 14.4%. Because of the extreme skew of p-value
distributions, when the bandwidth spans all the way to zero (i.e., [τ − h, τ ) = [0, 0.05)),
the symmetric caliper rejects 100% of the tests for discontinuity, since it assumes that the
proportion of observations on either side of the τ = 0.05 threshold are equal. Because our
method is designed speciﬁcally to account for this shape in the distribution of p-values, the
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Figure 1.18: False rejection rate for discontinuity at τ = 0.05, with α = 0.05

asymmetric caliper is able to control its positive rate below the desired level.
Power analysis. All statistical tests make a trade-oﬀ between false-positive control and
power—i.e., the ability to detect an eﬀect when one is truly present. One might be concerned that while our technique appears to do well on the former objective, it may falter in
performance on the latter. To assess this, we performed counterfactual simulations in which
we simulated daily time-series of p-values that would be observed throughout the lifetime of
an experiment and then p-hacked a proportion q of experiments in each simulation (using
the technique described in Appendix B). This was done 1,000 times for each of 15 diﬀerent
values of q in the range [0, 0.5]. Then we performed four diﬀerent tests for discontinuity at
this threshold: the same three tests analyzed above with the bandwidth set to h = 0.01, as
well as the adaptive bandwidth version of rddensity which non-parametrically estimates an
optimal bandwidth.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 1.19, in which we plot the simulated power
curve for all four tests. As can be seen, the symmetric and asymmetric versions of the
caliper test have very similar power curves. The symmetric caliper has slightly higher
power for small eﬀect sizes but, as discussed above, this comes at the cost of a potentially
inﬂated false positive rate (that is sensitive to the underlying nuisance parameter, h). Our
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method appears to achieve both signiﬁcantly higher power than the rddensity methods,
while simultaneously controlling for false positives across a range of bandwidth values.
Given this analysis, we argue there is strong evidence that the asymmetric caliper is able to
strike a better balance between sensitivity and speciﬁcity than the other methods considered
here.
Figure 1.19: Power analysis

Note: Power is computed as the number of times each test
rejects the null hypothesis out of 1,000 simulations for each
q, where in each simulation we draw a bootstrap sample of
size 2,518 tests from our dataset and p-hack a fraction q of
them (see Appendix B for details). For all tests except the
adaptive bandwidth version of rddensity, the bandwidth is set
to h = 0.01.
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B. Counterfactual Monte Carlo simulation for power analysis
Algorithm 1: Counterfactual p-hacking and power calculation pseudocode
Input: N ∈ N+ , sample size (number of experiments);
q ∈ [0, 1], eﬀect size (proportion of experiments p-hacked);
Output: Rejection rate (power) of discontinuity test at chosen α level, averaged by bootstrap
Fixed variables:
E, dataset of experiments, each experiment consists of the terminal outcomes observed for the
experiment in our dataset (e.g., number of conversions and sessions for each arm)
B >> 0, bootstrap sample size ;
Notation:
Ti , empirically observed duration of experiment i in days;
pit , empirically observed p-value of experiment i calculated on day t ≤ Ti ;
p∗i , terminal p-value observed for experiment i during simulation;
[Z], the set of integers {1, . . . , Z} for Z ∈ N+ ;
S(·), statistical test for discontinuity, as described in Appendix A (returns p-value);
P, set of p-values for statistical test, observed across bootstrap samples
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

function CounterfactuallyPHackExperiment (Experiment i)
DailyDatai ← Simulate daily data for each arm in experiment by distributing each arm’s terminal
observations multinomially across number of days in experiment Ti
{pit | i ∈ [Ti ]} ← Calculate daily p-values from DailyDatai
Set p∗i to NULL
for day t ∈ [Ti ] do
if pit < 0.05 then
p∗i ← pit
set to p-hacked value
break loop; go to 19
if p∗i is NULL then
for day t ∈ {Ti + 1, . . . , 2Ti } do
ExtraDatait ← Simulate new data using Poisson distribution for session counts (with mean set
to test daily average for each arm), Binomial distribution for binary outcomes (with
parameter set to observed rate for each arm), and Poisson distribution for non-binary
outcomes (with mean set to observed daily average for each arm)
DailyDatai ←DailyDatai ∪ ExtraDatait
pit ← Calculate cumulative p-value using all data observed in DailyDatai
if pit < 0.05 then
p∗i ← pit
set to p-hacked value
break loop; go to 19
if t == max{30, 2Ti } then
p∗i ← pit

set terminal p-value to observed value, even if not signiﬁcant

return p∗i
function PowerCalculation(q, N )
for bootstrap b ∈ [B] do
EN ← random sample of size N from E
Pb ← {}
Hb ← random sample of proportion q from EN
for experiment i ∈ EN do
if i ∈ Hb then
p∗i ← CounterfactuallyPHackExperiment(i)
else
p∗i ← piTi
Pb ← {p∗i } ∪ Pb
πb ← S(Pb )
P ← {πb } ∪ P

with replacement

use empirically observed terminal p-value
add simulated p-value to observation set

apply statistical test for discontinuity to p-hacked p-values
collect p-values of discontinuity test

R ← {1[p∑
< α] for p ∈ P}
power ←
R/B
return power

indicator set of rejected tests
average rejection proportion across bootstraps
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C. Selecting bandwidth parameter h
The primary bandwidth used for our testing procedure in the body of the text is ﬁxed at
h = 0.01. While this may appear arbitrary, we have attempted to use more data-adaptive
methods for selecting the bandwidth value. While these methods may be appropriate to
use with large N , our ﬁndings suggest that—at our current sample size of around 2,500
observations—data-driven bandwidth selection exhibits small-sample eﬀects that make such
an approach less than ideal for the problem of discontinuity detection. To see why this is
the case, we describe a straightforward comparison of data-adaptive and ﬁxed bandwidth
methods below.
We must ﬁrst select a method for determining a data-adaptive optimal bandwidth. We
argue the goals of our test align well with the goals of selecting an optimal bandwidth of a
histogram density estimator. Such procedures are designed to minimize the L2 risk of an
estimator, i.e., its mean integrated square error:
M ISE(fˆ) = E

Z 

2
fˆ(x) − f (x) dx .

The bandwidth selection problem can then be formally expressed as:
h∗ = arg max M ISE(fˆh )
h

For the family of histogram estimators, one approach for solving for this optimization problem empirically is leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV) Rudemo (1982). This method
has a convenient analytical formula for the histogram estimator’s mean integrated squared
error, a standard loss function in the density estimation literature:

M ISE(h) =

2
n+1 X 2
Nk
(n − 1)h n2 (n − 1)h
k

where n is the total number of observations and Nk is the number of observations in the

65

k-th histogram bin (Tsybakov, 2009).
We evaluated the performance of our test procedure using both the LOOCV bandwidth
method and the ﬁxed bandwidth method (as done in the main text). We are able to
estimate the power of each approach empirically, using the counterfactual method described
in Appendix B. Figure 1.20 shows the results of our power analysis, where we have varied
both the eﬀect size (fraction of tests p-hacked, q) and the sample size of A/B tests used
in our simulations (N ). For a grid of values over these variables, we used either the ﬁxed
or adaptive values of selecting the optimal h. The ﬁrst row contains the resulting power
contours of our testing procedure with h taking on the ﬁxed values of 0.005, 0.01 and 0.02,
respectively. In the second row, we use the data-adaptive LOOCV method (described above)
to estimate the optimal ĥ separately for each run of the simulation; we show the results of
our power analysis when the bandwidth of the testing procedure is set to ĥ/2, ĥ, and 2ĥ.
The third row of Figure 1.20 shows the average value of the estimated optimal bandwidth
used at each point in the grid.
In contrast to the top row in which h is a ﬁxed value, the power contours for testing
procedures with adaptive h values are highly irregular. Note that a good statistical test
will consistently increase in power as either the sample size or eﬀect size increases (as is the
case for the tests with ﬁxed h). However, for the tests with adaptive h values, statistical
power exhibits non-monotonic behavior with respect to sample size, sometimes increasing
and sometimes decreasing as sample size grows. While these irregularties appear to mellow
out for large samples sizes (near N = 10, 000), the size of our empirical sample is only
around 2,500. As such, it appears imprudent to ignore the small-sample eﬀects of the dataadaptive estimators. For this reason, we choose to use ﬁxed values of h, with h = 0.01 as
our primary bandwidth parameter, for analysis of our dataset. However, because we have
reported statistics for all values h = 0.005, 0.01, and 0.02 throughout this paper, one can
see that our results to not appear particularly sensitive to this choice.
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Figure 1.20: Eﬀects of ﬁxed vs. adaptive bandwidth values on statistical power
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CHAPTER 2
META-ANALYSIS OF E-COMMERCE A/B TESTING STRATEGIES
2.1. Introduction
Recent technological solutions have dramatically lowered the cost of conducting digital
experiments. The enterprise software market is now awash with low-cost, easy-to-install
testing tools from companies such as Optimizely, HubSpot, Adobe, and Google (among
many others). While large companies with signiﬁcant resources have been conducting online experiments for years, the advent of these new tools has dramatically increased the
availability and popularity of A/B testing among ﬁrms of all sizes. As such, managers are
increasingly turning to A/B tests to make objective decisions backed by statistical theory.
Though a large number of researchers have used the proliferation of these technologies
to test their own hypotheses, there has been much less focus on how ﬁrms natively use
A/B testing platforms in the course of everyday operation. But as A/B testing makes its
way into mainstream business practice, there is a growing demand for insight into how to
exploit these technologies and an increasing need for researchers to examine these tools
from a strategic—rather than purely technical—perspective. In its current state, academic
research provides little insight into basic questions about real-world A/B testing practices:
What kinds of experiments do companies run? What is the distribution of eﬀect sizes in
online experiments? Which types of experiments have the largest eﬀect sizes? How can
ﬁrms better target their experiments to increase conversion rates? While there is much
interest in the ﬁeld of digital experimentation generally, little is known empirically about
the testing strategies of e-commerce companies, let alone which strategies may be most
eﬀective.
In this project, we attempt to answer these questions by providing a rigorous, empirical
study of e-commerce A/B testing practices. To accopmlish this, we perform a meta-analysis
on 2,732 A/B tests conducted by 252 e-commerce companies across seven industries over
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the course of more than three years. We are able to exploit the metadata in our sample and
analyze experimentation strategies from multiple perspectives. We ﬁrst use this metadata to
characterize the content of the experiments in our sample. We then classify the interventions
associated with each experiment into several high-level categories that are applicable to the
majority of e-commerce websites. We attempt to measure the eﬀectiveness of these various
types of interventions on customer conversion rates by comparing the average absolute
eﬀect sizes of the most common interventions used in online experiments. We ﬁnd that
experiments involving price promotions and those targeted on category or product listing
pages are associated with the largest eﬀect sizes, relative to other experiment types in our
sample. We then investigate the treatment heterogeneity of diﬀerent types of interventions
at diﬀerent stages of the conversion funnel. and ﬁnd that promotional interventions on
product prices are most eﬀective early in the conversion funnel, whereas shipping-related
promotions are most eﬀective late in the conversion funnel (on product and checkout pages).
This work not only provides key insight for both describing and informing the A/B testing
strategies of a diverse set of companies, but it also has important implications for understanding online consumer behavior and optimizing the customer conversion funnel of
e-commerce websites.

2.2. Background & Related Literature
As the practice of A/B testing has grown in popularity over the last decade, there has
emerged academic interest in both the methodology and empirical practice of digital experimentation. However, this literature largely focuses on how to do digital experiments,
with relatively little to say about what to experiment on. This bias toward theoretical
know-how has left a gap in our understanding of how the characteristics of real-world interventions connect to business objectives. We attempt to provide some insight into the
nature of empirical e-commerce experiments and also study which factors have the largest
inﬂuence on test outcomes. This motivates the development of a classiﬁcation framework,
in which we categorize e-commerce interventions along two dimensions: experiment type
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and experiment location.
To contextualize and inform this analysis, we will review several related bodies of existing
research. We ﬁrst summarize related literature on digital experimentation and A/B testing
and then turn to the existing research on various factors that are known to drive purchasing behavior in e-commerce. We also highlight the importance of how the placement of an
intervention aﬀects its performance by discussing the existing research on how consumer
behavior can vary throughout the marketing conversion funnel. Given the diverse body
of work that has been done on these topics, we see our project building upon—and hopefully contributing to—existing research in statistics, information systems, human computer
interaction, and marketing.
2.2.1. Digital experimentation & A/B testing
While randomized controlled trials have been used by ﬁrms and researchers for more than a
century, experimentation in the online environment presents a distinct set of opportunities
and challenges that has motivated several recent developments related to A/B testing.
Extremely large sample sizes, the presence of rich demographic and technographic data
on participants, instantaneous data collection, and the ability to deploy many diﬀerent
experiments simultaneously are all features that distinguish modern A/B testing from older
forms of experimentation. New methodological research has emerged to exploit these novel
features of the online testing context, including papers on identiﬁcation of heterogeneous
treatment eﬀects (Wager and Athey, 2017; Taddy et al., 2016), targeted experimentation
(Liu and Chamberlain, 2018), sequential testing (Johari et al., 2015), and experimentation
at large scales (Kohavi et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2015).
Another unique aspect of A/B testing that has drawn the interest of some researchers is
how inexpensive and easy it is to test many diﬀerent interventions in a short period of
time. This characteristic is in stark contrast to the context in which classical randomized
controlled trials were historically developed; in agriculture, medicine, and even most academic research, the hypothesis is given and an experiment is conducted to answer a very
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clear question. However, the cost of digital experimentation is so low that marketers have a
preponderance of interventions that could be tested with little guidance on which of these
interventions should be tested. These questions, as opposed to being concerned with statistical methodology, seek to guide ﬁrm’s experimentation strategy. There is a small but
growing stream of research on this topic. The most closely related work in this literature
includes a recent study that develops a theoretical framework for addressing the challenge
of an experiment-rich regime, in which the number of potential hypotheses is so abundant
that it is the observations themselves that are actually more expensive—that is to say,
there are more potential experiments to run on a website than could ever be tested with
enough observations to yield statistical signiﬁcance (Schmit et al., 2018). In a diﬀerent
study, the strategic problem of determining an optimal experimentation strategy in terms
of sample size is considered in (Azevedo et al., 2018). By developing a theoretical model of
the distribution of eﬀect sizes and analyzing over 1,500 experiments at Microsoft Bing, the
researchers ﬁnd that the platform can expect higher returns by running a higher number of
low-powered experiments rather than a low number of high-powered experiments.
2.2.2. E-commerce & Website Design
Apart from the growing literature on digital experimentation, this project is also related
to the existing body of work in information systems, marketing, and human computer
interaction on how various factors in website design and marketing aﬀect consumer behavior. Researchers have shown that price promotions (Zhang and Krishnamurthi, 2004;
Zhang and Wedel, 2009) and shipping fees (Lewis, 2006; Lewis et al., 2006) can have significant eﬀects on customer conversions in e-commerce settings. The literature on price partitioning has also shown that consumers respond diﬀerentially to changes in product price
vs. shipping price (Hamilton and Srivastava, 2008; Chatterjee, 2011). Aside from pricebased interventions, there is an existing body of work in information systems and humancomputer interaction that studies how various non-marketing aspects of website design
aﬀect online behaviors. Indeed, “usability” is known to be a major factor in how users assess the quality of a ﬁrm’s website (Agarwal and Venkatesh, 2002; Venkatesh and Agarwal,
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2006). Several studies attempt to analyze how speciﬁc website characteristics aﬀect user
behavior; this includes research on page loading times (Galletta et al., 2006), presentation
ﬂaws (Everard and Galletta, 2005), and image characteristics (Hausman and Siekpe, 2009;
Zhang et al., 2016). A large-scale study soliciting user comments about factors that aﬀect
website credibility found that the “design look” was the most prominent (Fogg et al., 2003).
In this study, elements such as overall aesthetic, spacing, sizing, colors, and fonts were all
coded as reﬂecting the design characteristics of a website.
2.2.3. Marketing Conversion Funnel
In addition to studying how various types of interventions aﬀect online shopping behavior,
our project will also examine the role of an intervention’s location within a website’s architecture. To motivate this analysis, we build upon the “conversion funnel” framework, which
is a ubiquitous concept in both the academic and industrial literature on digital marketing. There are many ways this concept has been operationalized in existing research, but
a number of studies across diﬀerent contexts have demonstrated that the eﬀectiveness of
marketing interventions depends on where individuals are within their customer journey.
One technique for studying the marketing funnel is to use observable customer outcomes
as proxies for their position in the funnel. In a meta-analysis of many online advertising
experiments, Johnson et al. (2017) uses site visits and conversions as proxies for middle and
late funnel stages; a similar approach is taken in Braun and Moe (2013). In a B2B setting,
Jansen and Schuster (2011) uses the number of customer interactions, quotes, and orders
to capture the progress of a lead down the funnel. In a grocery store setting, Seiler and Yao
(2017) operationalizes diﬀerent funnel stages by using aisle visits and purchases as dependent variables.
An alternative approach for modeling the conversion funnel is to use individuals’ observable
characteristics as proxies for their latent psychographic funnel state. This method is based
on the notion that a customer’s position in the funnel is determined by their internal
thought processes and intentions. Traditionally, words used to characterize diﬀerent funnel
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stages across both academic and industrial literatures describe an individual’s internal state:
“awareness”, “consideration”, “decision”, “loyalty” (Court et al., 2009; Lavidge and Steiner,
1961). Studies in this paradigm are often designed to segment or target individuals in
diﬀerent conversion states with various marketing interventions (Netzer et al., 2008; Moe,
2003; Abhishek et al., 2012).
Though our study related to this body of work, the unique nature of our context requires
us to introduce an alternative way of operationalizing the conversion funnel. While prior
literature has analyzed the conversion funnel using diﬀerent outcomes or individual-level
characteristics, our meta-analytic approach means the primary unit in our study will be
interventions themselves. Rather than asking how an intervention or a customer’s latent
state aﬀects intermediate outcomes, our dataset allows us to investigate how an experiment’s
intrinsic characteristics aﬀect the primary outcome of interest in A/B testing (purchase
behavior). Based on the way ﬁrms label their experiments, we will motivate a way of
thinking about the location of an experiment within a website’s architecture as a marker
of its “location” within the conversion funnel. Analyzing the experiments in our dataset
this way also maps onto the user experience of most A/B testing platforms, which requires
ﬁrms to specify a page (or set of pages) on which an intervention will take place. We will
explore this phenomenon more formally in our analyses below.
In sum, this project is able to shed new light on experimentation strategy, website design,
and consumer behavior in the e-commerce conversion funnel. We build on existing research
on these subjects from several disciplines, but also believe this project represents a unique
contribution to the existing literature. In contrast with prior studies, this project will
be comparing multiple types of marketing interventions simultaneously and comparatively.
Furthermore, insight into the exact nature of the interventions in A/B testing datasets has
been identiﬁed as a key limitation in the previous large-scale analyses of online experiments
(Peysakhovich and Eckles, 2017). However, in our research context, we have access to a
set of metadata that provides us information about the nature of the interventions being
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investigated in our sample. This allows us to analyze A/B testing practices at a granular
level, which gives us the unique opportunity to connect these various streams of research.
Additionally, one characteristic of this study that distinguishes it from the previously cited
literature is its use of data from thousands of experiments by hundreds of diﬀerent ﬁrms.
As such, we believe the ﬁndings of this study and the associated managerial insights can be
expected to generalize quite broadly to a large number of e-commerce companies in a way
that micro-analyses of individual ﬁrms often fail to do.

2.3. Data & Descriptive Analysis
2.3.1. Data Collection
Provenance. Our data has been collected from a SaaS-provider of A/B testing technology
and services (“the platform”). Like many other platforms in this space, our partner is a
third-party technology service that allows websites to conduct randomized controlled trials
on their online customer base. To use the service, ﬁrms go through a relatively minor integration process that involves inserting a Javascript snippet into their website’s code that (1)
makes it possible for the testing platform to manipulate what customers see in real-time and
and (2) measure customer responses (time on site, pageviews, whether something was purchased, etc.). After this snippet is installed, ﬁrms can log into the testing platform’s website
where they will see a dashboard that allows them to create new experiments and see the
analytics associated with ongoing and past experiments. To create a new experiment, ﬁrms
can either use the platform’s point-and-click editor or custom Javascript that allows them
to manipulate essentially any element on their website. As we will describe below, these
manipulations are often new promotions or small changes to a site’s visual elements and
layout. Using the platform, ﬁrms will then choose how much of their web traﬃc to experiment on and specify any technographic targeting conditions that can limit experiments to
particular segments of their customer base (e.g., mobile device users, returning customers).
Once an experiment begins, the platform automatically allocates incoming website visitors
to a randomly selected treatment arm and metrics about each visitor’s behavior are re-
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ported back to the platform. Using the platform’s reporting dashboard, ﬁrms can then see
the analytics associated with an experiment and the results of standard statistical tests
comparing the treatment groups on various outcomes of interest.
Inclusion Criteria. We have collected the results of all experiments conducted on the platform by US-based ﬁrms between January 2014 and February 2018. We limited our analysis
to experiments with only two treatment groups. This was motivated by the fact that twocondition experiments are the most common type of intervention on the platform and that
requirement allows us to cleanly identify the intended intervention being tested in a given
experiment. We also selected experiments for which the ﬁrm speciﬁed “conversion rate” as
their primary outcome variable. A “conversion” in this context occurs whenever a visitor
completes a purchase (of any amount) on the site. This is easily the most common outcome
ﬁrms specify as their primary dependent variable, as nearly 90% of the experiments in our
population have this set as their goal metric. Lastly, we have only included experiments
that have at least 30 observations in each treatment group and at least 10 observations
for each outcome (conversion, no conversion). This last requirement matches the testing
platform’s minimum data requirements before they report the results of any statistical tests
to the ﬁrm. The resulting dataset contains 2,732 experiments from 252 unique ﬁrms. An
important feature of our sample is that 100% of the websites have some type of e-commerce
checkout process. Thus all conversions in our dataset involved a monetary transaction for
some good or service. While this limits the generalizability of our results to other sectors
(e.g., digital media sites, whose primary conversion metric may be email sign-ups), this
maximizes the value of our insights for e-commerce companies.
2.3.2. Firm Level Characteristics
Within the population of e-commerce companies, our data contains a signiﬁcant degree of
heterogeneity in the size and type of ﬁrms being investigated. It includes many modestlysized ﬁrms with daily traﬃc of less than 100 visitors, but it also includes some of the
largest brands and e-commerce websites in the United States (with daily traﬃc exceeding
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100,000 visitors); 16.7% of ﬁrms in our dataset are publicly listed. We are also able to
use a business intelligence service25 to identify the industrial sector of ﬁrms in our sample,
which we have shown in Table 1. The largest sector in our dataset by far is consumer
discretionary websites (149), which mostly includes websites selling fashion and clothing
accessories. We also have 51 websites in the consumer staples space (e.g., food and household
items) and 27 classiﬁed as information technology (mostly ﬁrms that sell software and
technology services). A portion (21) of ﬁrms are in typically B2B industries such as the
healthcare, telecommunications, industrials, and ﬁnancials; 29 ﬁrms in our sample could
not be matched.
We have generated plots for some high-level statistics to help visualize some of the most
important features of our dataset. Figure 2.1a displays the distribution of experiment counts
by ﬁrm. The majority of ﬁrms in our sample (58%) have fewer than 5 experiments; the ﬁrm
with the most number of experiments accounts for 75 of the observations in our dataset.
We do not directly observe the volume of traﬃc associated with each website in our sample.
However, we are able to approximate the daily traﬃc of each website by using the number
of sessions (i.e., customers or observations) throughout the duration of each experiment to
calculate an imputed velocity of web traﬃc over a 24-hour time period. We then average
this value across all experiments by each ﬁrm to arrive at an estimation of how much daily
traﬃc each website receives; this distribution is plotted in Figure 2.1b (log scale). As can
be seen, the vast majority of ﬁrms have daily traﬃc between 1,000 and 100,000, with the
primary mode of the distribution near 10,000 daily visitors.
2.3.3. Experiment Level Characteristics
We have also calculated some summary statistics to better understand the nature of the
individual experiments in our sample. The average number of sessions in an experiment
(i.e., the number of website visitors for which an observation was made during the test
period) is 185,540; the distribution of session counts is extremely skew with a standard
25

We used a database developed by Clearbit to match the domains of the ﬁrms in our sample to existing
public records to obtain these data.
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Figure 2.1: Histograms of Firm Level Characteristics
(a) Distribution of Experiments Counts per Firm

(b) Distribution of Imputed Daily Traﬃc by Firm

deviation of 365,099 sessions (see Figure 2.2a, log scale). The average experiment in our
sample runs for 42.4 days, with a sample standard deviation of 44.4 days (Figure 2.2b).
2.3.4. What types of experiments do e-commerce ﬁrms run?
Language of A/B Testing: Unstructured Text Analysis. We now turn to oﬀer a partial
answer to the question, “What are ﬁrms experimenting with on their websites?” To do this,
we will examine the textual metadata ﬁrms use to describe the nature of their intervention.
The testing platform allows ﬁrms to give both titles to their experiments and descriptions
Figure 2.2: Histograms of Experiment Level Characteristics
(a) Distribution of Session Counts by Experiment
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(b) Distribution of Experiment Durations

Table 2.1: Top Words in A/B Test Descriptions
Word
banner
free
oﬀer
sale
top
nav
homepage
shipping
countdown
email
promo
show
checkout
cta
split
mobile
cart
product
day
header

Frequency

Number of Firms Using Word

556
212
206
196
172
167
167
150
149
142
142
126
119
117
116
111
111
110
101
91

95
57
46
49
54
42
54
42
23
41
41
32
27
26
55
48
44
41
40
27

for each treatment group. A representative example of the text ﬁrms provide in these
ﬁelds would be, “Top Banner Shipping Test” for the experiment title and (“Control”, “Free
Shipping”) for the description of the two groups. To provide some insight into the language
ﬁrms use to describe A/B tests in our entire sample, we calculated word frequencies in the
entire corpus of experiment titles and descriptions. We removed common English language
stopwords, numbers, any company-identifying words, and the most common non-descriptive
words in our sample: “test”, “control”, “new”, “version”, “page”, “html”, “css”, “javascript”.
We then counted the number of times the remaining words appeared in our sample and also
the number of unique ﬁrms that used each word. We have displayed the top 20 words by
frequency in Table 2.1.
We highlight two observations about the words that commonly appear in our sample. First,
it appears that the majority of A/B tests are fairly incremental changes to a website’s
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existing design. By far the most common word in our sample is “banner” which, in the
language of web design, most frequently refers to an image placed above or to the side of a
website’s navigation that contains seasonal messaging or sales information. Second, we can
see ﬁrms often use words to describe the location of their intervention (“homepage”, “nav”,
“checkout”) or the nature of the intervention (“free”, “promo”, “cta”). We build on this
observation and formalize this distinction in the following section.
Feature Extraction & Classiﬁcation: Structured Text Analysis. To facilitate a meaningful
quantitative analysis of our dataset, we now attempt to provide a more structured classiﬁcation of the most common experiment types in our sample. In particular, we set out to
exploit the textual metadata described above and categorize the experiments in our sample into high-level groups that are meaningful to compare from a theoretical and practical
standpoint. We will draw on the marketing and website design literature referenced earlier
to analyze the eﬀectiveness of various intervention types that are found in our dataset. As
referenced in Section 2.2.2, both marketing/promotional and design/usability aspects of
e-commerce websites are known to play signiﬁcant roles in inﬂuencing user behavior. At
the same time, prior literature has highlighted the importance of funnel stage when evaluating the eﬀectiveness of various interventions. As such, we will classify experiments in our
dataset along these two high-level dimensions: experiment type and experiment location.
Experiment Type. Building on the literature cited in Section 2.2.2, we distinguish between
three primary types of experiments our analysis. Given the centrality of price as a driver
of economic behavior, we believe it is important to distinguish between interventions that
aﬀect purely aesthetic parts of the e-commerce experience and those that aﬀect prices. Thus
our ﬁrst category of experiments will be non-promotional design interventions. To identify
experiments of this type, we cross-referenced the metadata of each experiment with a list of
design-related keywords that are commonly used in the online user experience literature (see
Table 2.2). Additionally, we wanted to study the eﬀects of interventions that aﬀect pricing
which are quite common among our sample. However, the ﬁnal price consumers pay can
be aﬀected by both adjustments to the list price of a given product or adjustments to the
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Table 2.2: Experiment Type Classiﬁcation
Class
Design
Promotion
Shipping

Incidence
1,542
415
268

Sample Keywords
“button”, “cta”, “hero”, “image”, “text”, “color”, “layout”, “show”, “hide”
“promo”, “sale”, “deal”, “X% oﬀ”, “discount”
“shipping”, “delivery”, “FS” (abbrevation for “free shipping”)

shipping costs. Since we know from the price partitioning literature that consumers often
respond diﬀerently to these interventions, we separated them out in our analysis. Thus our
second and third experiment type categories are those involving promotional (i.e., list price
adjustments) and shipping-related interventions.
We have applied this coding scheme to our data in way that allows an experiment to
belong to one (and only one) of these three categories. Any experiment that matched
for both “design” and “promotion” keywords was counted as “promotion”. Furthermore,
any experiment that matched for both “promotion” and “shipping” keywords was coded as
“shipping”. (This is because an experiment titled “50% oﬀ shipping” would match for both
“promotion” and “shipping” categories, but the promotion is clearly tied to the shipping
costs. We could ﬁnd no examples of an experiment in which a price promotion and shipping
promotion were targeted simultaneously.)
Experiment Location. As described in 2.2.3, we know that diﬀerent marketing interventions
can have diﬀerential impact depending on where they are targeted in the conversion funnel.
A useful way for thinking about the conversion funnel in the context of e-commerce design
is to map diﬀerent aspects of a website to diﬀerent stages in the online conversion process.
Perhaps the most natural phase of the conversion funnel on any website is the homepage,
where almost all website visitors start their interactions with online merchants. As such,
homepage interventions will serve as our baseline “early funnel” class of experiments. In
coming up with other ways of mapping website elements onto funnel stages, we draw upon
the work of Moe (2003) and Song and Zahedi (2005). In particular, both papers distinguish
between behaviors having to do with browsing and searching and those concerning purchase
deliberation, facilitation, and checkout. Thus, we deﬁne one funnel phase as experiments
targeting “product listing pages” or “landing pages” (as they are commonly referred to in the
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web design industry); these are pages that list many products at once within a given category
(e.g., “men’s pants” and “women’s accessories” are common landing pages in fashion retail).
Interventions on these pages aﬀect consumers who are in the process of searching and
ﬁltering the product listings on a website. We then operationalize experiments targeting
the last phase in the e-commerce funnel as those that manipulate elements on individual
product listing pages or in the checkout process. These interventions are interpreted as
aﬀecting customers who are actively deliberating about or committing to the purchase of
a given item. Lastly, there are a number of web design elements that appear on every
page; these include the website header at the top of the page, the navigation menu, and
the footer at the bottom of the page. Because it doesn’t make sense to think of these as
targeting users at any particular phase of the conversion funnel, we consider manipulations
of these sitewide elements as their own category of experiments. In total, we have four
distinct experiment locations: sitewide, homepage, listing, and purchase. The incidence of
experiments in each of these funnel categories and the keywords used to identify them in
our dataset are shown in Table 2.3.26
Having developed this classiﬁcation scheme and labeled the experiments in our dataset using
their titles and descriptions, we will now ask if diﬀerent experiment types systematically
vary in their eﬀectiveness. We will try to quantify the average eﬀect sizes of experiments
in our sample across both experiment type and location. Importantly, we will attempt to
identify how the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent types of interventions varies across diﬀerent stages
in the e-commerce conversion funnel. However, there are several important subtleties in our
dataset that are important to model correctly to ensure we are identifying the right eﬀects
in our analysis. We will address some of these challenges in our model setup below and then
report on our ﬁndings about how experimental eﬀects vary across the conversion funnel.
26
A careful reader will notice we have not mapped the most common word in our dataset, “banner”, to
any category. This is because, by itself, an experiment testing a banner could be changing the promotional
information contained in the banner or changing the design of the banner without adding any new information. A banner could also be something that is placed throughout the entire website or only a subset of
pages. Thus, by itself, the word “banner” does not resolve much uncertainty in placing an experiment in
either the type or location dimension.
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Table 2.3: Experiment Location Classiﬁcation
Class
Sitewide
Homepage
Category
Purchase

Incidence
418
354
148
248

Sample Keywords
“sitewide”, “navigation”,
“homepage”, “HP”
“listing page”, “landing page”, “plp”
“details page”, “pdp”, “cart”, “checkout”

2.4. Meta-Analysis of Experimental Outcomes
2.4.1. Aggregate Analysis
As mentioned earlier, the stated primary objective of all A/B tests in our sample is to
increase a website’s conversion rate, i.e., the proportion of customers who buy something
out of the entire population of website visitors over a ﬁxed period of time. As such, the
main dependent variable associated with each experiment is its measured eﬀect size—or
conversion rate “lift”, as its known colloquially in digital marketing. To deﬁne this outcome
concretely, consider a given experiment (indexed by i) and its two associated treatment
conditions, t ∈ a, b. In our dataset, we observe both the number of conversions (represented
by cti ) and total sessions (represented by nti ) in each of the two treatment conditions for
each experiment in our sample. The observed “eﬀect size” of an experiment is then deﬁned
as the diﬀerence in mean conversion rates between the two treatment conditions: δ̂i :=
cai /nai − cbi /nbi .
One limitation in our dataset is that we cannot consistently identify the control condition in
many of our experiments. That is, while we know whether individuals are either in treatment
arm a or b, we do not always know which treatment arm represents the intervention and
which represents the control group. Furthermore, an intervention may not even have a
meaningful “control” group; this is because interventions in one treatment condition can
be positive, negative, or lateral changes compared to interventions in the other treatment
condition. For example, an experiment with a title of “20% promo test” may be adding
or removing promotional information, relative to the status quo version of the website at
time of the intervention. So while we will know this experiment has something to do with
promotions, we usually cannot identify the exact intervention being tested. This causes
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the distinctions between treatments a and b to vary arbitrarily across experiments; as such,
the sign of δ̂i also varies arbitrarily. This can be resolved by considering the absolute eﬀect
size of each experiment, |δ̂i |, rather than the signed eﬀect size. Given that the distribution
of eﬀect sizes is extremely skew (tightly clustered around zero), we will also be working
with the log-transform of absolute eﬀect size in subsequent analyses: yi = log |δ̂i |. We have
plotted the distribution of observed eﬀect sizes in our sample in Figure 2.3 (left panel),
along with the distribution of absolute (middle panel) and log-absolute eﬀect sizes (right
panel).
Before proceeding to examine heterogeneity across diﬀerent experiment types, there are
several characteristics of the aggregate eﬀect size distribution that are worth remarking on.
For one, the typical eﬀect size observed in an A/B test is very small: the median (absolute)
eﬀect size is just 0.1%, with the mean slightly higher at 0.7%. It is notable that for half
the experiments in our sample, the interventions failed to move the conversion rate (in any
direction) by more than one tenth of one percent. These ﬁgures suggest a large degree of
skew associated with the distribution of eﬀect sizes. Indeed, the shape of the eﬀect size
distribution is a central theme in the work of Azevedo et al. (2018), cited earlier. Using
data from Microsoft, the authors ﬁnd a very similarly skewed distribution of eﬀect sizes;
they use the shape of their distribution to argue that it is better to run a large number
of low-powered experiments to ﬁnd the small number interventions with outsized returns.
Our sample, which has data from more than 250 diﬀerent ﬁrms, appears to be consistent
with this ﬁnding. Indeed, the distribution of eﬀect sizes in our sample appears to almost
Figure 2.3: Distribution of experimental eﬀect size and its transforms in our sample
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perfectly follow the classic “Pareto principle”: 20% of the experiments in our sample account
for 81% of the lift aggregated across experiments. This relationship can be seen in Figure
2.4, in which we have ordered the eﬀect sizes from largest to smallest (left panel) and then
calculated the cumulative sums by percentile (right panel).
Figure 2.4: Distribution of Absolute Eﬀect Sizes by Percentiles

2.4.2. Heterogeneity Across Experimental Types
Having documented the heterogeneity of experimental interventions in our dataset in Section
3.4, we now turn to the question of whether these diﬀerent strategies can be linked to a
test’s outcome. This analysis will not only provide practical insight for managers when
determining their testing strategies, but it also makes a theoretical contribution to the
e-commerce literature by documenting and quantifying how diﬀerent factors drive online
shopping behavior. To investigate this topic, we will be performing a meta-analysis on the
eﬀect size of experiments in our sample. Speciﬁcally, we will ask how the intervention types
identiﬁed earlier are related to an experiment’s absolute eﬀect size. We already documented
why we discard the sign of the eﬀect sizes in our sample, but—before proceeding to the model
deﬁnition itself—it is worth taking the time to clearly delineate how this deﬁnition of our
dependent variable aﬀects the interpretation of our model and its parameter estimates.
While we lose some information in our data by discarding the direction of each experiment’s
eﬀect size, we also gain the ability to aggregate data across experiments by intervention type.
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This is particularly useful in the context of a cross-ﬁrm, cross-experiment meta-analysis. To
consider this concretely, consider a scenario in which two websites are testing an intervention
that increases the size of their product images. Relative to a baseline status quo control
condition, suppose larger product images lift conversions for Website A (positive eﬀect
size), while smaller product images may be better for Website B (negative eﬀect size). If we
attempted to simply average these signed eﬀects (in this over-simpliﬁed, stylized model),
we would ﬁnd that manipulating product images has no eﬀect on conversion rates. But by
taking the absolute values, we are instead able to say that image manipulations do have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on conversion rates, but the best way to implement that manipulation
will vary from website to website. As such, by taking the absolute value, we abstract away
from answering the question of whether a particular intervention increases or decreases
conversion rate, but rather answer the question of how generic types of interventions aﬀect
conversion rates. In this sense, instead of studying which interventions improve conversion
rates, our analysis answers a slightly diﬀerent question: “Which types of interventions
have the largest average impact on moving a website’s conversion rate (either positively or
negatively)?” Note that given the discussion around the shape of the distribution of eﬀect
sizes—in which experiments with large eﬀect sizes are actually quite rare—identifying broad
classes of interventions that have larger eﬀects is indeed a valuable exercise. As with any
generalizable insights, ﬁrms will need to experiment within a given class of interventions to
identify which particular manipulations result in positive eﬀect sizes, but this analysis can
at least guide this search process toward the fatter tail of the eﬀect size distribution.
2.4.3. Top-Level Models
We are now in a position to precisely deﬁne our primary regression model. We deﬁne our
dependent variable to be the log of the absolute eﬀect size associated with an experiment:
yij = log |δ̂ij |; in this setup, index i represents the i-th experiment associated with ﬁrm j
in our sample. Our main research questions are about how intervention type and location
varies with eﬀect size in e-commerce experiments. Before analyzing any interaction eﬀects
between these factors, we ﬁrst identify the main eﬀects of these variables. We run two
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separate regressions modeling experiment outcomes yij —the log absolute eﬀect size of each
experiment—on either a Typeij variable or a Locationij variable that includes dummies for
each of the experimental categories identiﬁed in section 2.3. We also include a set of control
variables, Controlsij :

yij = Typeij θ + Controlsij γ + εij

(M 1)

yij = Locationij θ + Controlsij γ + εij

(M 2)

The controls in this regression are included to address potential concerns about endogeneity
in our model. The largest likely source of endogeneity is unobserved heterogeneity across
ﬁrms. In particular, it is plausible that ﬁrms from diﬀerent industries exhibit systematically
diﬀerent testing strategies across experiment types. Even within an industry, it is possible
that—for unobservable reasons—some ﬁrms are simply more likely to make interventions
with large eﬀect sizes. The extent to which this is also correlated with our main independent
variables—the types of tests ﬁrms choose to perform—will bias the estimates of our primary
parameters of interest. Thus, we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects variables in our set of controls.
Furthermore, it is likely that diﬀerent types of experiments (say, promotions) are conducted
with varying frequency through the year. If observed eﬀect sizes also systematically vary
throughout the year, this would be a source of omitted variables bias in our estimation.
Indeed, we know from conversations with the testing platform that both ﬁrms and consumers
exhibit atypical behavior around certain time periods throughout the year (e.g., those near
Thanksgiving, Christmas). For this reason, we also include separate time-speciﬁc dummy
variables for each week of the year.
Imperfectly Observed Data. There is one challenge with how we have deﬁned our dependent variable that presents a non-trivial challenge for obtaining unbiased estimates of
the parameters in our model. In particular, we must consider the fact that our dependent
variable is necessarily observed with noise. Considering ﬁrst the raw eﬀect size that our
dependent variable is based on, recall that δ̂ij does not represent the true eﬀect size asso-
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ciated with an experiment, but rather an estimate of this value (we have used the “hat”
notation to distinguish this estimate from the true parameter, δij ). This is, of course, why
statistics are necessary in A/B testing in the ﬁrst place: to quantify the uncertainty around
this estimated eﬀect size and determine if it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Standard
practice in A/B testing is to use the proportional means Z-test with pooled variance. In
this test, a Z-score is computed by ﬁrst calculating the standard error of the mean:
q
ν̂ij = p̂ij (1 − p̂ij )(1/naij + 1/nbij ), where p̂ij = (caij + cbij )/(naij + nbij )

This is then divided into the estimated mean, δ̂ij , and cross-referenced with the standard
normal CDF to obtain a p-value: Z = |δ̂ij /ν̂ij |; p = Φ(Z).
To minimize the inﬂuence of spurious results and the incidence of false positives, this pvalue is typically checked against a pre-determined signiﬁcance level α (almost universally
0.05). Firms usually only consider experiments that reach this signiﬁcance level to be of
value. We are in a similar position, in which we want to minimize the impact of spurious
correlations on our parameter estimates. As such, we may be tempted to exclude any
experiments in our dataset with p-values above a designated threshold, α. However, this
also has signiﬁcant downsides that require us to discard the vast majority of our data.
Another problem with this approach is that, despite the prominence of the conventional α
level of 0.05 throughout the history of statistics, any value of α is essentially an arbitrary
modeling choice (Gelman and Stern, 2006).
However, there is an alternative: a common approach to address imperfectly observed variables is to weigh the observations by the inverse of their variance. This causes outcomes
that are observed more precisely to have higher weight in determining the model outcome.
Not only that, but this method—inverse variance weighted least squares, or WLS—is actually the best, linear, unbiased estimator of average partial eﬀects in a regression model
(Hartung et al., 2011). In most empirical research projects, the eﬀects of noise on dependent variables are often diﬃcult to deal with, since one rarely has estimates of both the
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observation mean and its variance. Our dataset is unique in that we are able to calculate
both the point estimate, δ̂ij , and the standard error, ν̂ij , of our dependent variable.
Lastly, because we are ultimately working with the log-norm transform of δ̂ij , suitable care
must be taken to calculate the proper variance of the resulting yij variables. By the Central
Limit Theorem, the sampling distribution of δ̂ij will be asymptotically Gaussian, centered
around the true eﬀect size with standard deviation ν̂ij . If we let uij = |δ̂ij | be deﬁned
as the absolute value of the observed eﬀect size in a given experiment, then the sampling
distribution of uij will follow what is known as the folded normal distribution. Finally, by
setting yij = log uij , we can see that the exponential of yij will be a folded normal random
variable. Using these facts with the density function of a folded normal variable and the
integral deﬁnition of variance, we can parameterize the variance of yij purely in terms of δ̂ij
and ν̂ij using the formula below. In this study, we evaluate this integral using Monte Carlo
simulation.27

h
i
σ̂ij = Var[yij | δ̂ij = δ, ν̂ij = ν] = E (yij − E[yij ])2
Z
= (y − E[yij ])2 py (y) dy
ZR
=
y 2 py (y) dy − E[yij ]2
ZR
=
y 2 pu (ey ) dy − E[yij ]2

ZR∞ 
(ey −δ)2
(ey +δ)2
1
1
−
−
2
2
2
y √
e 2ν + √
e 2ν
dy − E[yij ]2
=
2πν 2
2πν 2
0

2 , in our sample, we then deﬁne each obserHaving obtained an estimate for the variance, σ̂ij
27

Speciﬁcally, given that we have closed form estimates for δ̂ij and ν̂ij for each experiment, we ﬁrst
generate 100,000 draws (per experiment) from a normal distribution parameterized by these values. We
then calculate the empirical variance of the log-norm transform of the simulated values to obtain a reliable
measure of the variance associated with each observation in our sample.
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2 . We then estimate the parameters of our
vation’s weight as its inverse variance: wij = 1/σ̂ij
−1 T
model, β = (γ θ), using the weighted least squares estimator: β̂ = XT WX
X Wy,

where X is the stacked matrix of data vectors xij = (Controlsij Typeij ) and W is a diagonal matrix of observation weights wij . This estimator minimizes the weighted squared
error of the model’s residuals, resulting in estimates of our regression coeﬃcients that will
be unbiased (assuming conditional mean independence).
2.4.4. Main Eﬀects Models
We now turn to the results of our regression analysis, summarized in Table 2.4. Columns
(1) and (2) correspond to the main eﬀects models described earlier for experiment type
and location (respectively). In the ﬁrst model, we have used the design category as the
baseline class. We see in column (1) that the coeﬃcient on “Promotion” is positive and
signiﬁcant, with a point estimate suggesting that the average promotional experiment in
our dataset has an eﬀect size that is 100e1.26−1 ≈ 127% that of the average “Design”
experiment (without controlling for intervention location). The coeﬃcient on “Shipping” is
negative, but not signiﬁcantly distinguishable from zero. Calculating the contrast between
the “Promotion” and “Shipping” coeﬃcients (equivalent to changing the baseline class in
our regression design) results in a signiﬁcant T statistic of 2.02 (p=0.04). The fact that there
does appear to be a diﬀerential eﬀect between price and shipping promotions is consistent
with the literature on price partitioning.28
Turning to the location model in column (2), we have set the “Homepage” class as our
baseline experiment location. Without controlling for intervention type, the “Sitewide”
experiments (those manipulating elements that appear on every page of a website) appear
signiﬁcantly smaller than the average “Homepage” experiment (β = −1.65, p < 0.001);
experimental eﬀects in the “Category” funnel stage are signiﬁcantly larger (β = 1.24, p <
0.01). Perhaps surprisingly, the coeﬃcient on the last funnel stage (“Purchase”) is not
28
However, note that we are not controlling for the level of discount across interventions; this means we
are not directly comparing the eﬀect of a ﬁxed amount of price change across listing and shipping prices, as
would be required for a proper analysis of price partitioning.
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distinguishable from that of “Homepage” experiments.
2.4.5. Interaction Eﬀects: Heterogeneity by Funnel Depth
Among our primary research questions is to investigate how various types of e-commerce
interventions may diﬀerentially aﬀect purchase behavior throughout the online conversion
funnel. Having run two main eﬀects regressions above—in which we looked at the eﬀect
of experiment type and location separately—we will now specify an interaction model that
will allow us to determine if treatment eﬀectiveness does depend on where an intervention
is targeted in the funnel. In particular, we include the two categorical variables from the
prior speciﬁcations (Typeij and Locationij ), as well as the interaction between them.

yij = Typeij θ 1 + Locationij θ 2 + Typeij × Locationij θ 3 + Controlsij γ + εij

(3)

This model allows us to not only control for treatment heterogeneity in the identiﬁcation
of our main eﬀects coeﬃcients, but the interaction coeﬃcients will also give us the ability
to detect how diﬀerent types of interventions vary in their eﬀectiveness by funnel depth.
The results of this model (estimated with WLS and the same control variables as in prior
speciﬁcations) are shown in column (3) of Table 2.4.
Looking at the results, we ﬁrst note that the main eﬀects coeﬃcients among the intervention type variables are qualitatively similar to the main eﬀects regression in column (1).
Comparing model (3) with the location regression in model (2), we see an attenuation of
the coeﬃcient on the “Sitewide” location; this suggests controlling for intervention type
is an important factor to consider when looking at how intervention location aﬀects consumer purchasing behavior. Turning to the interaction eﬀects, we ﬁnd that there does exist
heterogeneity in the eﬀectiveness of various interventions across funnel depth. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence that “Promotion” interventions—those oﬀering discounts or purchase
incentives on product list prices—become less eﬀective at later stages in the funnel. The
diﬀerential eﬀect across the funnel between “Promotion” and the baseline “Design” class
appears to be strongest at the “Category” phase, with the largest interaction coeﬃcient
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Table 2.4: Statistical models
Dependent variable:
Log of A/B test
absolute eﬀect size yij = log (|δij |)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Intervention Type
Design (Baseline)
Promotion
Shipping

—

—

1.26∗
(0.64)
−1.08
(0.96)

2.10∗
(1.00)
−1.03
(0.72)

Intervention Location
Homepage (Baseline)
Sitewide
Category
Purchase

—

—

−1.65∗∗∗
(0.48)
1.24∗∗
(0.40)
0.06
(0.52)

−0.06
(0.48)
1.79∗∗∗
(0.38)
0.84
(0.68)

Interaction Eﬀects
−1.49
(1.12)
1.38
(0.84)
−6.20∗∗∗
(1.84)
0.29
(1.12)
−2.30+
(1.25)
2.59∗∗
(0.99)

Sitewide x Promotion
Sitewide x Shipping
Category x Promotion
Category x Shipping
Purchase x Promotion
Purchase x Shipping

Firm Fixed Eﬀects
Time Fixed Eﬀects
Num. obs.

Yes
Yes
2203

Yes
Yes
1085

Yes
Yes
899

∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, + p < 0.1. Dependent Variable: Log
of absolute eﬀect size. Heteroskedasticity robust (White-Huber) standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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being found between “Category x Promotion” (β = −6.2, p < 0.001). A marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect is also seen at the “Purchase” funnel stage as well (β = −2.30, p < 0.10).
While our results do not suggest promotions are ineﬀective at later stages of the online
conversion funnel, they appear to be most eﬀective if advertised earlier in the customer’s
journey through an e-commerce website. While this would need to be conﬁrmed with further research, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that promotions on a website
do more to convince shoppers that they want to buy something rather than aﬀecting their
decision about whether to buy a particular product they are already considering.
Turning to the interaction coeﬃcients on the “Shipping” category, we ﬁnd a evidence for
a positive moderation between funnel depth and the eﬀect size of shipping-related interventions. While the interactions between “Shipping” and both “Sitewide” and “Category”
funnel locations are not statistically distinguishable from zero, there is a signiﬁcant and
positive coeﬃcient on the “Purchase x Shipping” interaction (β = 2.59, p < 0.01). This is
perhaps not surprising by itself, as it would make sense that customers are not as sensitive to logistical costs like shipping if they have not yet decided to purchase anything. On
the other hand, rational consumers would be expected to consider total costs—including
both list price and shipping costs—when making a purchase decision at all phases of the
consideration process.
We have known from the literature on price partitioning cited in 2.2.2 that consumers
deviate from rationality in the form of a ﬁrst-order eﬀect between list and shipping prices—
i.e., that consumers react more strongly to a $1 change in shipping price more than an
equivalent change in listing price. However, our research suggests the existence of a secondorder eﬀect of price-partitioning on consumer purchase behavior. When we consider the
diﬀerential eﬀects of funnel depth on both “Promotion” and “Shipping” interventions—that
list price promotions become less eﬀective later in the funnel while shipping promotions
become more eﬀective later in the funnel—our analysis suggests that both the type and
location of marketing interventions are important factors for understanding consumers’

92

response to promotions. In addition to providing novel insight into how online consumers
deviate from rational consumption behavior, this research is also of consequential practical
signiﬁcance to managers of e-commerce ﬁrms, as it suggests how ﬁrms can maximize the
impact of both their A/B tests and unilateral marketing interventions by factoring both (a)
the type of intervention and (b) where it is advertised within a website’s architecture.

2.5. Robustness Checks
2.5.1. Alternative Funnel Speciﬁcation
The results from the primary regression model in Section 2.4—that models the interaction
between experiment type and funnel stage—provides suggestive evidence for two ﬁndings:
relative to non-marketing design interventions (a) promotional interventions are less eﬀective at later stages in the e-commerce conversion funnel; and (b) shipping interventions are
more eﬀective later in the conversion funnel. An important data requirement in this model
was that experiments needed to have metadata that allowed us to identify both independent
variables: the experiment type (design, promotion, shipping) and location on the website
(sitewide, homepage, category, purchase). This limited our analysis to experiments meeting
both these criteria, which left us with a selected, lower-powered sample to detect our eﬀects
in. One may also be reasonably concerned with measurement error in how well our labeling
scheme accurately captured the location of a given experiment on a website (due to ﬁrms
using the same terminology diﬀerently or lack of speciﬁcity in the keywords we matched
against).
In this section, we augment the prior analysis using an alternative operationalization of each
experiment’s funnel stage. Speciﬁcally, we will use what we call an experiment’s baseline
conversion rate as a proxy for how “deep” in the conversion funnel a given experiment is
targeted. To motivate this concept, consider two experiments; one oﬀering a promo code on
the website’s homepage and another oﬀering a promo code when a user begins the checkout
process (say on the “cart” page of the website). Note that sessions are only counted in the
results of an experiment if the user was exposed to the manipulation. Thus, while essentially
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all customers will see the homepage promotion, only customers that click through to the
cart page will see the cart promotion. A non-converting customer will be much less likely to
see the second experiment, whereas a converting customer would be counted in the results
of both hypothetical experiments. If we deﬁne the baseline conversion rate of a website
element as the conversion rate among the set of users exposed to that website element in
their session, it is obvious that the homepage experiment will have a lower baseline rate
than the cart experiment.
To capture this notion quantitatively, we will use the conversion among all sessions recorded
in a given experiment, (independent of which treatment each session was exposed to):

BCRi = BaselineConversionRatei =

cai + cbi
nai + nbi

While the quantity deﬁned above is by no means the “correct” proxy to use, using any
other reasonable proxy yields nearly identical results to those we will report below. Other
proxies could be the minimum (or maximum) of the two conversion rates between treatment
conditions, the conversion rate of all A arms or all B arms, or a random choice between the
conversion rates of each condition—the results presented in this section do not depend on
any of these operationalizations.
The goal of deﬁning this quantity is to be able to make comparisons about the funnel
stage of diﬀerent experiments. We are making the case that an experiment with a baseline
conversion rate of 10% is “deeper” in the e-commerce conversion funnel than one with a
conversion rate of 1%. This seems reasonable since, almost by deﬁnition, a section of a
website that has a high conversion rate is aﬀecting the behavior of users that are closer to
completing a purchase. Thus, we will interpret experiments with high baseline conversion
rates as those targeting later stages of the e-commerce conversion funnel (and vice versa).
Modeling Treatment Heterogeneity. By using an experiment’s baseline conversion rate
as a proxy for its position in the checkout funnel, we can look for heterogeneity between
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experiments that are targeted at diﬀerent stages in the funnel. In this analysis, we will divide
experiments into “Early Funnel” and “Late Funnel” groups and look for heterogeneous
eﬀects between funnel stages among the diﬀerent experiment types identiﬁed earlier. In
particular, we choose a conversion rate τ ∈ (0, 1) as our binarization threshold; experiments
with baseline conversion rates above this threshold will be considered “Late Funnel”:
LateFunnelτi = I(BCRi > τ )

We can then run a similar regression as in Equation (3), except rather than interacting the
intervention types with a categorical location variable, we will use the binary LateFunnel
variable deﬁned here:

yij = Controlsij γ + Typeij θ + LateFunnelτij + Typeij × LateFunnelτij β τ + εij

(4)

Note the conversion rate threshold τ (at which we consider an experiment to go from being
“early” or “late” funnel) is entirely arbitrary. Rather than choosing any particular value of
τ , we will calculate the regression coeﬃcients in Equation (4) for many levels of τ across
the support of the distribution of conversion rates in our dataset.
Because we are primarily interested in how intervention eﬀectiveness varies throughout
the conversion funnel, we calculate the main interaction eﬀects between LateFunnelτij and
Promotionij and Shippingij variables (design interventions are our baseline intervention
type). The top two panels in Figure 2.5 have both point estimates and (heteroskedastic robust) 95% conﬁdence intervals for this coeﬃcient (y-axis) plotted for diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of the binarization threshold τ (x-axis). The bottom panel contains a histogram of baseline
conversion rates, which aids in visualizing how many experiments fall above or below a given
binarization threshold level. Finally, because we are not using keyword ﬁltering to deﬁne
our funnel variable in this speciﬁcation, the analyses below are conducted on the sample of
2,201 experiments in our dataset that have been coded for intervention type. As we turn to
the results, recall that since design experiments serve as our baseline class, the interaction
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eﬀects reported here should be interpreted as how conversion rates among promotion and
shipping experiments vary across the conversion funnel relative to design interventions.
Figure 2.5: Robustness Test for Alternative Funnel Speciﬁcation

2.5
Looking at Figure 2.5, we see in the “Promotion × LateFunnel” panel that for experiments
very early in the conversion funnel (near the 0.001 baseline conversion rate), the coeﬃcient
on this interaction may be positive, indicating that eﬀect sizes are larger later in the funnel.
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However, these results rely on a small number of experiments with very small conversion
rates below the binarization threshold. Closer to the central mass of the conversion rate
distribution (near 0.08), the coeﬃcients (both point estimates and conﬁdence bands) on the
“Promotion × LateFunnel” variable are negative. At the tail end of the distribution (the
last three points on the right), the conﬁdence intervals become much larger and the eﬀects
become indistinguishable from zero. To summarize, the results of this analysis show mostly
null or negative eﬀects, which is largely consistent with the results reported in Section
2.4.5, where we found promotional experiments become less eﬀective later in the conversion
funnel.
Turning to the “Shipping × LateFunnel” panel in Figure 2.5, we see that the coeﬃcients
on this variable are almost always positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. There are
some regions where the point estimates appear to be closer to zero, but—on the whole—this
analysis also appears to be consistent with our previous ﬁndings: that shipping interventions
are more eﬀective later in the conversion funnel.
In sum, the results of this analysis—using a diﬀerent operationalization of funnel depth and
a larger set of experiments—are largely consistent with the evidence presented in columns
3 of Table 2.4. Relative to design interventions, shipping interventions are typically more
eﬀective later in the conversion funnel. And across both speciﬁcations, we see evidence
that promotions are less eﬀective at some later stages of the conversion funnel. That fact
that these ﬁndings are directionally consistent in both of our interaction analyses—using
text-based operationalization or conversion rate operationalization of funnel stage—provides
stronger evidence of our conclusions than either analysis alone.

2.6. Conclusion
The goals of this project have been to provide insight into the content of real-world ecommerce experimentation. We have investigated the types of experiments ﬁrms run and
provided a robust analysis of how varying intervention types vary throughout diﬀerent phase
of the e-commerce conversion funnel.
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The results described in this project provide both meaningful managerial insight and contribute to the broader literature on the marketing conversion funnel. We have shown that,
consistent with prior work, the distribution of eﬀect sizes in digital experimentation is
extremely skew. To help ﬁrms ﬁnd those interventions with larger eﬀect sizes, we then performed a meta-analysis across the experiments in our sample. This revealed that the largest
eﬀect sizes (in absolute terms) for the average experiment in our sample are achieved by
focusing on promotional and shipping-related interventions. Naturally, proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms will need to weigh the costs of price and shipping discounts against the changes in
conversion rates associated with these interventions. Nonetheless, there are times when
maximizing conversion rates speciﬁcally can be of strategic value to ﬁrms; in these cases,
this work provides evidence-based guidance on the most eﬀective ways for inﬂuencing customer conversions.
Furthermore, even without altering the types of interventions ﬁrms experiment with (i.e., by
increasing or decreasing the number of promotions they test), our research provides evidence
on where ﬁrms can best target those interventions in their website architecture to maximize
their impact. This is because we were able to use two independent operationalizations
to analyze the eﬀectiveness of various promotional interventions throughout the typical ecommerce conversion funnel. In particular, results of both our analyses suggest that price
promotions are best advertised early in the website conversion funnel, whereas shippingrelated interventions are best targeted towards customers that are in the later stages of the
buying process. Lastly, because we have arrived at these insights through an aggregate metaanalysis of many diﬀerent websites, we can make reasonable claims about the generalizability
of our ﬁndings among the population of e-commerce companies. We believe this research
provides a unique insight to the factors that inﬂuence online shopping behavior in a quite
general way across the on-site conversion funnel.
These ﬁndings and the framework laid out in this project provide several promising avenues
for future lines of both industrial and academic inquiry. For one, our results underscore the
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importance of testing not just the right types of interventions in e-commerce experiments,
but also making sure those interventions are targeted at the right position in the marketing
funnel. Even in cases where our results are not immediately generalizable (e.g., for SaaS
or media companies), this framework provides a useful template to individual ﬁrms for
optimizing online conversions along multiple dimensions. Determining whether our ﬁndings
do generalize to these other industries would be a valuable direction for future research.
Furthermore, our research can provide a starting point for targeted lab studies or ﬁeld
experiments to provide more speciﬁcity about the interaction between intervention types and
locations. In addition to expanding the scope of our top-level ﬁndings, natural hypotheses to
test in follow-up work are whether diﬀerent sub-types of design interventions (e.g., generic
banners vs. pop-ups) and diﬀerent magnitudes of promotions (e.g., 10% vs. 50%) aﬀect
consumers heterogeneously across the conversion funnel.
Though there is room for future work in this area, this research represents an important
contribution to our understanding of the increasingly important practice of A/B testing. By
determining which types of experiments ﬁrms are running on their websites and quantifying
the relative eﬀect sizes of these experiments, we have provided meaningful managerial and
theoretical insight into how ﬁrms use and can optimize their use of digital experiments.
Lastly, we reiterate how this project represents a shift in perspective among how researchers
can think about the topic of digital experimentation. Along with a small but growing body
of literature on this topic, we advocate that business researchers use modern A/B testing
technologies to not only test their own hypotheses, but also to investigate how companies
themselves use these technologies. We hope future research can build on this project to
further our understanding of the practice of digital experimentation in real-world business
environments.
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CHAPTER 3
PERSONALIZED DISCOUNT TARGETING IN ONLINE RETAIL
WITH TECHNOGRAPHIC TRACE DATA
3.1. Introduction
The use of technology to deliver personalized customer experiences has been a key strategy in
retail management for decades (Peppers and Rogers, 1993). As shopping has increasingly
moved online, algorithmic product recommendation, service customization, and targeted
promotional messaging have all become staples of the retail experience (Dias et al., 2008;
Ansari and Mela, 2003). But in addition to the value information technology has for improving customers’ shopping experiences, there is a growing appreciation of the power of
technology as a means of price discrimination (Wallheimer, 2018). As such, algorithmicallyenabled price discrimination, or “personalized pricing”, is an increasingly important topic
of study in legal, social, and economic disciplines. Our objective in this project is to study
the potential value of price discrimination in the e-commerce environment, with a particular
focus on evaluating the prospect of using technographic trace data to target promotional
discounts to online shoppers.
Though there has been increased interest in the subject in recent years, price discrimination of various sorts has been an essential practice throughout the history of retail.
Promotional discounts in particular have been used by ﬁrms for decades as a form of passive price discrimination, whereby consumers eﬀectively self-segment by deciding to use (or
not use) a discount coupon. (Narasimhan, 1984; Bolton, 1989; Reibstein and Traver, 1982;
Bawa and Shoemaker, 1987; Blattberg et al., 1995). But with the advent of customer relationship management (CRM) techniques and software, it became possible to measure and
exploit heterogeneity in customer preferences (Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Drew et al., 2001).
As a result, ﬁrms in many industries started to use CRM data to target their discounts
at the segment or individual customer level (Bawa and Shoemaker, 1989; Grewal et al.,
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2011). Within this vein, several empirical studies have investigated the value of using CRM
data as a means of price discrimination through the strategic targeting of price discounts.
(Rossi et al., 1996; Zhang and Krishnamurthi, 2004; Johnson et al., 2013; Musalem et al.,
2008). A common ﬁnding within this body of work is the importance of using purchase
history data to segment consumers; among the studies that include other variables (e.g.,
customer demographics) within a targeting framework, the authors ﬁnd these features to be
signiﬁcantly less valuable than customer relationship data (Gupta and Chintagunta, 1994;
Khan et al., 2009).29
While assuming the presence of purchase history data makes sense in many historical contexts, the online retail environment presents a novel set of both opportunities and challenges for customer targeting. Though traditional, CRM-based methods of targeting are
still valuable for email and mobile application promotions (Luo et al., 2014; Sahni, 2015;
Ghose et al., 2019; Dubé et al., 2017), they are much less useful for targeting interventions
of active web browsers. E-commerce ﬁrms have the unique ability to deliver algorithmically
personalized experiences in real-time to anonymous website visitors for whom they may
have no relational history data.30 For any user merely browsing a ﬁrm’s online storefront—
even if they are not logged in or are otherwise anonymous to the ﬁrm—modern e-commerce
websites can exploit the presence of digital trace data provided by nearly all modern web
browsers to target that person with a discount oﬀer or other form of promotional messaging.
In Table 3.1, we have listed various forms of technographic data generated by web browsers
and the information this data can reveal about an individual.
In some sense, the transition to online-shopping can seen as both a curse and a blessing from
the targeter’s perspective: on one hand, many (if not the vast majority of) online shoppers
will not be logged in when browsing an online storefront and, thus, traditional mechanisms
29

The importance of behavioral history proﬁles for targeting has been demonstarted in other settings as
well, such as web and mobile advertising (Raﬁeian and Yoganarasimhan, 2020; Trusov et al., 2016).
30
While it has been possible for brick-and-mortar ﬁrms to reach prospective customers through the purchase of market intelligence and demographic data on households (Simester et al., 2020), these techniques
can be expensive and make little sense for digital-ﬁrst e-commerce enterprises, for which their addressable
market has no geographic constraint.
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Table 3.1: Common trace data provided by modern web browsers
Data Source
TCP header
IP address

Inferrable information
Approximate location, internet service provider

HTTP header
User-Agent

Operating system, operating system version, browser,
browser version, device type

Referer

How the user arrived to the website; search query (if provided)

Cookie

Whether or not the user has visited website before

Client-side tracking script
Built-in browser
JavaScript objects

Device features, e.g., screen size, color depth, language, timezone,
graphics hardware, plugins installed, fonts installed, canvas hash

for promotional discount targeting will be irrelevant; on the other hand, the presence of digital trace data provides a means of distinguishing users that visit a ﬁrm’s website, whether
or not they have any prior relationship with the ﬁrm. Prior work has demonstrated the
value of adaptive web personalization using digital trace data in non-promotional contexts
(Kobsa et al., 2001; Zhang, 2003; Yi et al., 2009; Padmanabhan et al., 2001), but existing
literature contains no research about the value of this data for discount targeting in online
retail. And while there is descriptive research that has shown ﬁrms engaging in technographic price discrimination (Hamermesh, 2013; Hannak et al., 2014), there is a lack of
empirical research on this subject in terms of methodological implementation and quantiﬁable economic value.
This project makes several contributions to the growing literature on personalized pricing
and targeted marketing. First, we derive the theoretically optimal targeting strategy for
campaigns involving promotional price discounts and describe a technique for using machine
learning to estimate this strategy from experimental data. Our model is speciﬁcally designed
to accommodate many diﬀerent forms of price promotions that are common in online retail,
making it a ﬂexible framework for estimating and measuring the returns from optimal
targeting policies in a variety of campaigns. As a novel theoretical contribution, we ﬁnd
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that in contrast to prior literature on targeted marketing in the absence of discounts, the
optimal discount targeting strategy depends on segmenting customers based on a calibrated
trade-oﬀ between their individual baseline purchase rate and heterogeneity in their response
to the discount. Next, our methodology demonstrates how to use counterfactual policy
evaluation to assess the economic value of a targeted discount strategy using data from
a randomized experiment; thus ﬁrms can use this technique to accurately estimate the
proﬁtability of a campaign prior to implementation. Lastly, we conclude by applying our
proposed approach to real-world data from A/B tests at two separate ﬁrms and ﬁnd our
method results in signiﬁcantly higher proﬁts than both non-targeted strategies and existing
benchmarks in targeted marketing. This research is the ﬁrst to quantify the empirical value
of technographic data for discount targeting, ﬁnding that it can result in gains that are
competitive with those observed in prior research based on traditional CRM data.

3.2. Background & Related Literature
Given the growing interest and concern about the use of digital personalization technologies
for price discrimination, it is useful to contextualize our project within these broader topics.
We brieﬂy review the economic literature on price discrimination, and then review more
recent developments in public policy and consumer advocacy around the potential and
practice of personalized pricing. In the subsequent section, we discuss how our work relates
to prior methodological research on targeted marketing.
2. Price discrimination, welfare, & digital privacy
The traditional lens through which to evaluate the overall eﬀect of price discrimination—in
both academic and public policy settings—has been to measure its impact on Marshallian welfare, based on utilitarian notions of producer and consumer surplus.

Within

this framework, economic models of monopoly markets have consistently found that
price discrimination decreases consumer surplus while increasing ﬁrm proﬁts and total
welfare. (Varian, 1989; Katz, 1987). However, as various researchers have incorporated
more complex dynamics into models of personalized pricing—including the eﬀects of
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competition (Choudhary et al., 2005), quality diﬀerentiation (Ghose and Huang, 2009),
price-comparison technologies (Chen and Sudhir, 2004), and strategic consumer disclosure
of data (Ali et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2020)—the implications for ﬁrm proﬁts and consumer
surplus are ambiguous, with various models predicting increases and decreases in both
quantities.

Two empirical studies have speciﬁcally investigated the welfare eﬀects of

personalized pricing on the internet, with both supporting the monopoly theory of price
discrmination, ﬁnding that total welfare increases at the expense of consumer surplus
(Shiller, 2014; Dubé and Misra, 2019).31
Of course, there are other lenses through which to view the practice of personalized pricing
besides its implications for utilitarian economic welfare. Various forms of price discrimination remain controversial, as consumers generally view the practice of charging diﬀerent
consumers diﬀerent prices to be unfair, especially when such decisions are based on personal
characteristics (Kahneman et al., 1986; Huang et al., 2005; Englmaier et al., 2012). Further, targeted price discrimination has the potential to result in unintended racial or class
discrimination (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Larson et al., 2015; Miller and Hosanagar,
2019).

There is also a growing concern among consumer advocates and policymakers

around the use of big data and digital technologies for personalization more generally
(Wagner and Eidenmuller, 2019; O’Neil, 2016; Council of Economic Advisers, 2015;
Alreck and Settle, 2007).
As a result, there has been a vigorous policy debate in recent years with landmark privacyfocused regulations being passed in several major markets—including the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). These
polices have generally focused on regulating the use of “personal data” and cross-session,
31
Though information technology has increased the ability of ﬁrms to price discriminate, it is also relevant to consider the ways consumers have beneﬁted more generally from the transition to e-commerce. For
example, a macroeconomic analysis of the European market suggests that e-commerce has had substantial
beneﬁts for household welfare (Cardona et al., 2015). The eﬀects of shopbots have served to increase competition and keep prices low (Tang et al., 2010b); similar eﬀects likely exist for coupon and deal aggregators.
We highlight this to note that even purely economic analysis of how novel technologies aﬀect societal welfare
can be a very complex and nuanced exercise.
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cross-site cookie tracking. One consequence of these laws has been to force many ﬁrms to
delete CRM data gathered without aﬃrmative consent, with some companies losing up to
70% of their records (Hall, 2018). As such, the value of this data and traditional CRM
practices—which, as prior research has shown, have been critical for customer targeting
historically—face a future with increased compliance costs, regulatory scrutiny, and market
uncertainty.
At the same time, the extent to which technographic trace data falls under the purview of
these privacy laws is ambiguous. IP addresses and geolocation have been singled out by
some authorities as protected personal data (Reid, 2017; Meyer, 2018), but the collection
of other forms of trace data—such as a device’s operating system, browser version, and
referring domain—do not appear to be subject to the same strict regulations (unless these
data are tied to a user’s personal proﬁle within a CRM). In any case, given that this data
can be anonymously logged and that it requires no historical user proﬁles or third-party
tracking software, it almost certainly faces lower regulatory barriers than many forms of
CRM and behavioral proﬁling data that have emerged in recent years.32
In light of these circumstances, research on the value of this form of ﬁrst-party trace data
for targeted marketing and price discrimination may be of interest to several stakeholders,
including managers, consumer advocates, and policymakers. While we cannot deﬁnitively
address total welfare eﬀects of personalized pricing generally, this project is able to provide some empirical insights that are relevant to the broader discussion on personalization
technologies and the value of technographic data for price discrimination. In particular,
we attempt to quantify the how proﬁtable this data is for the purposes of oﬀering targeted
discount oﬀers to online shoppers.
32
Attempts to use the unique combination of all a user’s technographic data for device ﬁngerprinting—by
virtue of attempting to identify or link a user’s information across sources—is almost certainly prohibited
without aﬃrmative consent under EU privacy laws (Laperdrix et al., 2020).
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2. Statistical methods for targeted marketing
While we focused much of the prior discussion on the history of discount targeting and
personalized pricing, this project is also related to the literature on targeted marketing
more generally and the use of machine learning in marketing applications.

Several

innovations in statistics and economics have highlighted the potential of machine learning for estimating individual-level, heterogeneous treatment eﬀects using experimental
data and high-dimensional covariate information (Wager and Athey, 2017; Künzel et al.,
2019; McFowland III et al., 2018; Chernozhukov et al., 2018; Taddy et al., 2016).

In

marketing in particular, multiple recent papers have demonstrated the value of these
innovations for targeting purposes (Gutierrez and Gérardy, 2017; Hitsch and Misra, 2018;
Yoganarasimhan et al., 2020).
We also highlight the long history of research on using statistical techniques to develop
targeted outreach strategies for direct mail and customer retention campaigns (Cui et al.,
2006; Kim et al., 2005; Gensch, 1984). Research in these areas has emphasized the merits
of targeting customers least likely to take a desired action (e.g., customers who may be
at the lowest risk of contract renewal) (Ascarza and Hardie, 2013; Neslin et al., 2006) or
targeting all customers that will respond positively to a given marketing campaign—a staple
technique of so-called “uplift” modeling (Ascarza, 2018; Radcliﬀe, 2007; Lo, 2002). An
important insight, highlighted by the recent work of Lemmens and Gupta (2020) in the
context managing customer churn, is the value of directly using individual-level proﬁtability
as a criterion for targeting. Another recent paper by Yang et al. (2020) proposes a novel
technique for targeting customers based on their long-term proﬁtability outcomes.
Many of the interventions studied in the research cited in the previous paragraph do involve
promotional discounts, but none of these papers factor in the eﬀects of discounting on the
immediate proﬁtability of a promotional campaign. Prior work on targeted promotional
pricing has accounted for these eﬀects, but these studies only oﬀer empirical evidence for
the value of personalization in B2B settings (Dubé and Misra, 2019) or B2C settings in
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which relational purchase data is available (Rossi et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 2013). In
this project, we are able to study the eﬀects of personalized price discrimination in a novel
empirical context, and also to more closely relate the literature on targeted marketing
for pricing and non-pricing interventions. In particular, we demonstrate that, in the case
of discount interventions, the traditional marketing strategies described above—based on
either baseline response rates or heterogeneous response to intervention—are insuﬃcient for
estimating the optimal targeting policy. Our model shows (and empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm)
that an optimal discount targeting strategy depends on a calibrated trade-oﬀ between both
of these quantities.
Further, as a practical matter, a key beneﬁt of our model is that it can be used to target campaigns with various discount and cost structures. This is important for the modern online
retail environment, in which frequent and varied discount campaigns are a key component of
both consumer expectations and digital marketing strategy (RetailMeNot, 2018). And given
that consumers are known to exhibit heterogeneous response to diﬀerent types of discounts
(Broeder and Derksen, 2018; Chen et al., 2012; Cao et al., 2018; Ahmad and Callow, 2018;
Shampanier et al., 2007), there is considerable value in the ability to use a generic, parsimonious, and eﬀective targeting framework in an ad hoc fashion across various marketing
campaigns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 3.3 we describe a theoretical
model of discount targeting and derive the optimal policy; then, in Section 3.4 we describe a
framework for estimating this policy using a combination of experimental data and methods
from machine learning; Section 3.5 describes the results of an empirical investigation on the
value of our proposed approach. We conclude by discussing the implications of this work
for digital marketing managers and policymakers.
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3.3. Decision-theoretic model for optimal discount targeting
3. Problem Set-up
We consider an e-commerce ﬁrm that observes a continuous stream of users to their online
storefront. When a user (indexed by i) arrives, the ﬁrm observes Xi ∈ X , a vector of
customer characteristics, and must decide on a treatment Ti ∈ {0, 1} to which the user will
be assigned. Without loss of generality, we think of Ti = 0 as the control treatment in which
no discounts are oﬀered; in the treatment Ti = 1, users are oﬀered a promotional discount.
We allow the exact nature of this discount to vary ﬂexibly in our model. While this adds
some complexity, this feature is motivated by the fact that, in the real world, ﬁrms make
promotional oﬀers of varying types — and the proﬁt a ﬁrm earns takes a diﬀerent form
depending on the discount type. ; we parameterize the structure of a campaign’s discount
by allowing it to take the form of either a percentage price discount in the amount of
d × 100% for some d ∈ [0, 1] (e.g., “20% oﬀ”), or a level discount amount in the amount of
k ≥ 0 dollars (e.g., “$20 oﬀ”). In the e-commerce setting, one can think of each treatment
manipulation as a banner at the top of the retailer’s website advertising the associated
discount.
For each user, the ﬁrm observes the amount of revenue spent by the customer at the end of
their session, indicated by the variable Ri ∈ [0, ∞). Note in this model the revenue variable
Ri is equal to the nominal price of any goods purchased before discounts are considered.
We also deﬁne Ci := 1{Ri > 0} as a shorthand variable to indicate the binary outcome of
whether a user’s session ends with a purchase. Lastly, we assume the ﬁrm may have some
non-ignorable marginal cost c for each purchase on their site. Using this notation, we can
express the ﬁrm’s proﬁt for users in a the control condition (Ti = 0) as:
πi = Ri − c

For users in the treatment condition in which they are oﬀered a discount (Ti = 1), the ﬁrm’s
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observed proﬁt will be given as:
πi = (1 − d)Ri − (c + k)Ci
Proﬁts in this case are calculated as nominal revenue Ri times (1 − d) when a percentage
discount is oﬀered and, when a conversion is observed (i.e., Ci = 1), marginal costs c and
the level discount amount k are deducted.33
Lastly, to simplify our notation in subsequent derivations, deﬁne the conditional response
functions of a given targeting campaign using the following notation:
µR
t (x) := E [Ri | Ti = t, Xi = x]
µC
t (x) := E [Ci | Ti = t, Xi = x] = Pr [Ci = 1 | Ti = t, Xi = x]

These represent the conditional expected values of revenues (Ri ) and conversion rates (Ci ),
respectively, of a user with observed covariate Xi = x under treatment assignment Ti = t.
Further, we deﬁne the conditional average treatment eﬀect functions for both revenue and
conversion as:
R
τ R (x) := E[Ri | Ti = 1, Xi = x] − E[Ri | Ti = 0, Xi = x] = µR
1 (x) − µ0 (x)
C
τ C (x) := E[Ci | Ti = 1, Xi = x] − E[Ci | Ti = 0, Xi = x] = µC
1 (x) − µ0 (x)

3. Optimal targeting policy
Given the setup above, we are now poised to investigate the nature of the ﬁrm’s proﬁtmaximizing targeting policy. The central problem we seek to solve is whether or not the
ﬁrm should assign a user (speciﬁed by some covariate value Xi ) to a discount treatment
33

As a simple extension to the oﬄine retail environment, we note that in cases where the ﬁrm may incur
outreach costs, such as in direct mail, the proﬁt function can be modiﬁed to allow for an outreach-dependent
cost q, which will need to be accounted for in subsequent derviations: πi = Ci (Ri (1 − d) − c − k) − q. In this
case, the subsequent optimization problem may be constrained by a budget, requiring a linear programming
solution; e.g., see Imai and Strauss (2011). Because we focus speciﬁcally on digital targeting in this project,
we assume q = 0 and therefore any budget considerations are ignorable.
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(Ti = 1) or a control treatment (Ti = 0).
To continue, we formalize the ﬁrm’s decision problem by introducing notation for the ﬁrm’s
decision function or policy δ : X −→ {0, 1}, which maps the space of user-covariates into
the space of treatments. That is, for an arbitrary user i, δ is the policy the ﬁrm uses to
assign treatment so that Ti = δ (Xi ).34 We will consider decision functions of a particular
form, denoted by δf , that depend on a thresholding function f for assigning treatments:

δf (x) =




1

if f (x) > 0



0

if f (x) ≤ 0

We will refer to f as the ﬁrm’s targeting function.
In this notation, the problem of ﬁnding the proﬁt-maximizing targeting policy can be expressed in the following form:
max Π (f ) = E[πi | Ti = δf (Xi )]
f

(3.1)

In the following proposition, we derive the exact form of the optimal targeting function in
terms of the various quantities described above.
Proposition 1. Given the discount and cost parameters (d, k, c) associated with a targeting campaign, the ﬁrm’s optimal score function, i.e, the argument of the maximum of the
optimization problem in (3.1), is given by:


C
f ∗ (x) = τ R (x) − cτ C (x) − dµR
1 (x) + kµ1 (x)


C
= (1 − d)τ R (x) − (c + k)τ C (x) − dµR
0 (x) + kµ0 (x)

(3.2)
(3.3)

Proof. By deﬁnition, Ti∗ = 1 if and only if E[πi | T = 1, X = x] > E[πi | T = 0, X = x].
34

To clarify notation, we use Ti to indicate the treatment a user is assigned in the abstract, random
variable sense and use δ (Xi ) to indicate the treatment chosen for a user by a given decision rule δ.

110

Substituting in the deﬁnitions of conditional response and condtional average treatment
eﬀect functions, we have:
E[π | T = 1, X = x] > E[π | T = 0, X = x]
E[R(1 − d) − cC − kC) | T = 1, X = x] > E[R − cC | T = 0, X = x])
C
C
R
C
µR
1 (x)(1 − d) − cµ1 (x) − kµ1 (x) > µ0 (x) − cµ0 (x)
R
C
C
R
C
µR
1 (x) − µ0 (x) − c(µ1 (x) − µ0 (x)) > dµ1 (x) + kµ1 (x)
C
τ R (x) − cτ C (x) > dµR
1 (x) + kµ1 (x)
R
C
C
τ R (x) − cτ C (x) > d(µR
0 (x) + τ (x)) + k(µ0 (x) + τ (x))
C
(1 − d)τ R (x) − (c + k)τ C (x) > dµR
0 (x) + kµ0 (x)

If we let
C
f ∗ (x) = (1 − d)τ R (x) − (c + k)τ C (x) − [dµR
0 (x) + kµ0 (x)]

then f ∗ (x) > 0 if and only if E[π | T = 1, X = x] > E[π | T = 0, X = x].
■
3. Comments on optimal policy
Before continuing, we make several remarks about the result from Proposition 1. First,
as we will demonstrate in the following section, the decision criteria in Eq. (3.2) can be
readily evaluated by using experimental data to estimate the response and treatment eﬀect
functions; Eq. (3.3) is a completely equivalent expression of this criteria. Note that the left
side of Eq. (3.2) can be described as the expected gain in proﬁt by oﬀering a discount and
the right side (in brackets) represents the costs of oﬀering a discount to a user. To see this,
note that µR
1 (x) represents the total revenue the ﬁrm expects from a user by targeting them
with a discount; in the case of a percentage discount, dµR
1 (x) represents the money the ﬁrm
loses as a direct consequence of the discount on the user’s total spend; in the case of a level
R
C
discount, kµC
1 (x) is the relevant quantity. But τ (x) − cτ (x) represents the incremental
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gain in revenue the ﬁrm can expect by targeting that user with a discount treatment. If
this gain exceeds the costs, it is proﬁtable to oﬀer that user a discount promotion.
Next, to relate this targeting strategy to prior work on targeted marketing in non-discount
settings, we focus on the form of the optimal targeting function in Eq. (3.3), and consider the
simplest discount structure where a ﬁrm oﬀers a percentage discount with no marginal costs.
In this scenario, the optimal targeting criteria can be written as (1−d)τ R (x) > dµR
0 (x). Expressed in this form, it is apparent that the optimal targeting condition—even in the simplest
of cases—requires individual-level estimates of both treatment heterogeneity and baseline
response rates. We highlight this as a contrast to existing research on targeted marketing
in the context of retention and direct mail campaigns, which has traditionally focused on
only one of these quantities (Neslin et al., 2006; Ascarza and Hardie, 2013; Radcliﬀe, 2007).
Ascarza (2018) does compare targeting campaigns based on both quantities, but concludes
for the purposes of their research context that it is more beneﬁcial to focus on treatment
eﬀects than baseline responses as a targeting criteria. However, when a marketing campaign
oﬀers a promotional price incentive, and a ﬁrm is interested in maximizing the short-run
proﬁts of the campaign in question, the theoretically optimal targeting policy depends on
a calibrated trade-oﬀ between both baseline response rates and responses to treatment, in
a way that depends on the exact parameters of the ﬁrm’s campaign.
Lastly, we reiterate that the policy we derive in Proposition 1 is designed to accommodate
multiple diﬀerent discount campaign scenarios. It is very unlikely that all exogenous parameters in the model will be non-zero in a real-world application, but our generic framework
allows us to derive the form of the optimal policy across a variety of campaigns. To highlight how this framework can be used in realistic scenarios, Table 3.2 compiles a list of cost
structures common in several marketing campaigns and applies Proposition 1 to derive the
mathematical form of the optimal policy.
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Table 3.2: Realistic discount campaigns with corresponding optimal targeting policies

Relevant cost
parameters
d

Optimal
targeting function
(1 − d)τ Y (x) − dµY0 (x)

Free ﬂat-rate shipping or
dollar-oﬀ discount

k

τ Y (x) − kτ C (x) − kµC
0 (x)

Percentage discount and
free shipping

d, k

(1 − d)τ Y (x) − kτ C (x) − dµY0 (x) − kµC
0 (x)

Percentage discount with
universal free shipping

d, c

(1 − d)τ Y (x) − cτ C (x) − dµY0 (x)

Description
Percentage discount

3.4. Experimentation & estimation framework
While we have established the relevant theoretical foundations for the optimal targeting of
discounts in the online retail environment, we have yet to describe how ﬁrms can implement
this strategy in a feasible way. In this section, we outline a framework that allows for eﬃcient
estimation of optimal discount targeting strategies using data from randomized experiments.
We elaborate on some of the practical details of this methodology below, but here we lay
out our targeting framework at a high level. It consists of three primary phases:
1. Experimentation: The ﬁrm will choose discount structure (d, k) and run an A/B
test in which a randomized subset of users are assigned to the discount treatment
condition. In the process, they will gather data on targetable customer features Xi ,
individual revenue and conversion responses, Ri and Ci , and treatment assignments
Ti .
2. Estimation: Using the realized experimental data D = {ri , ci , xi , ti } gathered in the
ﬁrst phase, the ﬁrm can use machine learning techniques to estimate the conditional
C R
C
response and treatment eﬀect functions (µ̂R
0 , µ̂0 , τ̂ and τ̂ ); estimation of these func-

tions is discussed in detail below. Factoring in their relevant revenue and cost parameters, the ﬁrm can use these functions to estimate a targeting policy based on the
optimal criteria derived in Eq. 3.2.
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3. Targeting: For customers that arrive to their website moving forward, the ﬁrm observes their covariate x, evaluates the targeting criterion using the estimated quantiC
ties, (1 − d)τ̂ R (x) − (c + k)τ̂ C (x) − [dµ̂R
0 (x) + k µ̂0 (x)] > 0, and oﬀers a discount if the

criterion is met.
4. Estimation of customer-level responses and treatment eﬀects
For our theoretical model to be useful in practice, it must be the case that we are able to
estimate conditional response and treatment eﬀect functions with suﬃciently high-ﬁdelity
at the individual customer level. At a conceptual level, the accuracy of our predictions will
depend on two main factors: our prediction algorithm and the data provided to it. We focus
on explaining our algorithm and estimation technique in this section and use Section 3.5 to
study whether our approach is proﬁtable with the technographic data commonly available
in e-commerce environments.
Conditional response function estimation. We ﬁrst describe our process for estimating the
C
conditional response functions µR
t (x) and µt (x). Recall these functions are supposed to

map a set of observable customer characteristics x to their expected response, conditional
on treatment assignment. A key challenge in deriving an accurate estimate of expected
revenues for each individual customer is an abundance of zero-revenue observations in most
e-commerce environments. For example, if we assume that a ﬁrm has an overall conversion
rate of 3%, then 97% of the observations in any dataset will have a revenue value of zero.
To deal with this challenge, we implement a two-stage hurdle model for predicting customer
revenue levels (Tu and Liu, 2014). Such models are inspired by the following identity, by
which a positive count variable (such as revenue) can be decomposed into the product of
two distinct quantities:
E[Ri | xi ] = Pr[Ri > 0 | xi ]E[Ri | Ri > 0, xi ]
The ﬁrst quantity, Pr[Ri > 0 | xi ], is the probability that a customer buys anything in a
session; the second, E[Ri | Ri > 0, xi ], is the expected revenue observed, conditional on
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a conversion occurring. In our proposed technique, we estimate both of these quantities
by ﬁrst ﬁtting a probabilistic classiﬁer to predict whether or not a customer will convert;
note this quantity is precisely the conditional response function for conversion µC
t . Then,
a second continuous-valued predictor is ﬁt to estimate revenues, but only on the subset
of users that made a purchase. Once these models are ﬁt, we obtain an unconditional
estimate of expected revenue (µR
t ) by merely multiplying the predictions of the two submodels described above.35
C
While we only need estimates of conditional response functions under control (µR
0 , µ0 ) to

evaluate the targeting criterion in Eq. (3.3), we will also need to estimate response functions
C
under treatment (µR
1 , µ1 ) in subsequent calculations of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. As

such, we estimate the conditional response functions for both control and treatment groups
by training the aforementioned hurdle model separately on each subset of treatment and
control data; this process is described in the pseudocode for “EstimateResponseFunctions”
provided in Algorithm 1. In summary, by performing this approach to both control and
treatment conditions, we are able to derive estimated predictors of conversions and revenues
R
C
for both groups; we use hat notation to refer these estimated quantities as µ̂C
0 , µ̂0 , µ̂1 , and

µ̂R
1.
As for the choice of learning algorithms used for the classiﬁcation and regression tasks,
our technique uses gradient boosted decision trees (GBDT).36 Gradient boosting models
are frequently the best performing algorithm in popular machine learning competitions and
have shown strong performance in a large variety of contexts that rely on tabular data
35

By training our conversion model and revenue-conditional-on-conversion models separately, our technique treats these as independent quantities. While this approach would be problematic if our goal was
inference on a set of regression parameters (Heckman, 1979), this is not our objective in this project. Rather
we wish to maximize predictive accuracy of our targeting algorithms; the evidence of whether or not this
assumption of independence is appropriate is an empirical question and can be assessed by observing our
model’s performance in Section 3.5.
36
While simpler methods, such as penalized logistic and linear regression are also natural candidates to use,
they consistently demonstrated worse performance in our empirical ﬁndings. Further, with modern machine
learning software, there is little penalty for using more complex models, so long as they are appropriately
tuned. In our project, we use the LightGBM library as the core of our gradient boosting techniques (Ke et al.,
2017).
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(Nielsen, 2016; Martinez and Gray, 2019). In addition to exhibiting high levels of accuracy
in many diﬀerent environments, GBDT models can be easily adapted for both classiﬁcation
and regression tasks by choosing suitable loss functions. As such, we are able to minimize
the complexity of our estimation procedure by using similar optimization techniques and
vocabulary across classiﬁcation and regression tasks.
Conditional average treatment eﬀect estimation. Estimating conditional average treatment
eﬀects (CATE) at the individual level is a notoriously diﬃcult problem, but one that has
been facilitated in recent years by several advances in machine learning and causal inference. Many new techniques in this space have focused speciﬁcally on the problem of inference around CATE, which is often achieved using some form of repeated sample-splitting
(Chernozhukov et al., 2018; Wager and Athey, 2017). In our case, because inference is not
as important as prediction performance, we opt for a simpler technique that is commonly
referred to as the “T-learner” for heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. Because we assume
treatment assignments will have been exogenously randomized in our experimental data,
we can recover aysmptotically unbiased estimates of individual level treatment eﬀects by
merely predicting a user’s response for both treatment and control conditions and taking the
diﬀerence (Künzel et al., 2019).37 In concrete terms, for the case of predicting treatment
C
eﬀects on customer conversion, given the estimates of µ̂C
0 and µ̂1 described above, we calC
culate the expected treatment eﬀect for a user with covariate x as τ̂ C (x) := µ̂C
1 (x) − µ̂0 (x).
R
Estimating treatment eﬀects on revenue is done similarly: τ̂ R (x) := µ̂R
1 (x) − µ̂0 (x). Pseu-

docode for this process is given in the “EstimateCATE” function in Algorithm 1. Once
the response and treatment eﬀect functions have been estimated, we can now evaluate the
decision criteria in Eq. (3.3) to determine whether a new user that arrives at the website
should be oﬀered a targeted discount. Building on the estimation processes introduced
above, the “EstimateTargetingFunction” code provided in Algorithm 1 describes how the
37

We have implemented versions of our framework using both the methods of Wager and Athey (2017)
and Chernozhukov et al. (2018); even with considerable tuning, both were found to perform consistently
worse than the T-learning procedure described here. This is because the sample-splitting procedures at the
heart of these techniques reduces our eﬀective sample size.
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optimal targeting function for an arbitrary discount campaign can be derived from raw
experimental data.
Hyperparameter optimization. All machine learning algorithms have a number of hyperparameters that must be exogenously speciﬁed prior to training that signiﬁcantly aﬀect
model performance. In the case of gradient boosting, important hyperparameters include
the number of boosting rounds, the learning rate, and decision tree termination criteria.
(See Table 3.3 for the full list of parameters we use in our procedure and the range of values
in our search space.) For standard supervised learning, such parameters are often set by analysts using cross-validation to estimate prediction accuracy (e.g., ROC AUC in the case of
classiﬁcation; squared loss or log likelihood in the case of regression). While such techniques
are suitable for straightforward prediction tasks, they breakdown in the case heterogeneous
treatment eﬀect estimation. This is because, in most experimental data, a single individual is only exposed to one treatment condition. This makes it is impossible to observe
the “true” value of their counterfactual response to treatment, precluding the possibility of
minimizing a loss function between predicted and observed data. While several methods
exist for getting around this limitation, all techniques in existing literature are focused singularly on maximizing the accuracy of treatment eﬀect estimators (Rolling and Yang, 2014;
Nie and Wager, 2017; Schuler et al., 2018).
However, our ultimate economic objective in this project is not to minimize statistical error
of our treatment eﬀect estimators, but to maximize ﬁrm proﬁts by estimating a targeting
policy. We determined earlier that the theoretically optimal targeting policy depends on
estimating both response functions and treatment eﬀect functions. As such, there is no
guarantee that selecting the best model for either task individually will result in the most
proﬁtable outcomes for the task as a whole. In light of these challenges, we employ a tailormade hyperparameter optimization technique that is designed to maximize expected proﬁts
directly. This approach is adaptive to campaigns with varying cost and discount structures
and, as such, can be used as an oﬀ-the-shelf model selection technique in many diﬀerent
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scenarios.
To motivate our technique, note the task of estimating the expected proﬁts from a given
targeting policy maps directly on to the problem of oﬀ-policy evaluation in the literature
on reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 2018). If a user was assigned one condition in our experimental data and a targeting policy would have assigned them to the
opposite condition, we cannot observe their counterfactual response and thus must impute
this value in a reliable way to estimate the proﬁtability of the proposed policy. However,
there are multiple methods for inferring the value of a counterfactual policy from oﬄine
records. One approach, known as the direct method relies on simply imputing the value of
a counterfactual policy on the whole sample by using the subset of observations for which
the proposed intervention matches the intervention assigned in the oﬄine data (Li et al.,
2012). Another solution is inverse probability weighting (IPW), which is known to provide
unbiased estimation of oﬀ-policy rewards (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952). While both of
techniques have been used in the literature on targeted marketing (Lemmens and Gupta,
2020; Yoganarasimhan et al., 2020), they are known to oﬀer poor performance when the
counterfactual policy diﬀers substantially from the policy used for data collection.
An innovation to improve on these methods is doubly robust (DR) oﬀ-policy evaluation,
which requires either that we have good model of the relationship between covariates and
outcomes or a good model of the data collection policy (Dudík et al., 2014). In our case,
where we are using data from random experiments—for which we know exactly the data
collection policy—we do not expect the results of these methods to diﬀer signiﬁcantly,
though the DR method can still oﬀer eﬃciency gains since it has been shown to exhibit
both lower bias and lower variance than the direct or IPW methods (Jiang and Li, 2016).
Note that the DR approach we employ here has also been recently applied successfully in
the domain of targeted marketing by Yang et al. (2020).38
38

Also note that this technique requires signiﬁcantly fewer assumptions than model-based, simulation
approaches that have been used in past literature, which assume their parametric models accurately capture
customer behavior (Khan et al., 2009). So long as we know the treatment assignment policy that was used for
the observations in our dataset, these techniques are able to provide an unbiased counterfactual assessment

118

Before we can express the formula for the DR estimator, we deﬁne a predictive model of how
ﬁrm proﬁts depend on both treatment assignment and user covariates; let V (t, x) represent
such a model. This can be estimated using standard supervised learning techniques from
our experimental data, by adding the observed treatment assignment ti as a predictor to
the observed features xi , and using this data to predict the observed proﬁt πi in each user’s
session. Adapting the technique of Dudík et al. (2014) to our context, the DR estimator
takes the form:

π̂fDR



N
X
X
1 {δf (xi ) = t}
1
V (δf (xi ); xi ) +
=
(πi − V (ti ; xi ))
N
Pr[ti = t]
i=1

t=0,1

With the ability to estimate out-of-sample proﬁts for counterfactual targeting policies using
the formula above, we can maximize this quantity as our objective function within a crossvalidation framework for parameter tuning. We use an adaptive grid search over the space of
hyperparameters and select the combination of parameters that maximizes cross-validated
expected proﬁts (Bergstra et al., 2013); refer to Table 3.3 for details on our parameter search
space. Pseudocode for this entire procedure is described in the appendix in Algorithm 2.
Table 3.3: Hyperparameters used in gradient boosting decision tree models
Parameter name
Number of boosting rounds
Learning rate
Maximum number of leaves
Minimum samples in leaf
L1 regularization
L2 regularization

Distribution used in search space
LogUniform(50, 500)
LogUniform(0.01, 0.2)
Uniform(30, 150)
Uniform(20, 500)
Uniform(0, 1)
Uniform(0, 1)

Quantization interval
25
10
20

Note: The two numbers in each distribution represent the lower and upper limits of the search space used. Presence
of a quantization interval indicates the distribution was only sampled at numbers divisible by the interval. The same
hyperparameter space is used for both classiﬁcation and regression tasks.

3.5. Empirical applications with A/B test data
Up to this point, we have derived the theoretically optimal personalized discount policy
and described how a ﬁrm might use this result, in combination with experimental data, to
of any proposed targeting policy.
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optimize a marketing campaign of targeted discounts. However, we have yet to show that our
ﬁndings have value in real-world settings where there are many reasons our theoreticallyoptimal strategy might fail. For example, the common sample sizes used in A/B tests
and the limited number features that are observable within technographic trace data can
make it diﬃcult to estimate the individual level response and treatment eﬀect functions
required for optimal targeting. If the estimates of µˆ0 (x) and τ̂ (x) are too noisy, it may be
more proﬁtable to fall back on simpler targeting rules that don’t require such ﬁne-grained
distinction between customers on multiple dimensions. As such, it is important to study our
proposed strategy in an empirical setting with practical limitations common in real-world
e-commerce environments. We use the remainder of this paper to address this topic.
5. Empirical context and dataset
To empirically evaluate our method, we use experimental data from two separate US-based
e-commerce ﬁrms. The data from Experiment 1 comes from a retailer of women’s beauty
products; the data from Experiment 2 comes from a novelty apparel company. Summary
data from each dataset are provided in Table 3.4. In each experiment a discount treatment
was randomly assigned to a subset the website’s visitors; for such users, a discount was
advertised on the homepage and with a persistent banner across the header of each ﬁrm’s
website. The nature of the discount diﬀered between ﬁrms, allowing us to study whether our
generalized discounting framework adds value under diﬀerent discount and cost structures.
Table 3.4: Summary characteristics for experimental data
Variable
Number of sessions
Conversion rate
Average revenue per user
Average revenue per conversion
Proportion randomized to treatment
Average eﬀect size on conversion

Experiment 1
87K
1.4%
$0.79
$54.09
50%
+0.08%

Experiment 2
59K
4.9%
$2.15
$44.82
90%
+1.0%

For each user in both experiments, we observe their conversion responses, treatment assignments, and a set of technographic characteristics that are commonly accessible to most web
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servers. As our data has been provided by a collaborating experimentation platform, we
did not have explicit control over the variables collected in the experimentation process. As
such, we do not have access to all the variables shown in Table 3.1, but rather a subset which
includes many of the most common attributes regularly collected by standard web analytics
software. This includes a user’s operating system, web browser, screen dimensions, referral
source, and—when the user arrived through a search engine that appends this data to the
referring URL—search query information. The ﬁrm also observed each user’s IP address
which they map to a user’s approximate GPS coordinates using a geolocation service; we
also use this data to match each user to a Nielsen designated market areas (DMA). The
only variables in our dataset that require a client-side tracking script to collect are those
related to screen size; all others can be directly inferred from standard metadata provided
by internet communication protocols. In principle, a marketer with direct access to web log
data would be able to observe the raw trace data with slightly higher ﬁdelity, meaning our
analysis should be considered as a lower bound on the informational content contained in
these features.39
We provide summary statistics of the features available in our dataset in Table 3.5. For
numeric variables, we report the sample mean µ and standard deviation σ. For categorical
variables, we instead report the number of categories K. We also report the Gini coeﬃcient,
G, based on the count data for observations across categories within a given variable.
Though historically used for evaluating inequality in macro-economic data, the Gini index
is a useful summary statistic for characterizing how skew the distribution of counts is within
a categorical variable. In this case, a higher Gini coeﬃcient corresponds to a categorical
distribution that has more of its observations clumped within a small number categories;
lower Gini coeﬃcients indicate there is a more equal spread of observations across categories.
As can be seen in Table 3.5, many of these features are categorical; even after removing
39
For example, our data does not include the raw User-Agent header for each user’s session; this can be
used to extract information about exact version of operation system and web browser being used by the
client.
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categories with only one observation, our raw data matrix is very high-dimensional. Given
the success of single value decomposition (SVD) as a dimensionality-reduction technique in
other supervised learning tasks with high-dimensional data, we employ SVD to preprocess
our covariate matrix in this application (Sarwar et al., 2000; Wall et al., 2003). In particular, we approximate the categorical features in our data with a truncated SVD of rank
10 (Hansen, 1987). In both experiments, this process reduces the dimension of our data
matrices to 15 features.
Table 3.5: Variables available in dataset for promotional targeting
Variable
Device
Operating system
Browser
Screen height
Screen width
Behavioral
HTTP referrer
Search term
Existing cookie
Geographic
DMA
Latitude
Longitude

Type

Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Categorical
Categorical
Numeric
Numeric

K = 22
K = 12
µ = 1277.2
µ = 889.7

G = 0.81
G = 0.72
σ = 346.9
σ = 144.6

K = 18
K = 15
µ = 791.4
µ = 871.7

G = 0.78
G = 0.75
σ = 234.2
σ = 553.7

Categorical
Categorical
Binary

K = 817
K = 3,189
µ = 0.32

G = 0.97
G = 0.96
—

K = 327
K = 2, 883
µ = 0.19

G = 0.98
G = 0.95
—

Categorical
Numeric
Numeric

K = 210
µ = 37.8
µ = -95.2

G = 0.75
σ = 4.8
σ = 19.2

K = 211
µ = 37.6
µ = −91.7

G = 0.70
σ = 5.0
σ = 16.9

Notes: For numeric variables, we report the sample mean µ and standard deviation σ. For categorical variables, we
report the number of categories K and the Gini coeﬃcient G, based on the count data for observations in each
category.

5. Derivation of optimal policies
We now demonstrate how the diﬀering nature of each ﬁrm’s discount campaign can be
accommodated by our model. In Experiment 1, the discount was for free shipping, with
no assumed marginal costs incurred by the ﬁrm. Because we do not observe the ﬁrm’s
shipping costs, we assume a ﬂat cost of $7.50 to the ﬁrm when a user makes a purchase in
the treatment condition.40 Under this assumption, the free shipping promotion acts as a
level discount in the amount of k = 7.5; plugging this into the optimal targeting function in
40

This value is based on standard shipping costs observed on the web, and is consistent with shipping
costs according to e-commerce merchants we have spoken with.
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Eq. (3.3), assuming marginal costs c = 0 and setting d = 0, yields the following expression
for the ﬁrm’s optimal targeting criteria for this campaign:
fˆ(x) = τ̂ R (x) − 7.5τ̂ C (x) − 7.5µ̂C
0 (x)

In Experiment 2, the discount was for 20% oﬀ the retail price of a user’s entire order; at
the same time, the ﬁrm was oﬀering free shipping on all orders, whether or not the user
was in the promotional discount condition. To derive the optimal targeting criteria in this
scenario, the level discount parameter will be k = 0 and the percentage discount parameter
will be d = 0.20. If we assume the ﬁrm faces a ﬂat shipping cost of $7.50 per order, the fact
that they oﬀer free shipping to customers in both control and treatment conditions implies
they face an eﬀective marginal cost of c = 7.5 on every order. Plugging these values into
Eq. (3.3) yields the targeting criteria:
fˆ(x) = 0.80τ̂ R (x) − 7.5τ̂ C (x) − 0.20µ̂R
0 (x)

5. Alternative targeting policies
Before moving on to our empirical ﬁndings regarding the performance of our proposed
targeting policy, it will be instructive to identify other reasonable policies a ﬁrm might
use in its place. As a starting place, it makes sense to consider a non-targeted (or uniform)
policy. The proﬁt-maximizing choice for such a policy will be identical to the optimal policy
found in Section 3.3, but with the individual level estimates of τ and µ replaced by their
average values. Using an overline to denote sample means, (e.g., τ R = Ex [τ R (x)]), the
targeting function for this policy can be written as:
C
f (x) = (1 − d)τ R − (c + k)τ C − [dµR
0 + kµ0 ]

This approach treats all users the same (i.e., either assigns all users to the control condition or all users to the treatment condition), but does so in a proﬁt-maximizing way that

123

factors in the cost and discount parameters. Additionally, we consider a well-known policy
that has been mentioned many times in the literature on targeted marketing and uplift
modeling (Rzepakowski and Jaroszewicz, 2012; Lo, 2002), which is to target all customers
with positive treatment eﬀect on conversions:
f (x) = τ C (x)

This strategy, which we will refer to as the “uplift” approach, will serve as a useful baseline
for considering the value of our decision-theoretic approach relative to existing benchmarks
used for customer targeting.
5. Evaluation & Empirical Results
Recall that in Section 4 we described how to estimate the expected proﬁts of a counterfactual targeting policy from experimental data. We use this same approach for evaluating
the proﬁtability of our proposed technique, but with an additional, nested level of crossvalidation to honestly assess our method’s out-of-sample performance. In particular, we
used 100 iterations of Monte Carlo cross-validation, in which for each iteration, two-thirds
of our data are used for both optimizing hyperparameters and training the models needed to
estimate a policy’s target function fˆ; the remaining one-third of the data is used to estimate
the policy’s expected proﬁts on out-of-sample data using the doubly-robust technique. Our
primary outcome metric is the value of expected proﬁts E[π̂f ] given by the DR estimator,
averaged across all 100 iterations. Histograms of the distributions of the proﬁts observed
across these iterations are plotted in Figure 3.1.
To facilitate comparison between our technique and the uniform approach, we also compute
the within-fold “lift” of our targeting policy over the non-targeted baseline. If π̂0 are the
ˆ f , is given as ∆
ˆ f :=
proﬁts observed from the uniform policy, the level lift of a policy f , ∆
π̂f − π̂0 . We also report the lift in percentage terms, by comparing the average gains to
ˆ % := (π̂f − π̂0 )/π̂0 × 100. Results of these metrics
the average baseline proﬁt values: ∆
f
averaged across Monte Carlo iterations for each of the aforementioned targeting policies are
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summarized in Table 3.6. For relevant comparisons, we report p-values using a standard
t-test, calculated against the null hypothesis that the mean lift for each policy is exactly
zero.
Figure 3.1: Estimated proﬁt per user by policy, estimated over 100 cross-validation splits
(a) Experiment 1

(b) Experiment 2

Table 3.6: Empirical results for proposed targeting policies

Policy name
Uniform
Uplift
Optimal

Experiment 1
% receiving discount Proﬁts E[π̂f ]
0.0
0.586 (0.003)
57%
0.594 (0.004)
52%
0.604 (0.004)

ˆ f]
Lift E[∆
—
+0.007(0.003)∗∗
+0.018(0.003)∗∗∗

ˆ %]
% Lift E[∆
f
—
+1.39%
+3.16%

Policy name
Uniform
Uplift
Optimal

Experiment 2
% receiving discount E[π̂f ]
0.0
1.56 (0.008)
82%
1.60 (0.018)
77%
1.65 (0.025)

ˆ f]
Lift E[∆
—
+0.046(0.018)∗∗
+0.092(0.025)∗∗∗

ˆ %]
% Lift E[∆
f
—
+3.17%
+6.04%

∗∗∗ p

< 0.001,

∗∗ p

< 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05,

+p

< 0.1. Standard error of the mean for each value is reported in parentheses.

We remark on several aspects of our empirical results. First, we observe that the uplift
approach, which oﬀers discounts to all users with a positive estimated treatment eﬀect
independent of the discount rate, is a proﬁtable targeting strategy in both experiments,
resulting in a proﬁt gain of +1.39% in Experiment 1 and +3.17% lift in Experiment 2.
This need not be a universal characteristic, especially for campaigns with larger discounts
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for which this strategy may actually decrease proﬁts. That being said, in this case, uplift
remains a reasonable policy for targeting discount interventions.
Turning to the performance of our proposed targeting policy, we see an even greater increase
in proﬁtability. For Experiment 1, we estimate use of the optimal policy for discount
targeting will result in a proﬁt gain of +3.16%. Though not reported in the results table,
we ﬁnd that this increase is signiﬁcantly larger than the gain observed from the uplift policy
(+0.011, t = 9.45, p < 0.001). If the ﬁrm were to implement this policy over a time period
equivalent to the length of the experiment we observed (i.e., 17 days with 87,000+ total
sessions), we estimate they would earn an additional $1, 578 over a strategy that uniformly
implements the most proﬁtable treatment arm. While modest, our targeting approach
clearly has potential to increase ﬁrm proﬁts by non-trivial amounts over relevant time scales.
In Experiment 2, we see the predicted gains of our approach are even larger. The optimal
targeting policy is estimated to result in a +6.04% increase over the uniform baseline, which
is nearly twice the gains observed from the uplift strategy. (The direct comparison in level
gains between the uplift and optimal policies is also statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level;
+0.046, t = 2.21, p = 0.014.) In dollar terms, we estimate that our policy, if applied to the
59,000+ users in this experiment, is estimated to be $5, 443 more proﬁtable than a uniform
policy; this is an expected gain of nearly $0.10 ($0.092) for every person that visits the
website.
Overall, these empirical results indicate that technographic data can be proﬁtably exploited
for personalized price discrimination. Further, the estimated value of the data in this context
is not far removed from the value of purchase history data that has been calculated in prior
research on targeted price promotions. Rossi et al. (1996) estimated that, with access to
purchase history data for the purposes of targeting grocery store coupons delivered by
direct mail, a ﬁrm could earn an additional $0.15 per customer in their database. Similarly,
Khan et al. (2009) estimated that transactional history data can increase ﬁrm proﬁts by
7.8% in a targeted discount campaign delivered by email to customers of a brick-and-mortar
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drug store chain. In these cases, however, the ﬁrm was required to establish some sort of
prior relationship with each targeted customer to obtain their physical or electronic mailing
address. In the context studied in this project, we demonstrated that ﬁrms can use digital
trace data on any customer that visits their website—independent of any prior purchasing
behavior—to proﬁtably target them with promotional incentives.
5. Quantifying feature importance
To better understand exactly which variables play the largest role in determining targeting
outcomes in our application, we use post-hoc model explanation techniques from the literature on interpretable machine learning. While these techniques are typically used in the
context of standard supervised learning, they can easily be adapted to better understand
which features drive targeting decisions in our context. To do so, we can use the treatment
assignments implied by our targeting policy as the main dependent variable to be explained
and assess which predictor variables have the largest eﬀect on whether or not customers
are targeted with a promotion. This analysis can inform managers in deciding which type
of data to retain for targeting purposes; it can also add empirical insight to the discussion
on public policy and consumer privacy about what types of data in our context are most
consequential for online personalization.
To quantify the relative contribution of diﬀerent features for promotional targeting in our
context, we will adapt a measure of global variable importance ﬁrst introduced by Breiman
(2001). The intuition behind this approach is to randomly permute the ordering of data
points in each covariate column, and measure over many repetitions how this noise reduces model accuracy. While often used as a feature importance measure speciﬁcally for
techniques based on bagging such as random forests—for which these measures can be estimated with relative computational eﬃciency using out-of-bag data—there is no reason
permutation-based importance measures cannot be used for arbitrary black-box models.
Indeed, the approach we use here has been previously introduced as “model reliance” by
Fisher et al. (2019), who applied it as a model-agnostic measure of feature importance.
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To describe our importance measure concretely: for each fold in our cross-validation procedure, we ﬁt our targeting algorithm, denoted δfˆ, using data from the fold’s training data.
We then use this algorithm to predict the optimal treatment assignment for each observation in the fold’s test data. Those treatment assignments are then used to estimate the
counterfactual proﬁts reported in the previous section. We then take the test data X and,
for each variable j in our dataset, we randomly permute the rows of our data in the j-th
column; denote the permuted test data X (j) .41 After each permutation, we calculate the
accuracy with which the targeting algorithm based on the permuted test data X (j) can
predict the treatment assignments of the unpermuted test data X. For each fold and for
each feature j, we perform 100 permutations and calculate the importance of feature j by
taking 1 minus the observed accuracy over each permutation, and averaging across both
permutations and cross-validation folds (this technique is also sometimes referred to as mean
decrease in accuracy).
A common measure of accuracy used for permutation importance scores is the area under
the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC); however, since we are dealing with purely
binary outcomes (whether or not a user is targeted with a promotion), we are unable to use
the standard AUC metric, which depends on a continuous, thresholded predictor function.
Nonetheless, we can use an analogous measure for binary outcomes which can be considered
as “balanced accuracy”; this metric is similar to a standard “accuracy” score, except it
41

There are some technical diﬃculties associated with this approach that are worth mentioning. Our
raw data takes the form of web logs associated with user website visits which have been formatted into a
data frame containing the columns described in Table 3.4. However, before actually training any supervised
learning algorithms on our data, this data frame must be processed in several diﬀerent steps. First we encode
the categorical data using binary dummy variables for each category within a given variable, and then (as
described in Section 3.5), we use a truncated SVD procedure to project the categorical variables into a
10-dimensional continuous vector space. Only after this pre-processing do we train the GBDT algorithms
and estimate the targeting function (as described in Algorithm 1 of the appendix). When we say that we
“permute” a feature in our dataset, this means we actually permute the user-level feature in the original
data frame. To measure the eﬀect of this permutation occurring very early in the ML pipeline, our targeting
algorithm has to be engineered so that it can take a raw observation in the data frame, apply all the
pre-processing steps, feed the resulting output into the GBDT algorithm to predict the user’s response
function, and ﬁnally derive each user’s CATE and optimal treatment assignment. Fortunately, modern
machine learning tooling—especially the pipeline functionality provided by the open-source scikit-learn
project—has progressed to the point that makes a task of this complexity relatively painless (Pedregosa et al.,
2011).
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gives equal weight to false positives and false negatives, so that a completely uninformative
predictor will always have a balanced accuracy of 0.5 (Youden, 1950; Mosley, 2013; Powers,
2020). We use this characteristic of the balanced accuracy score to normalize our importance
measure, so that a feature that fully determines targeting outcomes has a score of one and
a feature that has no eﬀect on targeting outcomes has a score of zero.42
Moving on to the empirical ﬁndings from this procedure, we will review feature importance
results for Experiment 1; the ﬁndings of this procedure are qualitatively similar for Experiment 2 and are omitted here. In Figure 3.2, we have plotted the importance values for each
column in our dataset. (Variance of average importance values across folds is on the order
of 0.001, and thus we have omitted standard error bars.) Looking at the importance values
measured in this analysis, it appears the single most important feature for determining
whether a user is targeted vs. not targeted with a promotion is “screen width”. When considered independently, a user’s screen height is the second most important feature, followed
by a user’s designated market area (DMA). Note that no single variable has an importance
score anywhere near 1; this indicates that our model relies on several of these variables
simultaneously and performance of our targeting algorithm is not driven by any single user
characteristic.
One common criticism of permutation-based feature importance measures is that, by independently permuting individual columns, we break the correlation structure between features, giving an inaccurate assessment of any individual feature’s importance for prediction
42

The exact formulae we use are provided below, where—because we average importance across 100 crossvalidation folds—expectation can be considered as being taken over both the randomness of the permutations
of column j and the sampling variation due to cross validation:
(
[
( (
)
( ))])
I(j) = 2 × 1 − E BalancedAccuracy δfˆ X (j) , δfˆ X
where

(
)
( (
)
( ))
1
TP
TN
+
BalancedAccuracy δfˆ X (j) , δfˆ X =
2 TP + FN
TN + FP

In this formula, T P , T N , F P , and F N are true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives
respectively, which can be derived from the
( )confusion matrix comparing the optimal treatment assignment
for each user in the observed test data, δfˆ X , to the treatment assignments derived from the permuted test
(
)
data, δfˆ X (j) .
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Figure 3.2: Permutation importance of individual features for targeting

(Hooker and Mentch, 2019). This is particularly relevant in our context since, for example, the screen width and operating system variables are likely to be very correlated: users
with small screen widths are likely to be using mobile operating systems (iOS, Android)
as opposed to desktop operating systems (Windows, macOS). Permuting these columns
independently, as done above, requires our model to make predictions in areas of the feature space that are unrealistic and not likely indicative of our algorithm’s performance on
real-world data.
One way we can minimize this concern is by also permuting sets of features together, and
comparing the marginal beneﬁt in prediction accuracy attributable to various groups of features. To avoid a combinatorial explosion and to give us a more interpretable understanding
of which factors aﬀect model performance, we employ a grouped variable importance measure, that permutes multiple columns in tandem (Gregorutti et al., 2015). In particular, for
each of the three types of data in our feature set—device-related, behavioral, and geographic
(corresponding to the three subplots in Firgure 3.2 and also listed in Table 3.4)—we can
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permute all the columns within each group together. To do this, we employ the same permutation procedure described above for the individual columns, except in this case we will
permute subsets of multiple columns simultaneously. For example, to assess the importance
of device-related columns (screen height, screen width, browser, and operating system), we
take our dataset X and permute the rows in all four of these columns to obtain a permuted
dataset X (device) . Importantly, we do not permute each column independently, but rather
generate one row-wise permutation that applies across all columns in a given group. This
preserves the correlation structure within each column group, which addresses a criticism
of column-level permutation procedures that depend on model performance in regions of
the feature space that are unrealistic.
The results of our grouped variable importance analysis are reported in Figure 3.3. We
have computed importance scores for each of the three groups of variables separately, and
also the importance scores observed when permuting multiple groups at the same time. For
example, the importance score of “Device + Behavior” is computed by permuting all seven
of the device-related and behavioral columns in our dataset simultaneously. Combining the
groups of variables in this way allows us to better understand the eﬀect of each type of
variable for driving model performance, and to get a sense of the incremental importance
of each variable type.
Examining the importance scores, we observed several patterns. First, it appears the most
important group of variables in our context are those related to the device that users use
to access the retailer’s website. With an importance score of greater than 0.80, this set of
variables is clearly driving most of the targeting algorithm’s decisions. Importantly, however, note that the combination of all device-related variables explains much more of the
model’s decisions than any of the variables independently reported in Figure 3.2, where the
single most important variable (screen width) has an importance score near 0.35. Again,
this highlights how—even within each group—there is some signal being added by separate
variables included in our model. Considering the other types of data, it appears the behav-
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Figure 3.3: Permutation importance of grouped features for targeting

ioral and geographical variables have importance scores near 0.38 and 0.40 respectively. On
their own, these types of variables explain some, but clearly not all the variation in targeting decisions. Even when combined (in the “Behavior + Geography” entry), the grouped
importance score of these variables only reaches 0.49. The importance scores reported for
the “Device + Behavior” and “Device + Geography” entries are quite similar, reaching 0.92
and 0.96, respectively. Thus, even though most of the targeting algorithm’s decisions are
driven by device-related variables, taking away any subset of variables does have a measurable eﬀect on the importance score, suggesting that each variable is contributing some
non-zero amount to model performance.
These ﬁndings are useful for better understanding the black-box nature of the highly nonparametric machine learning algorithm we used for targeting in this application. Additionally, this analysis highlights that not all types of data are created equal, especially when
it comes to price discrimination online. This can be important for e-commerce managers,
who can use these ﬁndings to prioritize the collection or preservation of certain types of
data for targeting purposes (in this case, it appears device-related data are most valuable).
Our ﬁndings may also be of interest to policymakers, regulators, and developers of internet
protocols when considering what types of data can and should be shared by default online.
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As of now, all the variables used in the project were derived from web log data that is automatically transmitted by HTTP protocols and stored by many web servers. Given ongoing
discussions in the governing bodies of the European Union and United States about user
privacy and algorithmic regulation, these ﬁndings may be of interest for demonstrating how
diﬀerent types of data can be used for online personalization. This project may inform the
choices that regulators and developers make when designing the next generation of legal
statutes and communication protocols. For example, the logging of users’ IP addresses is
commonly singled out as problematic practice from a privacy perspective; however, our
ﬁndings suggest that IP addresses (from which we derived our geographical variables) are
not the most important type data for promotional targeting purposes. Instead, data that
may seem more innocuous—such as screen width and device type, that may reveal little
about a person’s individual location or identity—may actually be the most important for
enabling price discrimination online (at least among variables contained in technographic
trace data). We believe this highlights an important disconnect between commonly understood deﬁnitions of “privacy” (which often revolve around a person’s identity) and the
many other factors that lawmakers might consider when regulating the use of data in online
settings. In particular, we highlight that our results demonstrate the potential for eﬀective
price discrimination based on relatively impersonal data, which may have little connection
to an individual’s “identity”.

3.6. Conclusion
In this project, we set out to study the potential for price discrimination in online retail
settings, based solely on user-level technographic trace data. To this end, we developed a
framework for using ﬁeld experiments and machine learning to optimize e-commerce customer targeting strategies in the presence of discount and cost parameters. We found that,
whenever discounts are part of a promotional intervention, the optimal targeting strategy
depends on individual-level estimates of both consumers baseline response rates and treatment eﬀects in response to the promotional price. Further, we laid out a procedure for
using machine learning to estimate these parameters from experimental data and applied
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our techniques to real-world data. Using counterfactual policy evaluation techniques on
A/B test data from two separate ﬁrms, we found that our proposed targeting strategy signiﬁcantly outperforms both non-targeted baselines and industry standard techniques for
customer targeting. Given that our targeting policy is based on non-parametric machine
learning methods, we adapted techniques from the interpretable ML literature to better understand what is driving the performance of our targeting algorithm. An analysis based on
feature permutation revealed that, while the behavioral and geographic variables inferred
from technographic data have a role to play, the most signiﬁcant predictors of whether or
not customers are targeted with a promotion are related to the type and size of the device
customers use to access retailers’ websites.
This paper adds important insight to the growing discussions around personalized pricing,
with implications for managers, consumer advocates, and policymakers. For managers, our
empirical results can be used as a ballpark estimate of the proﬁt gains possible using this
technique. Further, ﬁrms can use the methods described in this project to estimate the
proﬁtability of targeting various discount campaigns by merely running pilot experiments
and applying our estimation procedure. We caution that, prior to implementation, managers would be wise to consider the potential reputational risks associated with targeted
price discrimination. Even though promotional targeting is far from new, awareness of and
consumer attitudes about the practice may be changing rapidly. As one proactive measure,
prior research has shown that consumers are more willing to purchase from ﬁrms that are
transparent in their privacy policies (Tsai et al., 2011), indicating that openly messaging
how online services are personalized can mitigate this downside risk.
For consumer advocates and policymakers, this research highlights the economic value
present in trace forms of technographic data transmitted by standard web protocols, and
demonstrates that such data can be exploited for algorithmic price discrimination. While
prior work has documented the use of this data for customer targeting, this paper is the
ﬁrst to establish the proﬁtability and measure the value of technographic data in a standard
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e-commerce setting. We highlight that this analysis is based on data from websites that are
not large tech companies or national brands, but rather small to medium-sized businesses.
Our ﬁndings suggest the practice of using technographic data for promotional targeting—
including for price-related interventions—may become more commonplace as ﬁrms of this
type develop the technical expertise required to do so. Our research also highlights how even
forms of information not obviously subject to statutes that apply to “personal data” may be
used for online personalization. As such, we hope this work contributes to the broader discussion about promotional targeting on the web and serves as a valuable empirical analysis
of the potential of personalization technologies in online retail.
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APPENDIX
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for deriving optimal targeting policy from experimental data

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15

Input: D = {ri , ci , xi , ti }, dataset of revenue, conversion, covariates, and treatment assignment variables
observed in experiment;
ξ, set of hyperparameters used for GBDT models;
Output: fˆ, estimated targeting function associated with optimal policy
function EstimateResponseFunctions(D, ξ)
for treatment condition t ∈ {0, 1} do
µ̂C
t ← train GBDT classiﬁer using data for which ti = t, using hyperparameters ξ
µ̂R>0
← train GBDT regressor using data for which ti = t and ri > 0, using hyperparameters ξ
t
C
R>0
µ̂R
, hurdle model for unconditional revenue distribution
t ← µ̂t × µ̂t
R
C
R
return estimated predictors µ̂C
0 , µ̂0 , µ̂1 , µ̂1
R
C
R
function EstimateCATE(µ̂C
0 , µ̂0 , µ̂1 , µ̂1 )
C
C
C
τ̂ ← µ̂1 − µ̂0
R
τ̂ R ← µ̂R
1 − µ̂0
return estimated CATE functions τ̂ C , τ̂ R

function EstimateTargetingFunction(D, ξ)
R
C
R
µ̂C
0 , µ̂0 , µ̂1 , µ̂1 ← EstimateResponseFunctions(D, ξ)
C
R
R
C
R
τ̂ , τ̂ ← EstimateCATE(µ̂C
0 , µ̂0 , µ̂1 , µ̂1 )
C
fˆ ← (1 − d)τ̂ R − (c + k)τ̂ C − [dµ̂R
0 + k µ̂0 ], plug estimated response and treatment eﬀect function into
theoretically optimal decision formula
return estimated targeting function fˆ

Algorithm 3: Hyperparameter optimization pseudocode

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

Input: D = {ri , ci , xi , ti }, dataset of revenue, conversion, covariates, and treatment assignment variables
observed in experiment;
Grid(ξ), grid values over distribution of hyperparameters (see Table 1);
I, number of grid values to search (set to 100 in our applications);
K, number of folds used for cross-validation (set to 10 in our applications);
Output: ξ ∗ , optimal set of hyperparameters to use for discount policy
Notation:
d, k, c, discount and marginal cost parameters;
Dk , subset of data in fold k;
D−k , subset of data excluding fold k;
function EstimateHyperparameters(D, Grid(ξ), I, K)
for iteration i ∈ [I] do
ξi ← random sample of parameters from Grid(ξ)
{Dk } ← randomly divide D into K-folds
stratiﬁed by treatment condition ti
for fold k ∈ [K] do
fˆ ← EstimateTargetingFunction(D−k , ξ)
(
)
∑
∑N
1{δf (xi )=t}
π̂k ← N1
(πi − V (ti ; xi ))
i=1 V (δf (xi ); xi ) +
t=0,1
Pr[ti =t]
π(ξi ) ←

1
K

∑

k

π̂k

ξ ∗ ← arg maxξi π(ξi )

average estimated counterfactual proﬁts across folds
returns hyperparameters with largest observed proﬁts
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